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s governments around the world have undertaken reforms to reduce the role of
the state in their economies in the past decade or so, they have confronted the
issue of precisely where to draw the line between public sector and private sector ac-
tivities. Egypt faces this question in regard to its wheat sector.
In 1987 Egypt partially liberalized wheat production and marketing, reducing
taxes on wheat production and allowing more private traders to participate in do-
mestic wheat markets. These steps have led to greater wheat and flour production.
Still, the government remains involved in wheat trading and processing, a situation
that creates a number of inefficiencies. Private sector traders have been limited to
small-scale activity. And although a universal consumer subsidy on certain flour and
bread serves the poor (and everyone else), it is costly for the government.
This research report quantifies the effects of the 1987 reforms and presents pol-
icy alternatives that can help Egypt achieve its goals of protecting the poor and main-
taining stable wheat prices in ways that are more efficient and less costly. The gov-
ernment’s goal of wheat self-sufficiency is needlessly expensive, the authors argue.
Targeting subsidies to the poorest people instead of making them available to all
would free government funds and make markets more efficient. Flexible import tar-
iffs can help maintain stable wheat prices. Instead of participating in processing and
marketing wheat, this report shows, the Egyptian government would do better to fo-
cus on creating an environment in which private markets can thrive, and on invest-
ing in agricultural research and extension.
The findings of this report are generally applicable to many developing countries
that are concerned that market liberalization will hurt the poor by leading to higher
and less stable prices and should be of great interest to researchers and policymak-
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S
ince 1987, as part of a general shift toward a more market-oriented economy,
Egypt’s wheat sector has been partially liberalized, primarily in production and
trade. The main objectives of this study are twofold: to analyze the structure and per-
formance of the Egyptian wheat sector following the agricultural market reforms ini-
tiated in 1987, and to present the economywide impacts of alternative policy options
that may be considered for future reforms in the Egyptian wheat sector. The study
uses various types of analysis, including a descriptive and econometric analysis of
cross-section data from market surveys, a time-series investigation of price behav-
ior, and a computable general equilibrium model of Egypt’s wheat economy. The
study findings can be summarized as follows:
• In the period before reforms, wheat producer prices were heavily taxed,
whereas the prices received by Egyptian farmers after reforms are approxi-
mately at international levels. The introduction of higher-yielding wheat va-
rieties and the resulting improved profitability of wheat relative to competing
crops raised local wheat production significantly. The self-sufficiency rate in-
creased from 21 percent in 1986 to 47 percent in 1996. Furthermore, the quan-
tity of domestic wheat procured by the government for its subsidy program
for baladi flour (a coarse flour made by extracting 82 percent of wheat grain)
and bread has increased from less than 0.1 million metric tons in 1986 to 1.8
million metric tons in 1998.
• The reforms in the wheat sector have promoted the participation of private
traders in the domestic wheat marketing system, resulting in a more open and
competitive trading environment. This has contributed to stabilizing wheat
market prices and improving market integration.
• The liberalization of the more-refined fino flour (made by extracting 72 per-
cent of wheat grain) market has induced new private investments in wheat
milling, greater domestic production of flour, and a noticeable reduction in
fino flour prices, to the benefit of consumers.
Despite these changes, the performance of the wheat marketing sector in Egypt
is limited by the current design of the universal consumer subsidy on baladi flour
and bread and by the continued involvement of the public sector in wheat trading and
xi
Summaryprocessing. More specifically, although many new private traders have entered the
wheat sector, expansion of private sector activities beyond small-scale trading has
been more limited. Despite the absence of severe infrastructural deficiencies—such
as access to transport, storage, or information—market integration in Egypt is still
low compared with other developing economies. The milling sector suffers from un-
equal competition between the public and private sectors, resulting in overcapacity
buildup, the cost of which is being borne by the private sector. Continued state in-
volvement in wheat milling is also delaying the transformation of many old and small
mills into processing facilities that are more efficient and cost-effective and that can
benefit from economies of scale.
The general equilibrium analysis of this study evaluates the economywide im-
pacts of several policy options that the government may wish to implement in the
wheat sector. The results are as follows:
• Wheat self-sufficiency is often cited as a goal of Egyptian wheat policy.
Achieving this goal through price policy would be costly and would distort
the efficient allocation of resources.
• If the government wishes to reduce the costs of the consumer subsidy on
baladi flour and bread, while protecting the poor, two alternative options can
be considered. One is to target the subsidy to the poorest groups. The other is
to eliminate the subsidy and compensate the poor through cash or alternative
safety nets. Both measures would lead to substantial cost savings, although
the administrative costs and feasibility of the options would have to be con-
sidered. The main advantage of these two options is that they would allow full
liberalization of the wheat marketing sector, which would raise economic
efficiency.
• The government may be interested in reducing the impact of international
price instability on domestic wheat prices, especially once the consumer sub-
sidy on wheat flour and bread is eliminated. A feasible and market-friendly
option is to use a flexible import tariff that keeps the border price at a target
level.
Four main policy implications can be derived for Egypt on the basis of the above
findings:
• The goal of increasing wheat self-sufficiency and delivery of domestic wheat
to the government using price policy would be expensive and ill-advised.
Egypt’s wheat production would benefit more from public investment in agri-
cultural research, extension, and market information—all of which could
boost yields and productivity.
• Targeting the consumer subsidy for baladi bread and flour to the poorest
households would not only reduce subsidy costs and free government re-
sources for more productive uses, it would also liberalize the wheat market-
ing sector with high potential for efficiency gains.
• Domestic price stability in the face of international fluctuations in wheat
prices can be achieved with less distortionary measures than fixed consumer
or producer prices by using a flexible import tariff regime.
xii• The public sector should shift its resources from wheat marketing and pro-
cessing activities (which can be more effectively conducted by the private sec-
tor) toward more supportive activities, such as providing rules and regulations
regarding market conduct, a system of commodity grading and standards, and
policies to foster the development of rural credit organizations for small farm-
ers and traders.
The findings and policy implications of this study can be used to draw lessons for
other developing countries undergoing similar types of reforms. In particular, this
study has shown that concern that market liberalization may lead to domestic price
instability and higher consumer prices is not warranted. Egypt’s experience indicates
that participation of the private sector in marketing activities leads to more stable and
integrated markets and lower retail prices for wheat. Partial liberalization, in con-
trast, dampens the potential investment response of the private sector and leads to
leakage of the controlled commodity into the free market. Furthermore, when the ob-
jective of a commodity policy is to protect consumers, targeting the subsidy directly
to the beneficiaries is more efficient than controlling the entire marketing channel.
Finally, the goal of attaining self-sufficiency is expensive and unnecessary, given the
increasing world trend toward globalization and reliance on international markets.
Governments are advised to shift their resources from production and marketing
activities that can be conducted more efficiently by the private sector toward more
public-good activities, such as conducting research; offering extension services; pro-
viding public market information; investing in roads and communication infrastruc-





n response to a stagnating agricultural sector and unsustainable levels of food im-
ports projected for the future, the government of Egypt embarked on a series of
agricultural reforms in 1987. The main objective of the reforms was to convert
Egypt’s agriculture from a state-dominated into a more market-oriented sector. The
government began the program by liberalizing prices, removing production controls,
and introducing market forces into the provision of agricultural goods and services.
In the wheat subsector, the reforms helped to boost domestic wheat production and
wheat marketing by the private sector. The transition toward a fully liberalized sys-
tem of wheat marketing is not complete and will require further changes in govern-
ment policies.
Because of its importance in the Egyptian diet, wheat is considered a strategic
commodity in the country. It provides more than one-third of the daily caloric intake
of Egyptian consumers and 45 percent of their total daily protein consumption
(Rowntree 1993; Rosen 1993; Abdel Ghaffar 1994). Wheat is mainly consumed in
the form of bread. It is also the major staple crop produced in Egypt, occupying about
32.6 percent of the total winter crop area. One dilemma that the government faces is
how to move to a private wheat marketing system without jeopardizing food secu-
rity for low-income groups.
This study has two main objectives: to analyze the structure and performance of
the wheat sector following the market liberalization programs initiated in 1987, and
to explore the economywide effects of changes in three areas that are critical to wheat
policy—consumer subsidies on bread and flour, producer subsidies aimed at raising
self-sufficiency, and responses of the domestic economy to changes in international
wheat prices.
The contributions of this report to the existing literature are manifold. While the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has devoted many years to an-




1 See Farrar (2000) for a review of this research as well as reports and papers by Alderman, von Braun, and Sakr
(1982); Scobie (1981); von Braun and de Haen (1983); Alderman and von Braun (1984, 1986); and Ahmed et al.
(1999a).depth look at its agricultural marketing system. This report complements current re-
search at IFPRI on the subsidy program for wheat flour and bread in Egypt by pre-
senting a comprehensive analysis of the systems for producing and marketing wheat.
It builds on previous papers by El Aamir and Siam (1996), Harrison (1996), and
Khedr, Erich, and Fletcher (1996). These authors qualitatively investigate the re-
sponse of the wheat sector to the reforms in Egypt. Using primary survey data col-
lected from 1996 to 1998, this report provides information on the impact of the most
recent changes in wheat policy on production, processing, trading, and price behav-
ior. It also gives new results from an economywide model designed to simulate al-
ternative wheat policy scenarios that have not been investigated in the past. The find-
ings of this research could be useful to both Egyptian policymakers and development
researchers by offering additional knowledge that could be used to design future pol-
icy changes in Egypt.
The study’s research activities are divided into several tasks that are organized by
chapter. The following chapter reviews the wheat policy environment in Egypt.
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, evaluate the response of wheat farmers and traders to
the reforms in Egypt’s economy. In Chapter 5, the behavior and adjustment of local
wheat prices are examined. Chapter 6 analyzes the structure and performance of the
wheat milling sector. In Chapter 7, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
is used to simulate the economywide effects of alternative wheat policy scenarios.
The last chapter concludes the study and summarizes its main policy implications.
2CHAPTER 2
Evolution of Wheat Policy in Egypt
T
he contemporary involvement of the government in the wheat sector started as
early as the 1940s.2 Before World War II, farmers were free to produce and sell
their crops to private retail traders or wholesalers. Wholesalers in turn sold wheat
grain to private mills. From the mills, wheat flour was sold to bakeries or consumers
at market prices. In 1940, a large decline in wheat prices caused by an excess sup-
ply of wheat discouraged farmers from planting wheat. Poor harvests, high wheat
prices, and subsequent protest strikes in 1941 induced the government to impose
retail-price controls on wheat flour and bread, and to pass a decree mandating that
wheat be planted on 50 percent of agricultural land holdings (Scobie 1981). Table 1
summarizes the evolution of the wheat policies implemented by the Egyptian gov-
ernment from 1941 to the present.
In the period from 1945 to 1955, the government slowly began to tighten its con-
trol over the production and trading of wheat. The government’s stated goal was to
promote the equitable distribution of food and income in Egypt. However, it is also
likely that the government’s underlying objective was to finance industrial growth
through the provision of inexpensive food to urban consumers (Farrar 2000). Rever-
sals in policy were common during the period. For example, by 1955 the government
had reduced the area allocation requirement for wheat production to 33 percent of
farmland. At the same time, the government imposed a compulsory delivery policy,
whereby each farmer had to sell a specific quota of wheat (between 1 and 3 ardeb
per feddan3) at a fixed price that was lower than international prices (Scobie 1981).
Any surplus exceeding the quota was available for the farmer to use in home con-
sumption or for local retail sale at market prices.
In the early 1960s, agricultural cooperatives were created in each village to con-
trol production and marketing of major crops, including wheat. Cooperatives pro-
vided agricultural inputs to farmers, imposed crop rotation schedules and crop area
3
CHAPTER 2
Evolution of  Wheat Policy in Egypt
2 For a detailed history of wheat policy in Egypt, see Scobie (1981).
3 An ardeb of wheat is equivalent to 150 kilograms, and 1 feddan is equivalent to 0.42 hectares.allocations, bought the delivery quota of crops under the compulsory system at fixed
prices, and marketed the crops (Hansen and Nashashibi 1975; Rowntree 1993;
Moursi 1993). Transport of wheat between governorates was prohibited without per-
mission from the Ministry of Supply.
In the early 1970s, the percentage of land allocated to wheat was further reduced
to 27.5 percent, but the delivery procurement system persisted. In 1976, the Princi-
pal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) was created and worked
along with the cooperatives in providing credit to farmers and receiving their output
quota. From 1976 to 1984, compulsory delivery was replaced by an optional deliv-
ery program, whereby farmers could voluntarily sell their wheat to the government
at a fixed procurement price. In 1985, however, compulsory delivery was reinstated
and maintained until the implementation of the Agricultural Reform Program in
1987.
With the food subsidy system in place and heavy control over wheat production
and marketing, the government became the major marketing channel for wheat grain,
flour, and bread. The extent of government involvement reached its peak in fiscal
year 1980/81, when the real cost (in 1987 constant prices) of the subsidy of wheat
4
Table 1—Evolution of government intervention in the wheat sector, various
years, 1941–96
Approximate
year Main government policy changes in the wheat sector
1941 Fifty percent of all agricultural land holdings are allocated to wheat production.
Consumer prices of all types of bread and flour are subsidized.
1955 Allocation of wheat area is reduced to 33 percent of all agricultural land holdings.
Delivery of wheat quota is made compulsory at fixed prices.
1970 Allocation of wheat area is reduced to 27.5 percent of all agricultural land holdings.
Government begins controlling marketing, distribution, and imports.
1976 Compulsory delivery is replaced with an optional delivery program.
1985 Compulsory delivery is reinstated.
1987 Mandatory area allocations and delivery quotas are abolished.
Optional delivery at guaranteed floor prices is introduced.
1992 The private sector is allowed to import, produce, and trade fino flour.
The subsidy on fino flour and bread is eliminated.
1993 All restrictions on marketing fino flour are eliminated.
Mills are not allowed to produce more than one type of flour.
1996 Private and public millers that produce fino flour are required to use imported wheat.
Production of shami flour and bread is stopped.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Note: Egypt has three main categories of bread: baladi, a coarse bread made from baladi flour, which
is produced by extracting 82 percent of wheat grain; shami, made of shami flour, which is
produced by extracting 76 percent of wheat grain; and fino, a fine bread made from fino flour,
produced by extracting 72 percent of wheat grain.grain and flour increased to 2.58 billion Egyptian pounds (£E),4 absorbing around
11.6 percent of government expenditure (Figure 1).5Real subsidy costs declined dur-
ing the mid- to late 1980s and reached their lowest levels (£E236 million) in 1987/88.
In the 1990s, real subsidy costs increased slightly compared with 1987/88 but re-
mained much lower than their levels in the mid-1970s or early 1980s.The subsidy
costs for wheat flour and bread rose to £E862 million in real terms (£E2.5 billion in
current prices) mainly because of the rise in international wheat prices to more than
US$200 per metric ton in 1996.6 This corresponded to approximately 68 percent of
the total food subsidy cost and 7.56 percent of total government expenditure.
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Figure 1—Real subsidy costs for wheat bread and flour, and the current
international wheat price, 1971–96
Sources: The source for subsidy costs for 1971–74 is Alderman, von Braun, and Sakr 1982; for 1975–93,
FAO 1995; and for 1996, MOTS 1997. Real subsidy costs are calculated by deflating subsidy costs in
current prices by the 1987 consumer price index. The price of wheat is the U.S. export price for wheat
(U.S. hard red wheat no. 1, FOB gulf port), from IMF 1996.
4 The annual official exchange rate for the Egyptian pound is shown in Table 68, Appendix 1. The official exchange
rate was £E2.03 for each U.S. dollar in 1987, and £E3.39 for each U.S. dollar in 1997.
5 According to Abdel Rahman (1997), food subsidy costs are usually calculated by subtracting the total value of the
sale of the commodity from the total costs of supplying the commodity (including administrative costs).
6 Other sources, such as Ali et al. (1997), report a wheat- and bread-subsidy cost of £E1.9 billion for fiscal year
1995/96. For many variables, especially those related to prices and values, figures from the statistical offices of var-
ious Egyptian ministries such as the Ministry of Trade and Supply, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclama-
tion, and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics are not always consistent. In these cases the num-
bers reported are checked against nongovernmental sources or other published papers.The subsidy system and government intervention in production and marketing
created many inefficiencies and imposed a heavy burden on the budget and foreign
exchange reserves. The inefficiencies included delivery quotas and area allocation
requirements that distorted choices among competing crops, an overvalued exchange
rate and artificially low wheat producer prices that suppressed wheat production, and
a complicated and costly collection and distribution system for both wheat grain and
wheat flour. In the mid-1980s, the widening food gap, stagnation of the agricultural
sector, and the rising costs of the food subsidy system encouraged the Egyptian gov-
ernment to reform the wheat sector. Therefore, supported by the U.S. government
and multilateral donor organizations, the government of Egypt in 1987 embarked on
a series of agricultural market reforms that included the liberalization of many pro-
duction and marketing controls.
The Agricultural Reform Program initiated in 1987 was designed to help the gov-
ernment realize its main policy objectives in the agricultural sector, namely (1) to
provide an adequate supply of food to all income groups, (2) to promote greater self-
sufficiency in crop production, (3) to increase farm income, (4) to conserve foreign
exchange, and (5) to bring the budget deficit under control (Rosen 1993). The pro-
gram consisted of two phases. In the first phase, prices, quotas, and marketing con-
trols were partially liberalized for 10 crops. Import subsidies were also reduced, and
markets were opened to private investment.
With respect to wheat, area restrictions and quota deliveries were eliminated in
1987. The government replaced the compulsory delivery program (reinstated in
1985) with an optional program. Moreover, rather than determining the procurement
price at the harvest period, the procurement price was replaced by a floor price that
was announced before the planting season to encourage farmers to plant wheat.
Finally, the Ministry of Supply established a more liberal framework for the trading
of wheat grain and wheat flour.
The second phase of the reform coincided with the launching of the Economic
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program in 1991. With the assistance of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and international lenders, this program
sought to shift Egypt from a state-controlled economy into a more-efficient, market-
oriented economy where the private sector could play a major role. Building on the
earlier program, phase II of the Agricultural Reform Program liberalized the pro-
duction and marketing of all remaining crops, principally rice and cotton. It also
eliminated all remaining input subsidies and encouraged the private sector to play a
greater role in agricultural trading.
General Structure of the Wheat Industry
Understanding the current structure of the wheat industry in Egypt is helpful in un-
derstanding the changes that occurred in the wheat sector following the reforms. Fig-
ure 2 outlines the structure and marketing channels of the wheat sector. As shown in
this flowchart, there are two main sources of wheat in Egypt: domestic production
and imports. In 1996, the country’s wheat supply stood at about 12 million metric
6tons, about half of which was imported. Domestic wheat is mainly consumed in ru-
ral areas. Rural households process the wheat into different types of flour in local
village mills and use the flour to bake their own bread. About 1 to 2 million metric
tons of domestic wheat is also sold annually by farmers or traders to the government.
The government collects the wheat through cooperatives, local branches of PBDAC,
and public mills. This wheat is transformed by the public mills or contracted private
mills into baladi (82 percent) flour. Baladi flour is either sold directly to consumers
or is processed to make baladi bread, a coarse and dark-grained type of pita bread.
Baladi flour and bread are sold at subsidized prices to consumers in government-
licensed warehouses and bakeries. The warehouses and the bakeries purchase the
flour from the government at discounted fixed prices and are expected in turn to sell
the flour or bread at subsidized prices set by the government.
Given the insufficient levels of domestic wheat procured, the government mainly
relies on imported wheat to supply its baladi flour and bread subsidy program. The
General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) is the public organization re-
sponsible for importing and procuring domestic wheat for the government. In 1996,
about 4.6 million metric tons of imported wheat were purchased by the GASC for
the production of baladi flour and bread.
Another important segment of the wheat industry in Egypt is the fino flour mar-
ket. This flour is of higher quality than baladi flour and is sold at free market prices.
7
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Notes: PBDAC = Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit; GASC = General Authority for
Supply Commodities; HCRWM = Holding Company for Rice and Wheat Mills; and FIHC = Food Indus-
tries Holding Company.
a PBDAC and the public mills collect the wheat from farmers and traders on behalf of GASC, which allo-
cates fund to each of these institutions to pay the procurement price to farmers and traders.It is used to make French breads, higher-quality pita bread, and pastries. The fino
flour market was liberalized in 1992. This involved allowing the private sector to pur-
chase wheat and process it into fino flour, as well as selling the flour at free-market
prices. However, shortly after liberalization, the government issued a decree allow-
ing only imported wheat to be used for the processing of fino flour. The private sec-
tor is still not permitted to import wheat and sell it as grain. (Policy changes in the
fino flour market are discussed in more detail later in this report.) Until 1996, 76 per-
cent wheat (shami) flour was also produced and sold at subsidized prices by the gov-
ernment. However, its production was banned in 1996 because of its easy sifting into
the free-marketed fino flour that was sold at higher prices.
Although the government controls the baladi flour subsector, it also contracts
with the private sector to help in its processing and distribution. In contrast, both the
private and the public sectors compete in the processing and marketing of fino flour.
Since the liberalization of the fino flour market, the private sector has built several
large industrial mills to process and market this type of flour. As will be discussed
further in Chapter 6, the public mills were reorganized in 1996 into two public hold-
ing companies: the Holding Company for Rice and Wheat Mills (HCRWM) and the
Food Industries Holding Company (FIHC). Although both of these companies have
sold parts of their subcompanies’shares to the private sector, they are still managed
by the government as public organizations.
Agricultural Market Reforms and Changes in Wheat Prices
and Consumption
As indicated in Table 2, the reforms initiated in 1987 led to an increase in the net
nominal protection coefficient7 from an average of 0.68 in the prereform period
(1971–87) to an average of 1.05 after reform (1988–95). This indicates that, while
in the past farmers incurred a 32 percent tax on their output prices, they now received
market prices that were almost equivalent to world prices. Similarly, the difference
between market and procurement prices declined significantly in the postreform pe-
riod. Table 2 shows that, in 1995, market prices were only 6 percent higher than pro-
curement prices, compared with 37 percent just before the reform period. Procure-
ment prices for wheat increased from £E167 per metric ton in 1987 to £E600 per
metric ton in 1995, while market prices increased from £E229 per metric ton to
£E636 per metric ton, respectively.
Starting in 1996, however, domestic wheat prices have diverged from trends in
world wheat prices. The domestic procurement price remained at £E633 per metric
ton in 1997—the same price support level set in 1996, despite the substantial drop
8
7 The net nominal protection coefficient (NPC) is a measure of price taxation (or subsidization) of prices. It is de-
fined as the domestic price divided by the border price of wheat. An NPC of greater than one indicates that pro-
ducers are receiving higher prices than they would otherwise, while an NPC smaller than one indicates that producers
are being discriminated against (Tsakok 1990).9
Table 2—Procurement, market, farmgate, and border wheat prices by fiscal
year, 1970–95
Procurement Net nominal 
Procurement Market Farmgate Border price over average protection
Year price price price price wheat export price coefficient
(Egyptian pounds per ton)
1970 34 39 38 28 n.a. n.a.
1971 33 35 35 35 0.63 0.95
1972 33 35 35 35 0.49 0.95
1973 34 38 37 42 0.37 0.86
1974 43 47 46 109 0.43 0.41
1975 49 51 51 85 0.45 0.57
1976 48 47 47 72 0.60 0.62
1977 50 54 54 60 0.64 0.86
1978 52 61 61 65 0.62 0.89
1979 65 64 64 144 0.60 0.42
1980 78 88 87 163 0.58 0.51
1981 80 92 91 185 0.47 0.47
1982 80 82 82 189 0.54 0.41
1983 93 110 109 198 0.67 0.53
1984 120 124 127 216 0.61 0.55
1985 120 172 168 236 0.54 0.69
1986 120 231 225 244 0.76 0.90
1987 167 229 223 233 0.90 0.94
1988 233 459 467 331 0.98 1.32
1989 400 528 533 445 1.18 1.13
1990 467 531 540 402 1.27 1.26
1991 467 568 550 547 0.93 0.99
1992 500 569 527 558 1.05 0.97
1993 500 570 556 572 1.15 0.95
1994 567 574 533 581 1.13 0.94
1995 600 636 565 704 n.a. 0.86
Sources: Procurement priceis defined as the fixed price at which the Government of Egypt would purchase
the wheat (quota) from the farmer. The source for 1970–85 is Dethier (1989); for 1986–95, MOTS
(1997). Market price is defined as the average annual free market price for an indicative market.
The source for 1970–85 is Dethier (1989); for 1986–95, USDA, Attache Report: Grain and Feed
Annual, various years. The farmgate price is defined as the average wheat price received by the
farmer at the farm gate. The source for 1970–85 is Dethier (1989); for 1986–95, USDA Agricul-
tural Situation Annual, various issues. The source for the border price for 1970–78 is Dethier
(1989); for 1979–95, the price is computed as the sum of average wheat export price and freight
rate (IGC, various issues) multiplied by the black market exchange rate (International Currency
Analysis, Inc., World Currency Yearbook, various issues). The net nominal protection coefficient
is computed as the ratio of the market price over the sum of the border price and a 5 percent mar-
keting margin.
Note: n.a. indicates not available.in the international price of wheat from a high of US$262 per metric ton in May 1996
(equivalent to £E888 per metric ton) to US$126 per metric ton (£E427 per metric
ton) by the end of May 1998 (IGC, various issues). This may be part of the govern-
ment’s continued effort to stimulate the production of domestic wheat, but it may
also be caused by the political difficulty in reducing the support price to levels lower
than in the preceding years.
In the postreform period, the prices of baladi flour and bread set by the govern-
ment were also gradually increased. Baladiflour prices are usually set at a lower rate
for bakeries than for warehouses. By 1996, the price of baladi flour had reached
£E290 per metric ton to bakeries and £E500 per metric ton to warehouses. On the re-
tail side, the government increased the price of baladi bread from £E0.02 per loaf in
1988 to £E0.05 per loaf in 1989, where it has remained until the year 2000, despite
significant increases in overall prices.
Bread prices rose in 1988, and finoprices were liberalized in 1992. However, con-
sumption of wheat grain and flour continued to grow throughout the 1990s, except
for 1991 and 1992, which were characterized by a general economic slump in the
country (Figure 3). In 1996, average per capita consumption of wheat grain and flour
was around 200 kilograms per year, constituting one of the highest levels of per capita
wheat consumption in the world.
10










Imports of wheat grain and flour
Consumption of wheat grain and flour
Year
Figure 3—Consumption and imports of wheat grain and flour (in wheat
equivalents), 1960–96
Sources: For the data on domestic wheat production, FAO (1997); for the data on wheat grain and flour im-
ports, 1960–80, FAO (1997); for 1981–84, MOTS (1996b); for 1985–95, CAPMAS (1996a); and for 1996,
USDA (1997). For the data on net change in wheat stocks, 1960–75, FAO (1981), for 1976–84, FAO
(1995); for 1985–95, CAPMAS (1996a); and for 1996, USDA (1997).
Note: Total consumption is computed on the basis of domestic wheat grain production, wheat grain and
flour imports, and net change in stocks.The positive consumption trend of wheat flour and bread (especially the con-
sumption of the heavily subsidized baladi bread) is due to several factors. First is the
continued high population growth rate of more than 2 percent per year. Second, the
baladi bread retail price is subsidized to the extent that it covers only one-third of its
average unit cost of production, making it the cheapest source of calories compared
with other food items (Ali and Adams 1996). Third, in the past few years, a general
decline in purchasing power has occurred that has induced a substitution to subsi-
dized bread from other more expensive food items (USDA 1995). Finally, low bread
prices relative to animal feed prices have encouraged farmers to use bread as feed for
livestock and poultry. In 1995, the wheat grain equivalent of subsidized baladi bread
was about £E418 per metric ton. The farmgate price of maize, the most commonly
used feed grain, was about £E512 per metric ton. Alderman and von Braun (1984)
estimated that in 1981/82, about 4 to 7 percent of baladi bread purchases were fed
to animals. More recent estimates by Kherallah, Minot, and Gruhn (1999b) suggest
that in 1998 about 7 to 8 percent of the baladi bread purchased by Egyptian wheat
farmers was used as animal feed.
Agricultural Market Reforms and Changes in Wheat Area,
Production, and Yields
In general, the agricultural reforms initiated in 1987 had a positive impact on wheat
production. From 1986 to 1996, the wheat area planted doubled, yields increased by
48 percent, and wheat production almost tripled. These results are attributed to sev-
eral factors, including
• higher relative wheat prices
• the increased profitability of wheat-based rotation
• the adoption of higher-yielding seed varieties that are also more resistant to
heat, drought, and salinity
• the implementation of more productive cultural practices
• a more liberal policy environment, which allowed farmers to base their crop
planting decisions on market forces and provided them with an incentive to
adopt modern technology
All these factors reinforced each other in making investment in wheat production a
more attractive and lucrative enterprise.
The resulting rise in wheat production also led to a significant improvement in
the wheat self-sufficiency ratio8 from 21 percent in 1986 to 47 percent in 1996.
Owing to a continued increase in demand, however, higher production has only kept
pace with the growth in consumption, requiring the import of 6 to 7 million metric
tons of wheat per year. Although the government revises its wheat self-sufficiency
target yearly, its goal is to maximize the share of domestic production in total wheat
11
8 The self-sufficiency ratio is defined as the percentage ratio of domestic production over both domestic and im-
ported wheat supply.consumption. This goal is fueled by concerns over requirements for balance of pay-
ment and foreign exchange and by political and strategic considerations given the
importance of wheat in Egypt’s food security.
Agricultural Market Reforms and Changes in Wheat
Marketing and Milling
The partial liberalization of the wheat trading sector started in 1992 in the fino flour
market. Until then, the government had maintained a monopoly over the importation
of all types of wheat grain and flour. In 1992, the government freed the prices of fino
flour and fino bread and allowed the private sector to import wheat for the produc-
tion of fino flour. Resale of wheat in excess of the milling needs for fino flour was
not permitted. The government also allowed private traders to import fino flour di-
rectly. In 1993, all the remaining restrictions on fino flour production and trading
were removed, allowing both the public and private sectors to freely import, produce,
distribute, and sell fino flour at free market prices. The quotas of government-milled
fino flour going to food processing factories, shops, and bakeries were also elimi-
nated, thus allowing these outlets to purchase their fino flour freely in the market.
All restrictions on the exchange, sale, and transport of wheat bran and germ were
canceled in 1992 as well. However, the government retained control over bran
prices. The large difference between private and public prices for bran created a
strong incentive for illegal arbitrage. In 1994, the government reinstated control
over bran resulting from baladi flour production, allowing only its sale to feed fac-
tories and to livestock and poultry producers for animal feed. In 1997/98, as a re-
sult of the increasing supply of fino flour, market bran prices declined to the
government-specified price of £E400 per metric ton. This has diminished the in-
centive for illegal trading.
In 1992, the government also began to liberalize the wheat milling sector. At that
time, around 80 percent of all industrial wheat mills in the country belonged to the
public sector; the rest were privately owned but were licensed to mill for the gov-
ernment under specific arrangements. Furthermore, during this period only the pub-
lic sector was equipped with mills capable of generating fino flour; the private sec-
tor was forced to contract with these mills to process its flour. Owing to the high fees
that the public milling companies were charging and the relative profitability of
milling wheat, the private sector started to build its own storage and milling facili-
ties in 1996.
By the end of 1997, nine new private mills had started producing fino flour. Cou-
pled with the flour produced by the public sector, this created an excess supply in the
market and reduced flour imports to less than 100,000 metric tons in 1997. (See
Chapter 6 for further discussion on excess capacity in the milling sector and the con-
tribution of the private and public sectors to fino flour production.) The new chal-
lenge facing the milling industry is how to tackle the buildup of overcapacity, which
is pushing fino flour prices down and forcing some of the new mills to operate at 50
percent capacity (USDA 1997, 1998).
12More Recent Policy Changes
Because of the high price differential between the two types of flour, there is an in-
centive to divert subsidized baladi flour for the production of the free-marketed fino
flour. Therefore, to reduce leakage, a decree was introduced in 1993 forbidding fino
flour mills from producing any other type of flour. According to Ahmed et al.
(1999a), in 1997, estimated national average leakage of baladiflour was still at about
28 percent of total supply.
Given its desire to minimize wheat import costs and because of low levels of do-
mestically procured wheat for baladi flour production, the government announced
in 1996 that fino flour could be produced only from imported wheat. Police en-
forcement was stepped up to detect any attempts to use domestic wheat for the pro-
duction of fino flour, and the production of subsidized shami flour was canceled be-
cause of its easy and profitable transformation into fino flour. In response to these
new restrictions and pressures to deliver an expected quota of wheat to the govern-
ment, some local officials have illegally imposed restrictions on the transportation of
wheat outside of their governorates to try to force increased delivery of domestic
wheat after the harvest season.
In another attempt to decrease Egypt’s dependence on imported wheat, to capi-
talize on the domestic production of white maize (about 5.5 million metric tons per
year), and to reduce the costs of the subsidy for baladi bread and flour (since white
maize tends to be cheaper than wheat), the Ministry of Trade and Supply (MOTS)
introduced an initiative to mix 80 percent baladi flour with 20 percent white-maize
flour to make subsidized baladi bread and flour. This new bread is sold at the same
subsidized price of £E0.05 per loaf and has almost the same taste as the regular bal-
adi bread. The initiative was implemented in 1996 on a pilot basis in a few bakeries
in Cairo, and MOTS is planning to extend the program on a larger scale. The main
constraint to this extension is the low level of domestic procurement of white maize;
most domestic maize is used by rural households for home consumption as animal
feed. In 1997, the government was able to procure only about 140,000 metric tons
of white maize for the new mix. Consequently, the government is counting on in-
creasing maize yields, which are currently below potential and appear more promis-
ing than increasing wheat yields. The government is also promoting the delivery of
farmers’marketable surplus of white maize.9Procurement experience with wheat in-
dicates, however, that the government is unlikely to be able to obtain enough do-
mestic white maize to extend this initiative nationwide.
Conclusion
The Egyptian reforms to local wheat production and the fino flour market have re-
sulted in significant changes in the wheat sector. Farmers are receiving higher rela-
13
9 According to Al Akhbar (1998), the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation announced that the govern-
ment was expecting to obtain 1 million metric tons of white maize from local farmers in 1998.tive prices for wheat, have more outlets to sell their products, and have more of an
incentive to invest in yield-increasing modern varieties and other agricultural tech-
nologies. The reforms have also encouraged private sector participation in the pro-
duction and marketing of wheat flour. Despite these changes, the government is still
heavily involved in the wheat sector and several restrictions are still in place. The
next four chapters investigate the impact of the reforms on wheat production, mar-
keting, price behavior, and processing
14CHAPTER 3
Adjustment of Wheat Production to
Market Reform in Egypt
T
his chapter analyzes the results of a survey of 800 wheat farmers to answer three
questions.10 First, what are the patterns in wheat production and marketing that
have emerged following the economic reforms? National statistics document the
growth in area and yield, but this study provides a more detailed picture of the char-
acteristics of wheat farmers, the role of wheat in farmer rotations, patterns in input
use, costs of production, and food consumption patterns. Second, why is the gov-
ernment unable to purchase more than a small portion of national wheat production?
The government is particularly interested in understanding wheat usage and mar-
keting patterns to determine why it has been unable to increase procurement of do-
mestic wheat for the production of baladi flour and bread. Third, how does wheat
supply and input demand respond to wheat and input prices? These parameters are
necessary ingredients for informed analysis of wheat policy in Egypt.
Survey Design
The Egypt Wheat Producers Survey (EWPS) was carried out in 1998 in 20 out of the
26 governorates in the country.11 The sample was designed to be representative of
farm households growing wheat in the 1997/98 season. It uses a four-stage stratified
random sample that relies, in part, on lists of wheat farming households prepared by
the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR).12
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10 Significant parts of this chapter were published in Kherallah, Minot, and Gruhn (1999a).
11 The governorates included in the EWPS survey were Alexandria, Qalubia, Kafr El-Sheikh, Gharbia, Menufia and
Beheira in the Western Delta; Damietta, Dakahlia, Sharkia, and Ismailia in the Eastern Delta; Giza, Fayum, Beni
Suef, and Minia in Middle Egypt; Assiut, Sohag, Qena, and Aswan in Upper Egypt; Matruh and New Valley in the
Frontier region; and the Nubaria region, which is not a governorate, but a new agricultural land region that crosses
several governorates.
12 Appendix 2 describes in more detail the four-stage, stratified, random-sampling method used.
CHAPTER 3
Adjustment of Wheat Production
to Market Reform in EgyptBecause each wheat farmer in Egypt did not have an equal probability of being
selected for the sample, weights were applied during data analysis. The weights (also
called expansion factors) are the inverse of the probability of selection. Thus, if wheat
farmers in a region were underrepresented in the sample, the weights compensate for
this by giving greater weight to these farms in the calculation of national averages
and percentages.
The survey used a 23-page, precoded questionnaire. The questionnaire is com-
posed of 16 sections: household member characteristics, household characteristics,
land-use and cropping patterns, crop production and sales, wheat usage, wheat
by-product use, wheat storage, wheat and bread consumption, labor use, inputs, own-
ership of farm assets, credit, ownership of consumer durables, sources of income,
sources of information, and farmer perceptions.
Basic Characteristics of Wheat Production
Characteristics and Income Sources of Wheat Farming Households
Analysis of the EWPS suggests that around 54 percent13 of household heads are lit-
erate, even though only 47 percent received any formal education. About 64 percent
of wheat farmers consider farming as their main activity; other primary activities in-
clude employment in the public and service sectors.
The value of consumer durables was used as a measure of wealth and thus a proxy
for the standard of living of the households. Average wealth and farm size were dis-
aggregated by wealth quintiles.14 Average wealth ranges from £E173 for the poor-
est households to £E18,226 for the wealthiest ones. This indicates a highly concen-
trated distribution of wealth, where 81 percent of all consumer durables are owned
by 20 percent of the wheat farm population. Farm size is also positively associated
with household wealth. Figure 4 indicates that wealth distribution differs by geo-
graphical region (see the definition of geographic regions and a map of Egypt in Ap-
pendix 3). Average household wealth is significantly higher in the Nubaria and Fron-
tier regions than in other regions.15 In the Nile Valley regions, average wealth is
higher in the Delta regions than in Middle and Upper Egypt.
The major sources of income for wheat farmers are crop sales and consumption
of home-produced crops. As Table 3 indicates, 97 percent of wheat farm households
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13 All the statistics reported in this chapter are weighted averages or percentages.
14 Each quintile groups 20 percent of the households, ranked by the value of their consumer durables. For example,
the first quintile represents the 20 percent of households with the smallest value of consumer durables, while the
fifth quintile is made up of the wealthiest 20 percent of the households.
15 Results from Nubaria and the Frontier should be interpreted with caution because of the small sample size: 30
households in Nubaria and 20 in the Frontier. The Nubaria and Frontier regions are characterized by large firms,
mostly on reclaimed land. A government program has reserved reclaimed land in Nubaria for university graduates
that participate in farm training classes. The graduates receive technical and financial help from the government to
manage the farms.17
Figure 4—Geographical distribution of wealth in Egypt












Table 3—Sources of income and income shares for wheat farmers
Share of households that receive
Income source this type of income Average income share
(percent) (percent of total income)
Agricultural wage income 17 4
Other wage income 45 12
Nonfarm self-employment 15 4
Crop sales 89 30
Home consumption of crops 97 25
Animal product sales 75 11






derive in-kind income from consumption of their own crops, while 89 percent of the
households receive income from crop sales. Income shares from crop sales and crop
home consumption are 30 and 25 percent, respectively. More than three-quarters of
the wheat farmers have income from livestock activities, but these activities account
for just 20 percent of income. Wages from nonagricultural activities provide 12 per-
cent of total income.Land Use and Crop Production
The vast majority of Egyptian wheat farms are small, irrigated, and owner-operated.
The average farm size is 1.7 hectares, but 50 percent cultivate less than 1.0 hectare
(Figure 5). About 10 percent of the households have more than 4 hectares. The largest
farms are found in Nubaria and the Frontier. If Nubaria and the Frontier governorates
are excluded, only 2.5 percent of the households would own more than 4 hectares,
which is consistent with MALR estimates (MALR 1998).
Irrigation is almost universal in Egyptian agriculture, allowing the cultivation of
summer and winter crops and a cropping intensity ratio of 1.9.16 More than three-
quarters of the land of wheat farmers is irrigated by pump from a canal. One excep-
tion to this pattern is that, in the Frontier, irrigation water comes from wells, both
private and public.
The survey also confirms that wheat plays an important role in farmers’crop ro-
tations. The most common winter–summer rotations are wheat–rice (20 percent of
the cultivated area), berseem (clover)–cotton (12 percent), wheat–maize (10 per-
cent), and berseem–maize (8 percent). Four-fifths of the wheat farmers in Egypt grow
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Figure 5—Distribution of wheat farms by farm size





















Farm size category (hectares)of all farming households) grow wheat in a given year, approximately 2 million
households grow wheat overall.17Interestingly, only 58 percent of the smallest wheat
farmers grow wheat every year, compared with 92 percent in the category of the
largest wheat farmers. The explanation appears to be that small farms have fewer
plots (just two on average), so it is more difficult to grow wheat every year and ro-
tate winter crops.
Wheat farmers devote one-half of their winter cropland (or slightly less than one-
quarter of their total sown area) to wheat (see Table 4). In terms of the value of pro-
duction, the most important crops grown by wheat farmers are cotton (24 percent of
the total), wheat (19 percent), and rice (15 percent). Cotton, fruits, and vegetables
account for a larger share of the value of production than of area because value per
hectare is higher than for staple foods.
The survey results also highlight the intensity of wheat production in Egypt. The
average wheat farmer harvests crops worth close to £E12,000, although this amount
varies considerably. About 23 percent produce less than £E3,000, while 9 percent of
them produce more than £E30,000 worth of crops. The average wheat farmer harvests
3.2 metric tons of wheat from 0.76 hectares of planted wheat, implying an average
yield of 4.3 metric tons per hectare. Similarly, the average yields among wheat farm-
ers are 7 metric tons per hectare for rice, and 4.8 metric tons per hectare for maize.
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Table 4—Measures of the importance of each crop to wheat farmers
Percent of Percent of Percent of value of
Crop households growing sown area crop production
Rice 40.3 12.3 15.3
Wheat 100.0 23.6 18.7
Maize 60.1 11.9 7.8
Sorghum 17.6 4.7 2.8
Fava beans 15.2 3.7  2.5
Other legumes 5.8 1.6  1.4
Tomatoes 3.9 1.8 3.0
Other vegetables 10.6 2.9  4.3
Fruit 5.9 2.0 3.4
Cotton 46.0 13.0 23.5
Berseem 76.5 16.8 11.6
Feed maize 10.7 1.5  0.6
Other crops 14.1 4.2 5.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: IFPRI/MALR-EWPS (1999).
17 This figure is estimated by adding the total number of farmers who grow wheat every year to twice the number
of those who grow wheat every two years, three times the number of farmers who grow wheat every three years, and
so on. This calculation adjusts for the undercounting of occasional wheat farmers in the sample.The estimated wheat yield of 4.3 metric tons per hectare would imply national
wheat production of 5.4 million metric tons, which is lower than the official figure
of 6.1 million metric tons in 1998. The reason for this discrepancy appears to be that
the official yield estimate (5.7 tons per hectare) is higher than the average estimated
from the EWPS data. Farmer recall (used in the EWPS) is not necessarily more ac-
curate than crop-cutting samples (used by the MALR), but the discrepancy is worth
further investigation. It may be that official numbers overestimate yields and do-
mestic production in Egypt. (See Abdel-Latif [1999] for a discussion of these issues.)
Finally, the survey indicates that Egyptian wheat farmers are highly commer-
cialized. The market surplus ratio18 is between 50 and 70 percent for the main food
grains: rice, wheat, maize, and sorghum. For legumes, fruits, and vegetables, 85–98
percent of the harvest is sold. Virtually all cotton (99 percent) is sold. This pattern is
not the result of just a few large producers, as shown by the high proportion of pro-
ducers that sell some of their output. Even for the basic grains (wheat, maize, and
sorghum), the proportion of growers that sell part of their crop is more than half. The
least-commercialized crops are berseem and feed maize, grown mainly for on-farm
use as animal feed.
The average value of crop sales is £E8,311 per wheat farm, although more than
half of wheat farmers sell less than £E4,000 worth of crops. At the other extreme,
roughly 5 percent of wheat farmers have annual crop sales of more than £E30,000.
Through comparison of the average value of sales to the average value of produc-
tion, 70 percent of the crop production of Egyptian wheat farmers was estimated to
be sold. Again, most households sell a smaller percentage of their harvest, but the
patterns of large farms tend to dominate the average. The market-surplus ratios are
highest in Nubaria and the Frontier, and are higher (on average) among large and
wealthy farmers.
Input Use
Seeds. Before the agricultural reforms of 1987, about 61 percent of the total cul-
tivated wheat area in Egypt was sown with low-yielding, long-stalked wheat vari-
eties (Sallam et al. 1989). Because the market price of wheat stalk (£E160 per met-
ric ton) was higher than the fixed price of wheat grain (£E120 per metric ton), farmers
preferred to sow traditional seed varieties that produced long stalks and large straw
(Harik 1996). With the liberalization of the wheat market and the introduction of im-
proved modern seed varieties, farmers started to adopt semidwarf varieties that were
both higher yielding and more resistant to heat and pests. By 1998, only 3 percent of
wheat farmers used traditional seed varieties.
On average, farmers apply about 162 kilograms of seed per hectare of land and
obtain 4.3 metric tons of wheat per hectare. As expected, traditional varieties are less
20
18 The market surplus ratios are calculated as the total volume of sales as a percentage of the total volume of pro-
duction. As a result, it is more influenced by the patterns of large producers than by those of small producers.expensive, have lower yields, and are typically sown by poorer farmers. Yields of
modern wheat varieties are about 15 percent higher. Although they are not major
wheat producing areas, yields in the Frontier and Nubaria are about 16 and 7 percent
higher than the national average, respectively. The ratio of wheat output to seed in-
put19suggests that wheat output from traditional varieties and older modern varieties
are generally lower than for the most modern varieties. The output–input ratio is sub-
stantially higher for the most modern varieties.
Nearly 55 percent of the farmers obtain their wheat seeds from cooperatives, and
about 14 percent purchase them from traders. A further 27 percent obtain their seeds
from either other farmers or from the previous years’ harvest. Cooperatives and
traders provide mainly modern varieties, while other farmers provide more than 85
percent of the traditional varieties purchased by farmers. Cash is the primary means
of payment; only 4 percent of farmers received seed on credit from their suppliers.
Farmers typically travel about 0.5 kilometers to purchase seeds, with cooperatives
usually being closer than traders and village banks. Seeds retail for about £E1.47 per
kilogram on average.
Fertilizers. Before 1987, the government controlled the distribution, marketing,
and pricing of fertilizers through PBDAC. The general subsidy on the distribution of
fertilizers was gradually reduced starting in 1988 and was completely phased out in
1992. In 1991, the government began to break up PBDAC’s monopoly on the distri-
bution of fertilizer by allowing the private sector to import and purchase domesti-
cally produced fertilizer. By 1992, the fertilizer market’s share of private sector
traders was more than 75 percent.
Wheat farmers rely principally on inorganic fertilizers and crop rotation to main-
tain the fertility of their wheat fields; use of manure is limited. According to the
EWPS, the three most widely used fertilizers by Egyptian wheat farmers are ammo-
nium nitrate, urea, and single super-phosphate. In the 1997/98 agricultural year,
nearly 100 percent of wheat farmers used some form of nitrogenous fertilizer, usu-
ally urea or ammonium nitrate, while 44 percent used single super-phosphate on their
wheat fields. Egypt has one of the highest application rates for nitrogenous fertilizer
in the world (390–450 kilograms per hectare).
About 45 percent of wheat farmers purchase their fertilizer from cooperatives,
and 41 percent from agricultural traders. Fertilizer prices vary between £E320 to
£E970 per metric ton, depending on the type of fertilizer. On average, farmers
travel about 0.5 kilometers to purchase fertilizers from a cooperative, and about 1
kilometer to make their purchases from an agricultural trader. As is the case for
seeds, cash is the primary means of payment for purchases of inorganic fertilizers.
About 92 percent of farmers purchased fertilizer in cash, 7 percent purchased it on
credit from suppliers, and only 1 percent obtained it through loans from a financial
institution.
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19 The ratio of output to input is computed by dividing the approximate wheat yield (kilograms per hectare) by the
average seed-application rate (kilograms per hectare).Labor
Unlike many other countries in the world, Egypt produces wheat labor-intensively.
On average, farmers use 79 person-days of labor on each hectare of wheat during the
growing season. Farm work is about evenly split between family labor (51 percent)
and hired labor (49 percent). The single most labor intensive activity is harvesting:
more than 23 person-days of labor are devoted to harvesting 1 hectare of wheat and
16 person-days to threshing.
Labor use varies with farm size. As shown in Table 5, households with small farms
use more labor per hectare, most of which is family labor. Large farms, by contrast,
use less labor per hectare, most of which is hired. They also hire more machinery.
Wage rates in wheat production are about £E8 to £E15 per day, depending on the ac-
tivity and the period of the year. Almost all farmers pay their hired labor in cash.
Agricultural Machinery
Shortages of family labor and high wage rates for hired labor during peak periods
have been an impetus for the mechanization of Egyptian agriculture (Khan 1993).
Virtually all wheat farmers (99 percent) use tractors, albeit for an average of just
three-quarters of a day over the wheat season. Despite high usage in wheat farming,
tractors are owned by only 14 percent of wheat farmers; the remainder rent. Wealth-
ier and larger farmers are more likely to own a tractor than poorer households. On
average, the daily rental rate for a tractor is £E116. Although 93 percent of wheat
farmers use pumps to irrigate their wheat fields, only 58 percent own a water pump.
The remainder rent pumps primarily from friends and neighbors.
Credit
According to the EWPS, few wheat farmers are able to purchase inputs on credit.
Cash transactions account for 92 percent of fertilizer purchases, 95 percent of seed
purchases, and 98 percent of the purchases of agricultural chemicals. On the other
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Table 5—Labor usage in wheat production by labor type and total
area category
Farm size quintile
Type of labor Smallest 2 3 4 Largest Overall
(person-days per hectare)
Family 65.6 48.1 35.4 26.5 14.4 40.6
Hired 36.3 33.9 36.1 32.2 43.3 36.2
Exchange 2.3 3.5 1.3 1.9 .2 1.9
Total 104.2 85.5 72.8 60.6 57.8 78.7
Source: IFPRI/MALR-EWPS (1999).hand, 24 percent of the wheat farmers were able to obtain a loan for the 1997/98 sea-
son, and 30 percent had received a loan within the past five years. Virtually all the
loans (96 percent) came from PBDAC, which offers loans at below-market interest
rates (11–13 percent per year). The average loan is for £E3,454, with a repayment
period of 302 days.
Access to credit varies according to household wealth, in part because PBDAC
uses the amount of land under cultivation as an important criterion in the allocation
of credit. Just 12 percent of the poorest wheat farmers had obtained a loan, compared
with 24 percent on average among all wheat farmers. Furthermore, poorer farmers
received smaller loans, the average amount being one-third less than the overall av-
erage. Poorer households were also more likely to use the loans for nonbusiness pur-
poses. Of the poorest loan recipients, 24 percent used the loan for consumption or
home improvement, compared with just 6 percent of the richest loan recipients.
Land
As part of the economic reforms, land rental prices were liberalized in 1992. Wheat
farmers in the EWPS report that land rents have increased by about 76 percent since
the agricultural year 1992/93, equivalent to a 17 percent increase in real terms. In-
creases have been particularly large in the governorates of Giza, Qalubia, and Beheira,
which are close to Cairo and where agricultural land is relatively scarce. About 62
percent of the wheat farmers in Egypt report that the removal of the land-rent ceiling
has had little effect on their households. Furthermore, relatively few of the poorest
households (30 percent) indicated that the new land law had made them worse off.
These results can be better understood in light of land ownership patterns. Ac-
cording to the EWPS, the overwhelming majority (90 percent) of the land cultivated
by wheat farmers is owned by the farm household. Just 8 percent is rented, and the
remainder is sharecropped. The proportion of rented area is much higher (about 24
percent of total land area) for the poorer than for the wealthier households (about 4
percent). This implies that about three-quarters of the poorest wheat farmers are not
directly affected by the liberalization of land rents. The survey also reveals that a sig-
nificant portion of the rented land is rented by relatively large and wealthy farmers.
For example, almost 45 percent of the land rented by Egyptian wheat farmers is
rented by those in the top two quintiles. This suggests that the benefits of land-rent
controls were not necessarily well targeted to the poor.
Costs and Returns of Wheat Production
The gross value of wheat production is calculated as the sum of the value of wheat
sales, the value of wheat retained for home consumption, and the value of wheat stalks
produced. The returns to family labor and family-owned assets are calculated as the
gross value of wheat production minus the cost of hired labor, seed (including re-
tained seed), fertilizer, other inputs, land rental, equipment rental, and animal rental
for wheat production. An estimate of the overall cost of production is not attempted,
23because of the conceptual and practical difficulties of imputing a value for family la-
bor and family-owned land.
The gross revenue from wheat production, defined as the value of wheat grain
and stalk production, is £E2,642 per farm or £E0.81 per kilogram of wheat produced
(see Table 6). The value of wheat grain is £E0.68 per kilogram, but stalks add an-
other 19 percent to the value of the grain. Variable costs of production are 36 percent
of revenue. The largest cost categories are hired labor (27 percent of costs), fertilizer
(23 percent), and equipment rental (20 percent). Nitrogen fertilizers, such as urea and
ammonium nitrate, are the largest items in fertilizer costs, while threshing and trac-
tor services are the most important types of equipment rental. Net revenue (gross rev-
enue minus variable costs) averages 64 percent of revenue. This represents the im-
plicit “wages” of family labor, the implicit “rent” on family-owned land, and the
return on family-owned equipment and animals used in wheat production.
Looking at crop budgets across farm-size categories, gross revenue per metric ton
is essentially constant, being determined by market prices, but variable costs decline
with farm size. This is largely because larger farms rent a smaller share of the culti-
vated land. Thus, returns to family labor and family-owned assets rise from £E473
per metric ton for the smallest farm-size category to £E551 per metric ton in the
largest (Table 7). Gross revenue per hectare is somewhat higher among smaller farms
because of more intensive cultivation and higher yields. However, per-hectare costs
are also higher among small farms, largely because of the cost of renting land. The
combined effect is that the net revenue is somewhat (13 percent) higher for the largest
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Table 6—Revenue and costs of wheat production
Cost per Cost per Cost per
Revenue or Cost hectare kilogram person-day Percent Percent
cost category per farm of wheat of wheat family labor of revenue of costs
(Egyptian pounds)
Revenue 2,642 3,798 .81 178 100.0 —
Wheat sales 1,132 1,627 .35 76 42.8 —
Retained wheat grain 1,077 1,548 .33 73 40.7 —
Wheat stalks 433 623 .13 29 16.4 —
Variable costs 937 1,347 .29 63 35.5 100.0
Hired labor 251 360 .08 17 9.5 26.8
Seeds 129 185 .04 9 4.9 13.8
Fertilizer 212 305 .07 14 8.0 22.6
Ag chemicals 54 78 .02 4 2.0 5.8
Equipment rental 190 273 .06 13 7.2 20.2
Land rental 68 98 .02 5 2.6 7.3
Other inputs 33 48 .01 2 1.3 3.5
Net revenue 1,705 2,452 .53 115 64.5 —
Source: IFPRI/MALR-EWPS (1999).
Note: — indicates not applicable.farm-size category than it is for the smallest. The returns per person-day also rise
sharply as farm size increases. This is not surprising, since labor productivity is
strongly influenced by the amount of other factors of production per worker, and by
definition large farms offer more land per family member.
Wheat Usage and Marketing
In 1998, the average quantity of wheat harvested per wheat farm household was 3.25
tons. Of the total quantity harvested, about 52 percent was sold, 31 percent was used
for household consumption, 6 percent was stored for other uses, and 6 percent was
given out as a gift or for other reasons. The remaining 5 percent was used to pay farm
workers or landlords, stored for seed, and used as animal feed.
The share of wheat used for household consumption is highest for small farmers
and tends to decrease with farm size (see Figure 6). Conversely, the share of wheat
sold increases with farm size. In small farms, most wheat is used for subsistence and,
therefore, only a small amount of wheat harvested is left to be sold. As farm size in-
creases, however, once wheat used for household subsistence has been allocated, the
rest of the wheat is sold. Therefore, wheat sales tend to increase more than propor-
tionately with farm size.
As expected, the frequency and volume of wheat sales was found to be correlated
with farm size. Whereas 63 percent of households in the smallest farm-size quintile
never sell wheat, about 67 percent of the largest farm-size quintile always sell
wheat. On average, a little less than one-third of the farmers never sell wheat, and a
little more than one-third always sell wheat. On a volume basis, a little more than
one-third of all farmers sell more than 50 percent of their wheat; another one-
quarter of farmers sell less than 50 percent; and less than 10 percent of all farmers
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Table 7—Revenue and costs of wheat production per unit of input by
farm-size category
Farm-size category
Revenue or cost category Smallest 2 3 4 Largest
(Egyptian pounds)
Revenue per metric ton 807 806 817 795 824
Cost per metric ton 334 338 321 274 272
Returns per metric ton 473 468 496 522 551
Revenue per hectare 3,878 4,445 4,037 3,967 3,593
Cost per hectare 1,606 1,866 1,586 1,366 1,187
Returns per hectare 2,272 2,578 2,451 2,601 2,405
Revenue per person-day 65 93 115 170 379
Cost per person-day 27 39 45 58 125
Returns per person-day 38 54 70 111 253
Source: IFPRI/MALR-EWPS 1999.sell all their wheat. However, even if most farmers sell less than 50 percent of their
wheat, those that sell more wheat own larger farms, so that overall more than 50 per-
cent of all wheat production is sold.
Table 8 shows the characteristics of the wheat sale transactions by the type of
buyer. The types of wheat buyers include private traders, neighbors, public mills, co-
operatives, the village banks, MALR, and others. As noted earlier, GASC uses the
public mills, the cooperatives, and village branches of PBDAC to buy the wheat from
the farmers on its behalf. This government-procured wheat is then channeled to the
public mills to make the subsidized 82 percent wheat flour for the baladi bread and
flour subsidy program. MALR, on the other hand, contracts with large-scale farms
to multiply wheat seeds.
The numbers in Table 8 indicate that about 39 percent of the wheat farm house-
holds sell to traders, while only 6 percent sell to their neighbors, and less than 5 per-
cent sell to the mills, the cooperatives, or the village banks. In terms of volume, pri-
vate traders receive two-thirds of all the wheat sold by farmers, or the equivalent of
1.88 million metric tons of wheat on a nationwide basis. The next-largest marketing
outlets for farmers are the mills and the village banks, each buying about 9 percent
of the marketed wheat. The cooperatives bought just 5 percent of the wheat sold.
Results from the wheat traders survey presented in the following chapter indicate
that about 61 percent of the wheat bought by traders is in turn sold to the government
through the mills or PBDAC. This implies that about 1.15 million metric tons of the
wheat bought by traders in 1988 was potentially sold to MOTS. These estimates in-
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Solddicate that the total quantity of wheat sold to the government (directly or indirectly)
would be about 1.8 million metric tons. Given the variance of the four-stage random
sample used for the EWPS, this estimate is consistent with the official figure of 1.75
million metric tons of domestic wheat sold to the government in 1998.
One question of interest to the government is why farmers sell primarily to traders
rather than to the cooperatives, mills, or village banks that facilitate direct govern-
ment procurement. The EWPS asked farmers why they chose to sell to one buyer
rather than another. The main reason was good prices (60 percent), followed by close
location (23 percent). Regarding price, the average price paid to farmers by traders
(£E0.67 per kilogram) was at least as high as the price paid by regular government
outlets, such as the mills, village banks, and cooperatives (£E0.64 to 0.66 per kilo-
gram). It is also toward the top of the range of government procurement prices, which
range from £E0.63 to £E0.67 per kilogram depending on quality.
Regarding the location of sale, traders usually purchase wheat on the farm (64
percent) or at a market (25 percent). In contrast, to sell to a mill, a cooperative, or
village bank, the farmer must transport the harvest to these sites. These findings con-
firm results from the traders’ survey (presented in the next chapter), which suggest
that farmers prefer to deal with traders because traders offer better prices, buy smaller
quantities, and pick up the wheat from the farmers’dwelling, which saves transport
costs. In some cases, traders also give an advance to the farmer.
On-farm wheat storage is quite common. Almost all wheat farmers use their own
houses to store their wheat (the exception is the Frontier, where most farmers do not
have wheat storage capacity). Farmers rarely rent storage space. The average quan-
tity of wheat in storage is seasonal. The quantity of wheat stored reaches a peak af-
ter harvest in April or May, at about 1.1 to 1.4 metric tons, and gradually declines to
150 kilograms just before the next harvest season the following year. Most of the
wheat (86 percent) is stored for consumption throughout the year rather than for sale.
27
Table 8—Characteristics of wheat sale transactions by type of buyer
Percent of Average volume sold Percent allocation
Type of buyer households selling per household National sales among buyers
(kilograms) (million metric tons)
Private trader 39.1 1,127 1.88 66.3
Neighbor 6.0 41 0.07 2.4
Mill 3.9 156 0.26 9.2
Cooperative 4.2 85 0.14 5.0
Village bank 4.8 156 0.26 9.2
MALR 0.5 98 0.16 5.8
Other 0.6 37 0.06 2.2
Total 58.9 1,700 2.83 100.0
Source: IFPRI/MALR-EWPS (1999).Wheat Consumption Patterns
To shed more light on wheat marketing decisions, this section describes the con-
sumption patterns of staple grains (wheat, rice, and maize) among wheat farmers.
The most widely consumed grain product in the sample was home-baked bread from
wheat produced on the farm, as reported by 91 percent of the households. Most
households also make other wheat products from their own harvest (65 percent), bake
bread from purchased flour (70 percent), buy rice (62 percent), and buy baladi bread
(59 percent). A minority of wheat farmers consumed rice that they produced, pur-
chased fino bread, or consumed bread made from purchased wheat.
Baladi bread is purchased by more than half of the wheat farmers, regardless of
wealth (Table 9). In contrast, the proportion of households buying fino bread rises
from just 7 percent in the poorest category to 55 percent in the richest. This reflects
the higher cost of fino bread, which makes it a “luxury” good among grain products.
The percentage of wheat farm households consuming home-made bread from pur-
chased flour and purchased wheat tends to decline in the high-wealth categories, re-
flecting the higher opportunity cost of time of these households.
When asked why they would not sell their wheat and buy bread, the majority of
farmers (56 percent) noted that they preferred the taste of home-baked bread. The rest
of the farmers responded either that the bakery might not have bread (17 percent), that
the bakery was too far (14 percent), or that it was more economical to bake bread at
home (10 percent). The distance to baladi bread bakeries and limited availability of
the bread in rural areas reflect the urban bias of the government in baladi bread dis-
tribution. Although 57 percent of the population of Egypt lives in rural areas, less than
one-third of the baladi bread subsidy goes to rural consumers (Ahmed et al. 1999a).
The EWPS highlights the high level of wheat consumption in rural Egypt. Egyp-
tian wheat farmers purchase 242 loaves of baladi bread per person per year or 31.5
kilogram per person per year. Among those who buy it, the average is 410 loaves per
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Table 9—Percentage of households that consume different grain
products, by wealth category
Wealth category
Grain product Poorest 2 3 4 Richest
Purchased baladi bread 56.0 66.3 50.8 57.7 64.8
Purchased fino bread 6.8 33.8 21.7 31.1 55.0
Bread from purchased flour 81.8 75.5 62.0 67.1 64.5
Bread from purchased wheat 22.4 26.7 14.1 9.6 6.3
Purchased rice 70.4 63.3 55.2 65.8 58.8
Bread from own wheat 93.6 97.5 81.0 93.8 88.5
Other from own wheat 56.2 61.3 63.3 68.6 73.3
Rice from own harvest 37.0 47.0 39.1 35.9 52.0
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1999).person per year, or 53 kilograms per person per year. The average consumption of
fino bread is about one-half that of baladi bread (84 loaves per person per year, or
15 kilograms per person per year).
Overall consumption of wheat products is 214 kilograms per capita. This figure
corresponds closely to estimates for rural consumption in the Egypt Integrated
Household Survey (Bouis, Ahmed, and Hamza 1999), confirming Egypt’s position
as having one of the highest levels of per capita wheat consumption in the world.
Most of the wheat consumption among wheat farmers (61 percent) is in the form of
wheat retained from the household’s own production. Purchased flour and purchased
baladi bread are the second and third most important wheat products, representing
17 and 12 percent of the total grain equivalent, respectively.
The survey also asked wheat farming households about the use of baladi bread
as animal feed. Almost 20 percent of the households surveyed reported feeding bal-
adi bread to their animals. The proportion does not vary much with wealth category
or farm size. On average, households feed 12 loaves of baladi bread per week (or 82
kilograms per year) to their animals. This implies that 7–8 percent of the baladibread
purchased by Egyptian wheat farmers is used for animal feed. It is true that much of
the bread fed to animals may be stale. (According to the Egyptian Integrated House-
hold Survey, about half of the households feeding baladi bread to animals gave this
as the reason.) Nonetheless, the consistent excess purchases by these households is
a reflection of the subsidized price.
The net sales of wheat by farmers was calculated through combining information
on the purchase of wheat products (in wheat equivalent) with information on wheat
sales. The net position of households is important because it determines whether they
would lose or gain from increased wheat prices in the absence of subsidies. Although
two-thirds of Egyptian wheat farmers sell wheat, less than half (46 percent) are net
sellers, whose wheat sales exceed the grain equivalent of their purchases of bread
and other wheat products. Just 4 percent are self-sufficient, without purchases or
sales of wheat or wheat products. One-half of the Egyptian wheat farmers are net
buyers, whose wheat purchases (expressed in grain equivalent) exceed their sales.
Most of these households are wheat farmers that do not sell wheat at all and supple-
ment their wheat production with purchases of bread and other wheat products.
Profitability Perceptions, Information Sources, and Extension Services
Next, wheat farmers were asked about their perceptions regarding changes in crop
profitability since 1995. Although perceptions about profits are subjective and do not
adequately measure changes in profit levels, they give an indication of how farmers
feel about the environment in which they operate. As shown in Table 10, 58 percent
of farmers indicated that the profitability of Egypt’s main crops increased since 1995.
The increased profitability of wheat was noted by a higher percentage of farmers than
for most other crops (64 percent versus less than 60 percent). The lowest-ranked crop
was maize. Farm size does not seem to influence perceptions regarding the change
in profit levels of the five main commodities.
29Across all regions, farmers indicated that their increased profit levels in wheat
production were a result of higher yields and wheat prices. In addition, in Nubaria,
improved wheat profitability was also a function of low, fixed fertilizer and other in-
put prices. Of the farmers who indicated that wheat profitability had declined over
the past three years, higher labor costs, lower wheat yields, and lower by-product
prices were cited most frequently. The effect of lower wheat yields was most strongly
felt in the more difficult agroclimatic regions of the Frontier and Nubaria, followed
by Middle and Upper Egypt. Lower wheat by-product prices were a particularly large
factor in Middle Egypt and the West Delta.
Wheat producers rely on a number of sources to obtain information to produce
and market wheat. As shown in Table 11, extension agents play an important role in
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Table 10—Perceived changes in profitability by main crop type
Change in profit level since 1995
Crop type Higher Same Lower Total
(percent)
Wheat 63.9 8.6 27.5 100
Berseem 58.7 33.3 8.0 100
Cotton 55.7 13.2 31.0 100
Maize 43.3 35.6 21.1 100
Rice 56.6 9.4 34.1 100
Overall 57.7 21.4 22.9 100
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1999).
Table 11—Main information sources for wheat producers
Information about Main information source Percent of farmers
Seed varieties Extension agent 62
Cooperatives 24
Fertilizer prices Cooperatives 44
PBDAC 14
Fertilizer use Extension agent 54
Cooperatives 21
Pest and weed control Extension agent 65
Cooperatives 20
Soil management Cooperatives 35
Extension agent 33
Irrigation methods Extension agent 30
Neighbor 22
Wheat prices Wheat traders 59
PBDAC 12
Wheat marketing opportunities Wheat traders 37
Cooperatives 17
Source: IFPRI/MALR-EWPS (1999).disseminating information on seed varieties, fertilizer use, and control of pests and
weeds. Wheat producers report being visited by an extension agent five times during
the wheat season, on average. Traders are the primary source of information on out-
put markets and wheat prices, while cooperatives are the main source of information
on fertilizer prices and soil management.
Wheat Supply Response and Input Demand Analysis
This section uses the EWPS to examine the factors that influence wheat supply and
input demand. In particular, three questions are addressed:
• How responsive are Egyptian wheat farmers to changes in wheat prices?
• What are the most important nonprice factors affecting wheat supply?
• How do prices and nonprice factors influence the demand for labor and fer-
tilizer on Egyptian wheat farms?
Survey Methods
In the short run, farmers’decisions are based in part on the relative prices of inputs
and outputs and on the fixed factors of production available to the farm household,
including family labor, family-owned land, and family-owned agricultural assets.
Because prices vary from one region to another and fixed factors vary from one
household to another, multiple-regression analysis can be used to study the differ-
ences in household-level input use and output supply as a function of differences in
input prices, output prices, and fixed factors available to the household.
A profit function approach is used in which output supply and input demand are
estimated jointly and cross-equation restrictions are imposed on the parameters.
These restrictions ensure that the results are consistent with economic theory and in
doing so, they improve the efficiency of the estimation by using more information.
This approach was pioneered by Yotopoulos and Lau (1979) and has been widely
used since. Several profit function studies have been conducted that use data on
Egyptian agriculture. Antle and Aitah (1983) use the profit function with farm-level
data to study rice supply and input demand in the East Delta of Egypt. Antle and
Aitah (1987) broadened the analysis to consider three summer crops (maize, rice,
and cotton) as well as several inputs. Esfahani (1987) applied the profit function ap-
proach to study supply response in the Nile Delta.
The wheat supply and input demand model is specified as follows. Under certain
conditions, the behavior of a rational profit-maximizing producer can be described
by a restricted profit function in the form
π = f(p, z),
where π is the return on fixed factors of production, p is a vector of the prices of out-
puts and variable inputs, and z is a vector of fixed factors of production.
31This is a restricted profit function in that it is assumed that the producer can de-
cide on the levels of variable inputs but cannot change the levels of the fixed factors.
Thus, it describes a planning horizon of 1–3 years.
If q is defined as a vector describing the output supply and the negative of input
demand, then according to production theory, the first derivative of the profit func-
tion with respect to the price of an input (or output) yields input demand (or output
supply):
∂π(p, z)
———– = qi(p, z).
∂pi
Young’s Theorem states that the cross-partial second derivatives of a function are
equal. Applying this rule to the profit function yields the following:
qi(p, z) ∂2π(p, z) qj(p, z)
——– — = ———— = ———–.
pj ∂pi∂pj pi
To make use of these restrictions, Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression with
cross-equation restrictions is used to ensure symmetry of price effects. The normal-
ized quadratic profit function used is














where the asterisks indicate that profits and prices have been normalized by dividing
by the numeraire price, in this case the rental rate of machinery.
This profit equation is associated with input demand and output supply functions
in the following form:






One output supply function (wheat) and four input demand functions (hired la-
bor, nitrogen-based fertilizer, phosphorus-based fertilizer, and machinery rental) are
estimated. The vector of prices includes the price of wheat, the wage rate for hired
labor, an index of the prices of urea and ammonium nitrate, the price of single super-
phosphate, and the rental rate of tractors. The prices are based on the village-level
average unit value from observed transactions. If no unit value is available (because
none of the households carried out that type of purchase or sale), higher levels of ag-
gregation are used to obtain an average. As mentioned above, the prices are “nor-
malized” by dividing each by a numeraire price—in this case, the rental rate for ma-
chinery. The vector of household characteristics includes variables representing the
productive capacity of the household, including the size and composition of the
household, total farm size, and ownership of several types of animals and agricul-
32tural equipment. The analysis was carried out with Limdep software. Because the
main interest of the study is on the impact of prices on wheat supply, only the results
of the wheat supply function are discussed below.
Wheat Supply
The results of the regression analysis indicate that wheat supply is significantly af-
fected by wheat prices, wage rates, nitrogen fertilizer prices, the education of the
head of household, farm size, whether the farm is in the new lands, and buffalo own-
ership. Table 12 summarizes the price elasticities estimated from the model. The ad-
justed R2 correlation coefficient for the wheat supply equation is 0.52, implying that
approximately one-half of the household-level variation in wheat supply can be ex-
plained by the model. The coefficient on the price of wheat is statistically significant
at the 10 percent level and corresponds to a price elasticity of wheat supply of 0.30.
Similar to any regression analysis, the results may be biased by the omission of
relevant variables, such as technology and market access, that are difficult to quan-
tify. However, the supply elasticity of about 0.3 is in line with regional time-series
estimates from Egypt found in a previous study (Kherallah, Minot, and Gruhn
1999b). It is also consistent with estimates from other developing countries (Sadoulet
and de Janvry 1995). Thus, a 10 percent increase in the price of wheat would induce
farmers to allocate 3 percent more land for wheat cultivation. This suggests that farm-
ers will react favorably to real and relative increases in rural wheat prices. (This is
particularly relevant in Egypt because it is a wheat-deficit country and because the
government seeks to purchase its wheat requirement for the baladi bread and flour
subsidy program from domestic sources.)
Two of the three input prices are significant at the 5 percent level. The elasticity
of wheat supply with respect to the wage rate indicates that a 10 percent increase in
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Table 12—Elasticities of output supply and input demand with respect
to prices
Elasticity
Demand for Demand for Demand for
Price category Supply of wheat hired labor nitrogen fertilizer phosphate fertilizer
Price of wheat 0.301* 0.498** 1.577*** 0.528
Wages −0.021** −0.422*** 0.118* 0.216
Price of nitrogen
fertilizer −0.048*** 0.118* −1.53*** 2.204**
Price of phosphate
fertilizer −0.002 0.216 0.258** −1.874*
Note: * = significant at the 10 percent level.
** = significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = significant at the 1 percent level.
Number of observations: 800.the wage rate would reduce wheat supply by 0.2 percent. Similarly, a 10 percent in-
crease in the price of nitrogen fertilizer is associated with a 0.5 percent decrease in
wheat supply. One implication of this finding is that a reduction in fertilizer price (due
to a subsidy, for example) would have only a modest effect on wheat production.
The size and composition of the household have no significant effect on wheat
production, but the education of the head of household appears to have a significant
positive effect on wheat production, perhaps reflecting greater managerial capacity.
As expected, the total farm size has a positive and significant effect on wheat pro-
duction. For every 10 percent increase in total farm size, wheat production rises by
6.6 percent. In addition, being located in newly reclaimed lands is associated with
higher wheat production, other things being equal.
The price of berseem, which normally competes with wheat, was tested in some
alternative versions of the model but it was not statistically significant. Although a
higher price of berseem would normally be expected to be associated with lower
wheat production, this relationship may be weak or nonexistent in Egypt because
most berseem is retained for domestic use rather than sold.
Conclusions
The agricultural and economywide reforms have had a significant impact on the
wheat production sector in Egypt. The removal of area allocation and compulsory
delivery, the increase in producer prices, and the introduction of higher-yielding
wheat varieties have led to increased wheat crop area, yields, and production. As a
result, the self-sufficiency ratio increased from about 21 percent in 1986 to 47 per-
cent in 1996. In addition, the quantity of domestic wheat procured by the govern-
ment for its subsidy program for baladi flour and bread has increased from less than
0.1 million metric tons in 1986 to 1.8 million metric tons in 1998.
Despite the increase in wheat production, the government has problems reaching
its wheat procurement targets. The main reason for this is that most of the wheat pro-
duced is consumed in the rural areas. Half is retained by wheat farmer households,
29–32 percent is purchased by the government, and the remainder is consumed by
rural households that do not farm wheat and, to a lesser extent, wheat farmers who
are net buyers.
Given the high level of wheat consumption in rural areas, the cost of increasing
deliveries of domestic wheat to the government are considerable. To do so, the gov-
ernment would have to increase the procurement price substantially above interna-
tional prices. When procurement prices are above international prices, as they cur-
rently are, the government incurs the budgetary costs of subsidizing its wheat
producers. In addition, increasing the incentive for farmers to sell the wheat they have
set aside for home consumption will encourage them to purchase more subsidized
flour and bread, resulting in higher costs to the consumer subsidy system.
Finally, wheat self-sufficiency is often cited as a goal of Egyptian wheat policy.
The supply elasticity of wheat was found to be 0.3, implying that an increase in wheat
self-sufficiency from 50 to 55 percent (that is, a 10 percent increase in wheat pro-
34duction) would require an increase in wheat prices of roughly 30–35 percent in the
short run. This finding supports conclusions from Chapter 6 that indicate that rais-
ing the wheat self-sufficiency rate from 47 percent to 60 or 70 percent through higher
producer prices would involve increased subsidy costs of £E1.5 billion and £E3.3
billion (0.7 and 1.6 percent of gross domestic product, or GDP), respectively. This
result highlights the difficulty in achieving, or even increasing, wheat self-sufficiency
through price policy alone.
35CHAPTER 4
Evolution and Structure of the Wheat
Trading Sector Under Reforms
T
he market reform programs in Egypt were expected to bring about private sec-
tor participation by encouraging new actors to enter the distribution system and
by creating the incentives for existing traders to expand their activities. The results
of a survey of about 2,000 wheat grain and flour traders were used to review the re-
sponse of the emerging private wheat marketing system to the policy reforms initi-
ated in 1987.
The main questions addressed in this chapter are:
• What is the structure of the private wheat marketing system?
• What are the characteristics of private traders involved in wheat marketing?
• How is the private trading sector performing following the reforms?
• What are the main constraints faced by private traders?
• How have reforms affected the investment behavior of private traders?
Survey and Sampling Methods
The survey of wheat traders in Egypt was conducted from August to December 1996.
Since there are no records on the number and type of private traders operating in each
market, the sample of wheat traders was chosen randomly. More specifically, in each
of the 18 governorates20 selected for the survey, enumerators were asked to go to the
market and interview any trader with whom they came into contact. The targeted
sample size of 2,000 domestic traders was chosen to be large enough to offer good
degrees of freedom within the limited financial means of the project. As a result, the
random sample included 1,984 wheat grain and flour traders covering markets in 141
districts. Table 13 shows the regional distribution of the traders. About half of the
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20 The governorates covered in the wheat traders’ survey are Cairo, Alexandria, Matruh, Damietta, Dakahlia,
Sharkia, Gharbia, Ismailia, Qalubia, Kafr El-Sheikh, Menufia, Beheira, Giza, Fayum, Beni Suef, Minia, Assiut, and
Sohag.sample was located in Lower Egypt, and a third in Upper Egypt.21This regional dis-
tribution was not targeted, but reflects the fact that there are more traders in Lower
than in Upper Egypt.
The questionnaire covered many topics, including the general characteristics of
the traders; the patterns of their trading activities, including their volume of opera-
tion, area coverage, trade networks, marketing channels, marketing inputs and out-
puts; use of credit, costs, and margins; investment and asset accumulation behavior;
and traders’perception about government policy changes.
Wheat Traders’Survey Results
General Characteristics of the Emerging Private Trading Sector
Table 14 shows the main characteristics of the wheat trader sample. About half of the
almost 2,000 traders interviewed view themselves as wholesalers, while one-third
consider themselves retailers. The remainder of the sample is composed of traders
engaged in both wholesale and retail trading.
Private trader participation in wheat marketing has not occurred for more than 15
years. This is expected, because, except for small-scale village trading, intergover-
norate trading in wheat products was prohibited until the beginning of the reforms
in 1987. Private trader participation is particularly recent in Matruh, in the Frontier
region, with an average length of experience of only 5 years. Wheat production in
Matruh has only recently been developed on new reclaimed lands. This might also
explain why wholesale trading is still not widespread in that region. Except for the
case of wheat flour in Alexandria and Lower Egypt, the average length of experience
37
Table 13—Regional distribution of sample
wheat traders








21 The governorates included in the sample were grouped into five regions for analysis: the city governorates of
Cairo and Alexandria, Lower Egypt (Damietta, Dakahlia, Sharkia, Ismailia, Qalubia, Kafr El-Sheikh, Gharbia, Men-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of about 12 years indicates that private sector participation in wheat trading before
the reforms was fairly limited.
Traders were also asked about their professional background before they entered
the general trading business. Only one-third of the trader population had always been
in the trading business; another third worked as farmers before becoming traders.
There are, however, significant differences among regions. Not surprisingly, in the
cities of Alexandria and Cairo, the majority of wheat traders had a background in
general trading. In the more rural regions of Lower and Upper Egypt, a greater per-
centage of wheat traders were engaged in farming before becoming traders.
About three-quarters of the traders consider trading as their main occupation. The
largest degree of specialization is found in the city governorates of Alexandria, Cairo,
and Matruh, where about 90 percent or more of the traders in the sample define trad-
ing as their principal occupation. Lower and Upper Egypt have the largest farmer-
trader population, where the share of traders whose main occupation is in farming
reaches 14 and 17 percent, respectively.
The two main reasons cited for entering the trading profession were expected
profits (75 percent of traders) and inherited business (26 percent).22 A higher per-
centage of traders in Alexandria and Cairo (about 60 percent) have inherited their
businesses, compared with an average of 26 percent for all regions. This explains
why a larger percentage of traders in these two cities have had previous experience
in trading before entering the wheat market. The share of first-generation traders is
largest in Lower Egypt (84 percent of traders) and Matruh (77 percent), although in
Lower Egypt, traders have been in the wheat marketing business longer than in any
other region (between 12 and 14 years). Wheat traders are mostly male, and two-
thirds are about 50 years old or younger.
Structure of Activities and Operations of the Private Trading Sector
Wheat trading represents, on average, one-fifth of the traders’total income from mar-
keting activities (Table 15). The share of wheat flour in total trading income is 7 per-
cent. The overwhelming share of trading activities, about one-half, is accounted for
by trade in other grains. The income share of other grain trade is particularly high in
Alexandria and Cairo (52 and 60 percent, respectively). In Matruh, on the other hand,
income from other trade is higher than in any other region (36 percent versus 10–17
percent for other regions). The lack of specialized wheat traders is not peculiar to
Egypt. Most agricultural commodity traders, even in industrialized countries, deal
with several commodities at a time.
Tables 16 and 17 present the structure of clients and suppliers of wheat traders in
individual regions. On average, four-fifths of wheat grain traders buy directly from
farmers. There is no specialization yet in assembly compared with wholesaling and
retailing of wheat grains. As expected, the share of direct procurement is particularly
39
22 The motivation to become a trader refers to trading in general and is not specific to wheat.40
Table 15—Income shares of major business activities of the traders, 1995–96
Income share from
Governorate
category  Wheat trade Wheat flour trade Other grain trade Other trade Other
(percent)
Cairo 16 9 60 10 5
Alexandria 16 10 52 17 5
Lower Egypt 20 9 46 14 11
Upper Egypt 26 3 48 12 11
Matruh 11 11 33 36 9
Average 21 7 47 14 11
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Table 16—Share of wheat and wheat flour purchased from different suppliers
Wheat Wheat flour
Governate Public Private
category Traders Farmers Others Traders mills mills Importers Others
(percent)
Cairo 64 35 1 17 60 23 0 0
Alexandria 41 58 1 48 3 27 22 0
Lower Egypt 12 87 1 34 59 2 4 1
Upper Egypt 16 83 1 36 60 2 0 2
Matruh 87 13 0 92 8 0 0 0
Average 19 80 1 44 46 5 4 1
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Table 17—Share of wheat and wheat flour sold to different customers
Wheat Wheat flour
Governorate
category Consumers Traders Millers Others Consumers Traders Bakeries Others
(percent)
Cairo 34 61 5 0 77 13 9 1
Alexandria 18 23 43 16 35 21 21 23
Lower Egypt 14 12 55 19 80 13 6 1
Upper Egypt 25 18 35 22 74 18 7 1
Matruh 92 0 5 3 96 2 2 0
Average 21 17 44 18 77 13 7 3
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).high in the major production regions of Lower and Upper Egypt. The percentage
is much lower in the city governorates of Alexandria and Cairo, and especially in
Matruh.
A more varied regional structure emerges in the procurement of wheat flour by
private traders. Whereas private traders procure a little bit less than half of their
wheat flour quantities from public mills and an equal share from other traders, the
sources of procurement differ significantly across individual regions. For example,
private mills play a significant role in the procurement of wheat flour only in the
city governorates of Alexandria and Cairo. Public mills, in contrast, appear to be
marginal suppliers in Alexandria and Matruh. In Matruh, private traders procure
wheat flour primarily from other traders. In Alexandria, private traders, followed by
private mills and imports, are the most important sources of wheat flour supply to
traders. The finding that private mills and imports are significant supply sources of
wheat flour only in Cairo and Alexandria is explained by the concentration of pri-
vate mills in these cities, and the fact that importers operate mainly from Alexan-
dria, a large port city.
In terms of sales of wheat grain, private traders transact, on average, more with
millers than with other groups of market participants. Here again, significant differ-
ences can be observed across regions. Traders in the two main producing regions of
Lower and Upper Egypt and the import city of Alexandria, for instance, sell prima-
rily to millers, whereas traders in Cairo sell primarily to other traders. In Matruh, on
the other hand, the bulk of the sales goes to consumers (defined here as households).
The share of sales to consumers is the next highest in Cairo, where it reaches one-
third of total sales. In contrast, sales to millers in Cairo and Matruh are a mere 5 per-
cent. Note, however, that the average volume of wheat grain sold in Cairo is sub-
stantially lower than in other regions. Therefore, the high share of wheat grain sales
to consumers and low share of sales to public mills in Cairo should be interpreted
with caution. Finally, close to 20 percent of wheat grain sales in Alexandria and
Lower and Upper Egypt go to other clients, such as PBDAC and poultry farmers.
In contrast to wheat grain, the majority of wheat-flour sales by private traders
goes to final consumers, which account for more than three-quarters of total sales. A
noticeable exception is Alexandria, where only a third of wheat flour sales go to con-
sumers. The remainder is distributed equally among sales to other traders, bakeries,
and a group of unspecified other users. This is consistent with the fact that more than
80 percent of the traders interviewed in Alexandria were wholesalers, or both whole-
salers and retailers.
Table 18 shows information on the factors that influence the choice of private
traders over their purchase and sale area. According to the figures in this table, the
most important reason for selecting the purchasing or sale area is dictated by the
price, followed closely by the distance traveled between regions. Other less-
important factors for the purchase area are the quality of the product (19 percent of
traders) and government regulations (5 percent). For the choice of sale area, the size
of the market was cited by 26 percent of traders and government regulations by 16
percent. Government regulations refer mainly to the unofficial local restrictions on
41the movement of wheat outside certain governorates to ensure delivery of the target
wheat quota to the government at the harvest season.
Table 19 shows the response of traders concerning their desire to expand area cov-
erage or trading volume. More than half of the traders would like to expand their area
coverage, and as many as two-thirds would like to expand the volume of their mar-
keting activities. In both cases, 90 percent of traders cite higher income as the rea-
son for the desire to expand the level of trading activities. The majority of traders cite
lack of capital as the main deterrent to expanding area coverage or raising activity
levels.
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Table 18—Factors influencing private traders’choice of purchase and
sale areas
Choice of purchase area Choice of sales area
Governorate Government Size of Government
category Price Distance Quality regulations Price Distance market regulations
(percent of respondents)
Cairo 74 76 17 4 68 65 22 8
Alexandria 74 64 38 2 28 66 38 2
Lower Egypt 68 67 24 7 65 54 23 21
Upper Egypt 66 62 30 4 70 44 29 13
Matruh 51 69 16 2 41 60 27 1
Average 67 65 19 5 64 52 26 16
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Table 19—Factors inhibiting private traders’desire to expand area coverage and
trading volume
Desire Impediments to Desire Impediments to
expansion of expansion of expansion of expansion
area coverage area coveragea trading volume of trading volumea
Governorate Regu- Lack of Compe- Regu- Lack of Compe-
category Yes No lations capital tition Yes No lations capital tition
(percent of respondents)
Cairo 39 61 47 43 0 68 32 38 55 9
Alexandria 45 55 11 55 8 37 63 11 57 11
Lower Egypt 53 47 8 71 4 72 28 3 75 9
Upper Egypt 58 42 19 70 1 70 30 6 78 9
Matruh 41 59 0 97 0 30 70 5 81 5
Average 53 47 14 70 3 67 33 7 75 9
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
a Other minor impediments include lack of transport or storage, and stagnant demand.It is perhaps by looking at the differences across regions that more is learned
about the relative role of regulations in determining the decision to expand trading
activities. The share of traders assigning a greater role to distance in the choice of
procurement and sales areas is higher than the sample averages in the main con-
sumption region of Cairo (Table 18). In turn, almost half of the traders in Cairo cite
regulations as the main deterrent to expansion of area coverage. About one-third of
traders in Cairo also cite regulations as the main factor restraining the expansion of
trading volume. Wheat trading in Cairo is more tightly regulated than in other re-
gions because of high population density and the large concentration of baladi bread
bakeries. This creates higher opportunities for diversion and leakage between baladi
and fino flour and between domestic and imported wheat.
In cases where long-distance trading fails to develop, the lack of infrastructure and
deficiencies in the transport sector are often among the principal explanatory factors.
Given that Egypt does not have any severe infrastructure problems that might dis-
courage long-term trading, traders were asked questions related to the access to and
use of transport services to detect any constraints to the expansion of long-distance
trading. The first group of questions asked concerned the degree of use and owner-
ship of transport services. The second series of questions addressed problems with
transport services, such as the presence of restrictions on the movement of wheat,
problems faced with transporters, the existence of seasonal supply bottlenecks, and
the degree of competition and market power in local transport markets that limit the
ability of traders to chose among different transport companies or to negotiate trans-
port fees. The results of these questions are reported in Tables 20 through 22.
Tables 20 and 21 show that more than 90 percent of traders use transport, the over-
whelming majority among them using trucks. The only exception are traders in Ma-
truh, where only slightly more than a third of traders use transport services because
they are mostly retailers. Although the large majority of traders rent transport serv-
ices, about 16 percent own transport vehicles. The portion of traders who own vehi-
cles reaches 45 and 25 percent in Cairo and Alexandria, respectively.
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Table 20—Access to and use of transport services
Use transportation for trade Ownership of vehicle used
Governorate category Yes No Owna Rent Own and rent
(percent) (percent of respondents)
Cairo 88.5 11.5 45 (62) 48 7
Alexandria 99.2 0.8 25 (93) 70 5
Lower Egypt 95.4 4.6 16 (55) 80 4
Upper Egypt 93.5 6.5 9 (69) 84 7
Frontier governates 35.6 64.4 23 (47) 67 10
Average 92.1 7.9 16 (63) 79 5
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
aFigures in parentheses are usage share of own vehicle in wheat trading.Table 22 shows the transport problems faced by traders. About 42 percent of
traders noted that there were occasional restrictions on the movement of wheat. This
percentage is much higher in Cairo (93 percent) than anywhere else for the same rea-
sons that were cited earlier. The other potential problems with transport do not ap-
pear to be as relevant. For example, only 6 percent of the traders noted problems with
transporters. Moreover, more than 90 percent of traders had access to transport serv-
ices throughout the year and were able to freely choose among transport companies.
In Table 23, the cost of transport is estimated. In total, the average cost of trans-
port amounts to £E1.2 per metric ton per kilometer, which is not high by African
country standards (see Ahmed and Rustagi 1987; Badiane et al. 1997).
These results suggest that there are no real supply-side constraints in the trans-
port sector to the expansion of area coverage by local traders. Nevertheless, the av-
erage distance between purchase and sales areas covered by individual traders’trans-
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Table 21—Type and use of transport services
Method of transportation
Governorate category  Truck Cart Truck or cart Others
(percent of respondents)
Cairo 94.2 1.4 4.3 0.0
Alexandria 99.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
Lower Egypt 89.1 4.3 3.8 2.8
Upper Egypt 78.1 7.7 9.0 5.2
Frontier governates 58.1 38.7 3.2 0.0
Average 85.7 5.7 5.2 3.4
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Table 22—Problems with transportation
Percentage of traders who said yes to the following questions
Are there
occasional Does your Are there periods Can you choose
restrictions on business have when it is difficult among different
Governorate the movement of problems with to transport types of transport
category wheat or flour? transporters?    wheat or flour?    companies? 
Cairo 93 4 20 91
Alexandria 30 3 13 98
Lower Egypt 36 6 10 97
Upper Egypt 50 9 10 96
Matruh 3 0 0 96
Average 42 6 10 96
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).actions is about 20 kilometers (Table 23). The longest average distances covered by
trader transactions within the study regions, observed in Cairo and Alexandria, barely
exceed 70 kilometers. In the main production regions of Lower and Upper Egypt,
which together account for 80 percent of the traders in the sample, the average dis-
tance covered by trader transactions is less than 20 kilometers. The table also shows
that traders do not transact in markets that are, on average, more than two hours away.
Therefore, it would seem that the spatial limitation of trading activities has more to
do with the limited demand by traders for long-distance transport services rather than
problems with the supply of transport services.
It is unlikely that the limited area coverage of trading activities is due to limited
information of supply and demand conditions in local markets. According to the
numbers in Table 24, more than 90 percent of traders collect market information
while carrying out trading activities. Their main source of information is other
traders, followed by newspapers and personal contacts. Furthermore, about 40 per-
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Table 23—Cost of transport services
Average Average Average Average cost
Governorate Distance between shipping quantity cost per per ton per
category points of purchase time transported shipment kilometer
(kilometers) (hours) (tons) (£E)
Cairo 71.3 2.3 4.4 35 0.3
Alexandria 65.1 2.1 5.6 62 1.2
Lower Egypt 18.9 1.5 3.9 27 1.1
Upper Egypt 12.8 1.3 2.9 20 1.4
Matruh 34.3 1.1 4.7 60 3.4
Average 20.6 1.5 3.6 27 1.2
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Table 24—Access to and use of information
Main source of information
Governorate Collect News- Other Personal Own Access to Own Access Own
category information papers traders contact telephone telephone fax to fax computer
(percent)
Cairo 100 19 49 31 73 86 3.8 0.0 2.7
Alexandria 95 9 83 4 53 64 0.8 0.8 0.8
Lower Egypt 96 21 43 15 29 64 0.2 0.6 0.2
Upper Egypt 89 14 59 12 45 66 0.0 0.8 0.6
Frontier
governorates 91 23 70 3 36 50 0.0 1.2 1.2
Average 93 18 52 13 38 65 0.3 0.7 0.5
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).cent of traders, on average, have their own telephone lines and 60 percent have ac-
cess to a telephone. Local traders are thus sufficiently equipped to trace market con-
ditions in distant areas.
Aside from spatial arbitrage, traders are usually engaged in temporal arbitrage (or
storage) activities. In this case, traders make their profit by storing grain in a period
of low prices (for example, at harvest time) and selling it when prices rise (for ex-
ample, during the lean period). The amount stored and the length of the storage pe-
riod are determined by several factors, including the elasticity of supply and demand,
the costs of storage, interest rates, variability of production and imports, and avail-
ability of substitutes (Gardner 1979).
The survey results indicate that nearly 85 percent of Egyptian wheat traders use
storage facilities and more than 70 percent use them to store wheat. Most traders own
their storage facilities; only 10 percent rent storage space. The available storage ca-
pacities per trader are much larger in the production regions of Lower and Upper
Egypt than in the city governorates.
Average annual storage rental costs are £E1.6 per ardeb.They are highest in Cairo
and Alexandria, where they reach £E3.7 and £E3.4 per ardeb, respectively. Based on
an average weight per ardeb of 140–150 kilograms, the average annual rental cost of
storage space is less than 1 percent of the price of 1 ardeb of wheat. Despite low
transport costs and the availability of relatively cheap storage, traders store an aver-
age of only 7.5 metric tons (50 ardeb) for a month. The low volume kept in storage
is consistent with the short-distance nature of local arbitrage and the observed small
shipments, which are recorded at an average weight of 3.6 metric tons. As is shown
later in this report, in the analysis of local prices, seasonal price spreads range be-
tween 18 and 25 percent in urban markets and 15 and 19 percent in rural markets. To
the extent that the rental cost of storage space is a good indicator of storage costs in
the marketing sector, the prevailing seasonal price spreads should provide enough in-
centives for wheat storage. In addition to the availability and cost of storage space,
the decision to store wheat will be affected by the factors listed earlier, such as the
level of interest rates and the variability of supply. However, the failure of traders to
undertake significant storage activities in Egypt is also unlikely to be related to the
unwillingness of traders to engage in long-distance trading and the associated small
shipments.
Operating Costs and Profitability in the Emerging Marketing Sector
The average operating cost components in the wheat marketing sector are presented
in Tables 25 and 26. The figures represent the average of that particular cost item if
incurred rather than the average cost per trader. Most of the dissimilarity in market-
ing costs is accounted for by differences in local labor costs. Labor costs in Cairo
and Alexandria are three to four times higher than the average. The other important
cost components are storage and transport costs. The category “other operating cost”
in Table 26 sums up all costs other than transport, salary, and storage costs. The in-
46dividual cost items that are included are calculated in Table 27. Given that traders
engage in activities other than wheat trading, the cost of individual items accruing to
wheat was calculated using the overall cost for each given cost item and the estimated
share of wheat for that item.
It appears from the figures in Table 25 that there are some economies of scale in
the marketing sector. Except for the cost of transport in Cairo, individual cost items
show a decreasing trend with an increasing level of activities, as measured by the av-
erage quantity of purchased wheat. All cost categories are accordingly lower in the
Lower and Upper Egypt regions, where average purchased quantities per trader are
nearly two to three times higher than the levels recorded in other regions.
To test for economies of scale in the operations of Egyptian wheat and fino-flour
traders, a translog cost function can be estimated. The translog cost function is a
second-order Taylor approximation in logarithms of a general cost function and can
be written as follows:

















































C = total costs,
yi = outputs,
Pj = input prices, and
Lk = the quasi-fixed input factors.
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Table 25—Structure of operating costs in the marketing sector, 1995/96
Average Average Average Average
Governorate quantity transportation rented storage Average other
category purchased costs costs salary costs operating costs
(ardeb) (£E per ardeb)
Cairo 368 1.1 3.7 21.3 3.2
Alexandria 806 2.0 3.4 16.5 3.7
Lower Egypt 1,211 1.1 1.6 1.8 0.6
Upper Egypt 1,056 1.1 1.1 6.0 0.8
Matruh 650 1.5 1.9 17.0 1.2






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Under the conditions of cost minimization, Shephard’s lemma can be used to de-
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To ensure symmetry and linear homogeneity in factor prices, the following re-















λij = 0 (j = 1, 2,…, o);
and δij =δ ji; γij =γ ji.
As shown by Hanoch (1975), the scale elasticity is identical to the reciprocal of
the elasticity of cost with respect to output. For the translog cost function, the scale
elasticity can be computed as
∂lnTC SE =(———)
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SE > 0 indicates positive economies of scale,
SE = 0 indicates no economies of scale, and
SE < 0 indicates negative economies of scale.
The specific model estimated for Egyptian wheat grain and flour traders is
1 lnTC =α 0 +α ylnQs +β 1lnP tr +β 2lnP st +β 3 lnP pl +φ 1lnLfl + — δyy(lnQs)2
2
11 1 1 + — γ11(lnP tr)2 + — γ22(lnP st)2 + — γ33(lnP pl)2 + — θ11(lnLfl)2
22 2 2
+γ 12lnP tr⋅lnP st +γ 13lnP tr⋅lnP pl +γ 23lnP st⋅lnP pl
+ρ 1ylnQs⋅lnP tr +ρ 2ylnQs⋅lnP st +ρ 3ylnQs⋅lnP pl
49+λ 1llnLfl ⋅lnP tr +λ 2llnLfl ⋅lnP st +λ 3llnLfl ⋅lnP pl
+ω 1D cg +ω 2Dle,
where
TC = total costs, which include the cost of purchasing the raw material (fino flour or
wheat), transport costs, information costs, storage costs, total labor costs
(permanent and temporary), other operating costs, and credit costs for the year;
Qs = the quantity of fino flour or wheat sold;
Ptr = the price of rented transport;
Pst = the rental rate for storage;
Ppl = the wage rate of permanent labor;
Lfl = the quasi-fixed input of family labor; and
Dcg and Dle = regional dummy variables for Cairo/Giza and for Lower Egypt.
In addition to total cost, all prices have been normalized by the purchase price of the
particular commodity (wheat or fino flour).





= (∂y +ρ 1ylnP tr +ρ 2ylnP st +ρ 3ylnP pl +µ 1lnLfl)−1 − 1.
The normalized cost function and the three input share equations (transporta-
tion, storage, and permanent labor) are estimated simultaneously. An error term, as-
sumed to be normally distributed, homoskedastic, and uncorrelated within but con-
temporaneously correlated across equations, is applied to each equation. The
system is estimated with Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression method using
STATA. Homogeneity in prices is imposed through normalization of the system by
the price of the purchased raw material (wheat or fino flour), and symmetry is im-
posed. The equation for raw-material purchase is omitted from the system because
it is redundant and its parameters can be recovered through homogeneity (Huffman
and Evenson 1989).
The estimation results for the cost function and the share equations are reported
in Tables 27 and 28, respectively. A majority of the coefficients are not significant,
except in the labor share equation, where all the parameters are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level. The nonsignificant results are related to the characteris-
tics of cross-section data from the trader survey. For example, about 92 percent of
the traders did not report storage costs and another 20 percent did not incur any trans-
port costs. For these traders, average storage and transport costs were computed at
the district level and the averages were used to fill in the missing storage and trans-
port information. This was done to avoid losing too many observations for the
econometric estimation. However, this limits the variability of these costs by trader
50and reduces the ability of these unit costs to explain changes in total costs. An added
difficulty is that wheat grain prices also do not vary much by trader.
Using the cost-estimation results, economies of scale are estimated for both
wheat and flour traders. The positive but small numbers (0.039 and 0.075) indicate
that wheat trading may have some economies of scale, particularly for the more
freely traded fino flour. Although the nonsignificant cost-estimation results and the
small magnitude of the scale indicator make it hard to derive any conclusive state-
ment regarding scale economies in the Egyptian wheat trading sector, commodity
trading in general is characterized by positive economies of scale, and this is likely
to hold true for Egyptian grain traders. The existence of economies of scale would
51
Table 27—Parameter estimates of translog cost function for wheat
and fino flour traders
Wheat trader Fino flour trader
Parameter Coefficient z P > > |z| Coefficient z P > > |z|
α0 0.4242 4.086 0.000 3.0771 2.289 0.022
αy 0.9266 35.304 0.000 0.7257 6.200 0.000
β1 −0.2006 −0.649 0.517 −0.0546 −0.830 0.407
β2 0.0126 0.670 0.503 0.1740 1.450 0.147
β3 −0.0204 −0.484 0.628 −0.5198 −1.358 0.175
φl 0.1693 2.078 0.038 1.1075 2.051 0.040
δyy 0.0043 0.970 0.332 0.0223 2.870 0.004
γ11 −0.0136 −2.655 0.008 0.1374 2.016 0.044
γ22 −0.0025 −0.802 0.423 0.0045 0.390 0.696
γ33 0.0132 1.688 0.091 0.0988 1.614 0.107
θll −0.0426 −0.549 0.583 0.8187 1.361 0.174
γ12 0.0052 1.934 0.053 −0.0038 −1.173 0.241
γ13 0.0091 1.281 0.200 0.0108 1.041 0.298
γ23 0.0052 1.374 0.169 0.0022 0.098 0.922
ρ1y −0.0004 −0.073 0.942 0.0023 0.619 0.536
ρ2y −0.0028 −1.176 0.240 −0.0152 −1.879 0.060
ρ3y 0.0050 0.708 0.479 −0.0007 −0.034 0.973
λ1l 0.0212 1.524 0.127 −0.0399 −2.202 0.028
λ2l 0.0062 0.849 0.396 0.1078 3.305 0.001
λ3l 0.0056 0.293 0.769 0.0707 0.752 0.452
µyl −0.0089 −0.743 0.458 −0.1471 −4.046 0.000
ω1 −0.0778 −4.206 0.000 −0.0968 −1.695 0.090





Economy of scale 0.0391 0.0748
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Note: RMSE stands for root mean squared error.52
Table 28—Parameter estimates of share equations for wheat and fino
flour traders
Wheat trader Fino flour trader
Parameter Coefficient z P > > |z| Coefficient z P > > |z|
Transport
β1 −0.0020 −2.420 0.016 −0.0090 −0.140 0.889
ρ1y 0.0004 2.835 0.005 0.0061 1.574 0.115
γ11 −0.0001 −0.692 0.489 0.0041 1.853 0.064
γ12 −0.0001 −1.045 0.296 0.0036 1.031 0.302
γ13 −0.0001 −0.552 0.581 −0.0095 −0.940 0.347






β2 0.0111 4.723 0.000 0.0969 2.671 0.008
ρ2y −0.0015 −4.215 0.000 −0.0064 −2.918 0.004
γ12 0.0002 0.551 0.582 0.0014 1.156 0.248
γ22 0.0000 0.053 0.958 −0.0010 −0.493 0.622
γ23 0.0002 0.348 0.728 −0.0042 −0.726 0.468






β3 0.1100 9.343 0.000 0.0958 3.249 0.001
ρ3y −0.0152 − 8.338 0.000 −0.0044 −2.432 0.015
γ13 −0.0091 −4.157 0.000 −0.0006 −0.640 0.522
γ23 0.0038 3.339 0.001 0.0029 1.797 0.072
γ33 −0.0086 −3.124 0.002 −0.0076 −1.636 0.102






Note: RMSE stands for root mean squared error.indicate that an expansion of activities in the marketing sector, following a continu-
ation of reforms, would cut the unit costs in the distribution sector, benefiting both
producers and consumers.
Table 29 presents the ex post evaluation of trader perception of profitability in lo-
cal trading activities (that is, before and after the reforms in 1987). It provides some
ideas about the perceived direction of past and expected changes in the level of prof-
itability. On average, the number of traders who felt that profitability was low fell
from 23 percent before 1987 to 4 percent after 1987. The sharpest decline was de-
tected in Cairo and in the Upper and Lower Egypt regions. At the same time, the per-
centage of traders who perceived high profitability levels in local wheat marketing
fell from 30 percent prereform to 17 percent postreform. The largest drop was noted
in Cairo and Alexandria, where the share of traders who perceived profitability as
being high fell from 34 and 10 percent to 6 and 1 percent, respectively.
The trend above suggests that there has been a convergence in the perceived prof-
itability of wheat trading after the reforms. About 80 percent of traders perceived
their profits as being either average or fair after the reform, compared with less than
50 percent before the reforms. This may indicate that the increased competition fol-
lowing the reforms has reduced the possibility for high profits, but it has also pro-
vided for a more stable and fair market.
More recent changes and expected changes in the near future provide a more ac-
curate picture of how traders judge profitability in the sector. The remaining columns
of the table present the results for the season when the survey was carried out, and for
the immediate preceding and following seasons. The figures show that the share of
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Last season Current season in season
Before 1987 After 1987 (1994/95) (1995/96) (1996/97)
Governorate
category High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
(percent)
Cairo 34 30 6 0 22 0 27 0 55 0
Alexandria 10 56 1 22 6 12 9 4 24 3
Lower Egypt 33 18 21 2 30 3 38 4 52 3
Upper Egypt 29 23 14 3 12 6 20 5 32 3
Matruh 26 48 27 18 2 12 0 28 89 0
Average 30 23 17 4 21 5 28 5 44 3
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Note: The figures correspond to the percentage of respondents citing their perception on the level of
profit, either good or bad. The response of the remaining respondents is either average or fair.traders who feel that the profitability in wheat trading is high increased throughout
the three-year period, from 21 percent for the 1994/95 season to 44 percent for the
1996/97 season. The low-profitability numbers, in contrast, remain around the same
level as for the post-1987 period. It is interesting to note that the high-profitability
numbers are higher for the 1996/97 season than any other period for all regions.
As shown in Table 15, wheat trading accounts, on average, for only one-fifth of
private traders’ marketing activities. Table 30 illustrates how private traders judge
profitability in the wheat sector with respect to other activities. Less than 10 percent
of traders indicated wheat trading to be the most profitable activity. Three-quarters
of the traders surveyed find trading in other agricultural commodities, including
livestock, to be more profitable than trading in wheat. Under the current circum-
stances, traders would be more likely to invest in trading in commodities other than
wheat. If the level of relative profitability is used as an indicator, the lowest propen-
sity for investing in wheat trading is observed among traders in Cairo, Alexandria,
and Matruh.
Investment Asset Accumulation and Access to Credit
An important indicator of whether the recent reforms have encouraged the partici-
pation of the private sector in marketing activities is reflected through their invest-
ment and asset-accumulation behavior.
In Table 31, the average real value of assets purchased by traders is calculated for
the prereform and postreform periods. The numbers indicate that the level of invest-
ment has dropped during the postreform period of 1987–96. This suggests that
traders may be hesitant to invest further in wheat trading despite the reforms. On the
other hand, the long-term responsiveness of private-trader investment to isolated
changes in the wheat marketing sector might be quite limited. Given that wheat is
54
Table 30—Relative profitability of wheat trading
Other
Governorate Wheat Rice Maize Agricultural agricultural and Other
category trade trade trade input trade livestock trade activitiesa
(percent)
Cairo 1 28 9 3 52 7
Alexandria 3 6 6 8 59 18
Lower Egypt 8 38 9 7 22 16
Upper Egypt 11 1 14 3 58 13
Matruh 2 0 0 0 53 45
Average 8 22 10 4 40 16
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Note: The figures correspond to the percentage of traders citing the corresponding activity as the most
profitable.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.marketed with other commodities and represents a small share of trader activities,
improvements in the policy environment of other agricultural markets will likely
contribute more to capital formation in wheat trading.
Table 31 also shows that the great majority of wheat traders used their own re-
sources to fund their asset investment. Furthermore, a large share of the credit re-
ceived was raised outside the formal banking sector, primarily from other traders.
The limited access to the formal banking sector is not only restricted to the funding
of investments but also is observed with respect to the financing of other regular mar-
keting. Table 31 indicates that more than 80 percent of traders usually rely on their
own resources to fund their marketing activities.
The figures in Table 32 suggest that traders in Lower and Upper Egypt have rel-
atively greater access to credit than their counterparts in the urban centers of Cairo
and Alexandria. Although at lower levels of investment, 20 percent of traders in
56
Table 32—Sources of finance for marketing activities
Primary source of finance
Governorate Received credit in 
category  Own funds Credit Own and credit 1995/96 agricultural year
(percent of respondents)
Cairo 97 0 3 3
Alexandria 87 0 13 10
Lower Egypt 80 1 19 21
Upper Egypt 78 2 20 21
Matruh 100 0 0 5
Average 81 1 18 19
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
Table 33—Details of average credit obtained by the traders in 1995/96
Governorate Amount Amount Loan Share of credit
category borrowed repaid period used in trade Interest rate
(£E) (days) (percent)
Cairo 60,000 67,200 365 45 12
Alexandria 105,129 112,129 102 50 11
Lower Egypt 10,515 11,284 165 67 15
Upper Egypt 12,045 13,448 249 59 16
Matruh 47,056 47,057 5 60 4a
Average 16,229 17,558 192 63 15
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1997).
a The low interest rate in Matruh is due to the fact that three out of the four traders that used credit in that
region paid no interest rate. The credit was obtained from friends and family or other informal sources for a
short period of time (five days on average).Lower and Upper Egypt secured credit to finance their trading activities compared
with 3 and 10 percent for the latter. The higher access to credit among traders in
Lower and Upper Egypt may be due to the stronger presence of PBDAC in these re-
gions. In fact, Table 26 indicates that only in these regions have traders been using
PBDAC to finance their investments. Since the introduction of the 1987 reforms,
PBDAC has financed 20 and 50 percent of the investment by traders in Lower and
Upper Egypt, respectively. The absolute level of credit received in the 1995/96 agri-
cultural year by the average trader is, however, much larger in Cairo and Alexandria
(Table 33). It ranges between £E60,000 and £E105,000 in Cairo and Alexandria,
respectively, compared with less than £E50,000 in each of the remaining regions.
The average interest rate paid for these loans is 15 percent, which is moderate by
developing-country standards (see Badiane et al. 1997).
Determinants of the Investment Behavior of Wheat Traders
To determine the factors that may have influenced the investment behavior of local pri-
vate traders following the reforms of 1987, a probit model was used. In this model, the
propensity to invest is approximated by the likelihood of purchasing a warehouse af-
ter 1987. A warehouse is the most common asset that a trader usually purchases to ef-
fectively conduct his marketing activities. Following Feder and Onchan (1987); Place
and Hazell (1993); and Hayes, Roth, and Zepeda (1997), who analyze investment in
farmland and land improvement, it is assumed that investment is a function of indi-
vidual trader characteristics, access and use of credit, initial wealth, and regional or lo-
cation-specific variables. It is also conjectured that perceptions regarding the policy
environment have an important effect on the willingness to invest in a certain sector.
The probit model is specified as follows:
WAREPO87 = (INTEDUC, HIEDUC, YTRD5T10, YRTRDGR10, INHERIT,
NONTRAD, WHTRAD, OGTRAD, INPTRAD, OWNFUND,
HAVEFUND, RTASPR87, AREAEXP, VOLEXP, PRF87GD,
PRF87AVG, WAREPR87, LACKSTOR, CAIROGIZ, ALEX,
EDELTA, UEGYPT).
The dependent variable WAREPO87 is equal to 1 if the trader has invested in a ware-
house after 1987 and 0 otherwise. The individual characteristic variables include
measures of the following: Levels of education (INTEDUC is equal to 1 if the trader
has attained intermediate education, and HIEDUCis equal to 1 if he or she has a high
level of education); experience (YTRD5T10 is set to 1 if the trader has been in the
trading business between 5 to 10 years and YRTRDGR10 is set to 1 if the trader has
more than 10 years of experience in trading); the trader’s motivation for entering the
wheat trade (INHERIT is equal to 1 if the business was inherited); the trader’s main
occupation (NONTRAD is a dummy if the trader’s main occupation is not trading);
and whether the trader conducts trading activities in wheat (WHTRAD), other grains
(OGTRAD), or agricultural inputs (INPTRAD).
57Since the level of credit use may be endogenous to investing in a warehouse and
no adequate instruments are available to predict credit use, exogenous variables that
approximate the use of credit are used in the model. These include whether traders
generally use their own funds to finance their trading operations (OWNFUND) and
whether they responded “yes” to the question “do you have enough funds to conduct
your trading operations?” (HAVEFUND is set to 1 if the answer is “yes”)
Initial wealth is measured by aggregating the real value of all assets purchased or
owned before 1987 (RTASPR87). The policy variables include the traders’ percep-
tions about their levels of profitability before 1987; PRF87GD is one if this was
ranked as good and PRF87AVG if it was average. The variables AREAEXPand VOL-
EXP are set to 1 if the traders expressed an interest in either expanding their area or
volumes of operations, respectively. These approximate the traders’ positive re-
sponse to the changes in the wheat policy environment.
To control for whether the supply of storage is a constraint for investing in a
warehouse, the variable LACKSTOR is set to 1 if the trader noted a problem in ac-
cess to storage space. The variable WAREPR87 is equal to 1 if the trader owned a
warehouse before 1987. This controls for the fact that a trader who already owned
a warehouse before 1987 is less likely to purchase one afterward. The regional dum-
mies are for Cairo–Giza (CAIROGIZ), Alexandria (ALEX), the Eastern Delta
(EDELTA), and Upper Egypt (UEGYPT). These approximate unobserved supply-
side characteristics that may influence the propensity to invest.
The results from the probit analysis are shown in Table 34. As expected, the es-
timated parameters suggest that the propensity to invest in marketing activities is pos-
itively associated with education levels. The level of experience in trading has a non-
linear effect on the likelihood to invest. Some level of experience is likely to
encourage investment, but beyond 10 years of experience the effect is not significant.
This could also be explained by the fact that traders with more than 10 years of ex-
perience have already invested in a warehouse before 1987. Traders who have in-
herited their business are less likely to have bought a warehouse after 1987, most
probably because they would have inherited it from their relatives. Whether or not
the primary occupation of the respondent is trading does not seem to affect invest-
ment behavior. However, compared with being engaged in other trading or non-
agricultural activities, trading in wheat decreases the probability of warehouse
investment. On the other hand, trading in agricultural inputs, which were only
recently liberalized, increases the probability of investing in a warehouse. This find-
ing supports the earlier argument that investing in wheat marketing activities is in-
fluenced by policy factors outside the wheat area and related to the agriculture
sector in general.
The coefficients on the credit variables are significant. They suggest that traders
that finance their operations with their own funds are less likely to invest in a ware-
house. This underscores the general finding that lack of access or use of credit is a
major investment constraint. If traders have enough funds (cash or credit) to conduct
their trade, the propensity to invest is positive. The initial wealth variable is not sig-
58nificant, nor is the lack of supply storage space. In fact, as found from the traders’
survey, access to storage does not seem to be a major impediment in Egypt.
The policy perception variables show some unusual results. If the traders’ per-
ceptions about their profit levels were good or average for the period before 1987,
they seemed less likely to invest in warehouses after 1987. One plausible explana-
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Table 34—Probit analysis of trader investment in wheat marketing
Variable Coefficient Standard error zP > > |z|
INTEDUC 0.2730* 0.1104 2.473 0.013
HIEDUC 0.5725* 0.1496 3.826 0.000
YTRD5T10 0.2415* 0.1235 1.955 0.051
YTRDGR10 0.0722 0.1577 0.458 0.647
INHERIT −0.2578* 0.1293 −1.993 0.046
NONTRAD −0.1304 0.1123 −1.161 0.246
WHTRAD −0.3703 0.2048 −1.808 0.071
OGTRAD 0.2579 0.1997 1.292 0.196
INPTRAD 0.2534* 0.1277 1.984 0.047
AREAEXPD 0.2173* 0.1118 1.943 0.052
VOLEXPD −0.1257 0.1193 −1.054 0.292
LACKSTOR 0.0059 0.1133 0.052 0.959
OWNFUNDS 0.5464* 0.1307 −4.181 0.000
HAVEFUND 0.3021* 0.1176 2.569 0.01
PRF87GD −0.3476* 0.1585 −2.193 0.028
PRF87AVE −0.4483* 0.1620 −2.767 0.006
RTASPR87 −9.48 e−09 1.68 e−07 −0.056 0.955
WAREPR87 −1.5532* 0.1984 −7.832 0.000
CAIROGIZ −0.5166* 0.1937 −2.667 0.008
ALEX −0.0318 0.2415 −0.132 0.895
EDELTA 0.3487* 0.1259 2.771 0.006
UEGYPT −0.2941* 0.1292 −2.276 0.023




No 1,363 8 1,371
Yes 180 11 191
Total 1,543 19 1,562
Number of observations = 1,562
Likelihood ratio = −463.45086
χ2
22 = 233.48
Probability >χ 2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.2012
Note: * significant at the 5 percent level.tion is that traders who did fare well before 1987 did not see the need to invest in
warehouses after that period, whereas poorly performing traders hoped to improve
their performance by investing in warehouses. Moreover, the traders that responded
positively to the desire to expand their areas of operation were also more likely to in-
vest in warehouses. However, the desire for volume expansion does not have a sig-
nificant impact on warehouse investment.
As conjectured, if traders owned warehouses before 1987, they were less likely
to invest in another warehouse after 1987. That effect is large and significant. This
finding may also indicate that reforms have contributed more to the entry of new
traders in wheat marketing than to the expansion of existing operations. Finally, the
regional dummies suggest that, compared with the Western Delta, the propensity to
invest in a warehouse in Cairo-Giza or Upper Egypt is lower. In contrast, the likeli-
hood of investing is higher in the Eastern Delta. For the Cairo-Giza regions, this is
because storage costs are higher (see Table 25) and storage space is more difficult to
obtain. The Eastern Delta is considered the main wheat producing region of Egypt.
Therefore, this result is not surprising. Upper Egypt, on the other hand, does not have
a well-developed infrastructure relative to the Delta region.
Conclusion
There is some indication that market reforms have increased the number of partici-
pants in wheat marketing, which has resulted in more competitive markets. However,
there is no indication that the reforms have led to an expansion of existing trading
operations. The survey findings suggest that wheat marketing is a small-scale activ-
ity, often not the most important one for local traders. As in many other countries,
limited access to capital is the most important constraint to the area or volume ex-
pansion of private traders.
Some evidence also suggests that traders are hesitant to engage in long-distance
trading or in long-term storage. Despite widespread access to transport, storage, and
information infrastructure, the area coverage of spatial arbitrage seems to be deter-
mined both by price differences between these markets, as well as by the physical
distance of markets. This finding is partly related to the occasional restrictions on
wheat movement between governorates and the fact that a large segment of the wheat
distribution and processing subsectors are still regulated by the government. This
should have significant implications for the performance and efficiency of local
wheat markets, which is the focus of the following chapter.
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Price Behavior and Adjustment in the
Egyptian Wheat Markets
A
n important yardstick in assessing the impact of policy changes on the do-
mestic marketing system is to evaluate their effects on the level and stability
of local prices and on the performance of rural and urban markets. While the pre-
ceding chapter evaluated changes in market structure in terms of market competi-
tion, this chapter focuses on changes in market performance and efficiency by ana-
lyzing marketing margins and the extent of integration between local markets.
Expected Impact of Market Reforms on Wheat Prices
The impact of market reforms on the behavior of prices will depend largely on the
prereform pricing regime and the response of the private and public sectors to the re-
forms. Because wheat farm prices in Egypt were heavily taxed before the reforms of
1987 (see Chapter 2), producer prices would be expected to rise to reach international
price levels following price liberalization. In contrast, because consumer prices are
subsidized in Egypt, elimination of the subsidy could result in higher consumer
prices. However, if marketing costs also decline because of the participation of a
more cost-efficient and competitive private marketing sector, the increase in con-
sumer prices could be substantially dampened. This was observed, for example, in
Kenya, where the liberalization of the milling sector resulted in lower consumer
prices for maize meal, despite the fact that the consumer price subsidy for maize meal
was eliminated (Jayne and Argwings-Kodhek 1997).
Changes in price variability following the reforms are hard to predict because
market prices are determined by several factors, including local supply and demand
conditions, international prices, improvement in productivity, changes in marketing
and processing costs, and extent of competition and efficiency of the emerging pri-
vate sector. In general, if market prices were fixed by the government during the pre-
reform period, price deregulation should result in higher price variability. However,
if local market prices were not effectively controlled by the government, price vari-
ability could decline. The more rapid response of the private sector to changes in sup-
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Price Behavior and Adjustment
in the Egyptian Wheat Marketsply and demand conditions, coupled with the freer flow of wheat between surplus
and deficit regions following the reforms, should dampen regional price swings. In
addition, the ability to store wheat to conduct temporal arbitrage should smooth out
interyear price variability.
Price seasonality following the reforms could either increase or decrease. If mar-
ket prices were effectively fixed before market liberalization, seasonality would be
expected to increase after the reforms to reflect the local supply conditions that vary
with the natural cycle of wheat production. However, if markets were not well con-
nected (because of various infrastructural weaknesses or government regulations)
and the government did not effectively control prices in local markets, seasonality in
the prereform period could be more pronounced than in the postreform period. When
markets are not well integrated, surplus regions cannot efficiently supply deficit re-
gions, resulting in higher seasonal price swings within each market. In other words,
if one region has a deficit and that region cannot rapidly import wheat from another
area, the increase in the price in that region will be higher than normal, reflecting
limited supply.
The efficiency of markets is usually measured in empirical research by analyz-
ing time-series data on producer and consumer prices to examine either marketing
margins or the extent of market integration. Marketing margins are the difference or
spread in prices between two pertinent market levels. Commonly calculated as the
price spread between nodes along the vertical marketing channel—farm to whole-
sale to retail, across regions (spatial margins), and across time (intertemporal)—mar-
keting margins measure the price of a collection of services rendered by market
agents in bringing commodities from one market point to another. These marketing
services include transportation, storage, milling, product transformation, packaging,
and all other relevant postharvest marketing services. These activities are required to
move products from the farm to their final destination, the consumer, across space
and over time. They also often result in a change in the attribute of the commodity
with respect to form. Marketing margins are expected to decline with market re-
forms, reflecting the lower marketing costs of private traders and a more competitive
trading environment.
Market integration can be measured in terms of the strength and speed of price
transmission between markets across various regions of a country (Goletti and Babu
1994). If markets’are not well integrated, this often indicates the presence of either
government policies or infrastructural and institutional bottlenecks that interfere
with the efficient flow of goods and prices between markets. With market reforms,
market integration is expected to increase, reflecting a more rapid and effective trans-
mission of price signals between markets.
Price Data Used
The analysis in this chapter used monthly retail prices of wheat grain and flour in the
city governorates of Cairo and Alexandria and in six governorates in Lower Egypt
and four governorates in Upper Egypt. The governorates in Lower Egypt included
62Beheira, Dakahlia, Gharbia, Kafr El Sheikh, Qalubia, and Sharkia; and the gover-
norates in Upper Egypt included Fayum, Giza, Minia, and Sohag.
Retail prices of wheat grain, in piastres23 per kilogram, were reported by CAP-
MAS for both rural and urban markets in each of the governorates where wheat is
actively traded.24While rural prices were collected bimonthly, urban prices were re-
ported on a monthly basis. Because retail prices of wheat grain for some governorates
were incomplete, the analysis only included the period January 1976 to December
1995 for urban prices, and 1983 to 1995 for rural prices.
Where real prices were used in the analysis, prices were deflated by the monthly
consumer price index (CPI) in Egypt, using 1995 as the base year. The CPI was ob-
tained from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (IMF 1999). To convert
local retail prices in Egypt to their U.S. dollar equivalent, appropriate monthly black
market exchange rates were obtained from Pick’s Currency Yearbook (ICA various
issues) and the World Currency Yearbook (ICA various issues). Information on the
procurement price for wheat grain from 1970 to 1985 and from 1986 to 1995 were
from Dethier (1989) and from MOTS (1997) in Egypt, respectively. For the 1970–85
period, annual producer prices of rice, maize, and berseem (calculated as the
weighted price of long and short berseem) were from Dethier (1989). Supplemen-
tary farm prices of rice, maize, and berseem for 1986–95 were collected from the
United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Attache Report: Grain and
Feed Annual reports for 1995–98.
Monthly international prices of wheat grain are for No. 2 hard winter wheat
(f.o.b. U.S. Gulf) in U.S. dollars per ton, obtained from the International Financial
Statistics CD-ROM (IMF 1999). These were deflated using the monthly world food
commodity price index collected from that CD-ROM, with 1995 as the base year.
The analysis of local retail prices of wheat grain in this chapter covered the pe-
riod 1983–95. The choice of the period was dictated by the availability of price data
and the desire to cover both the prereform and postreform years. The comparative
analysis of local and international wheat grain prices is for the period 1983–95. To
determine the impact of reforms on the price behavior and performance of the Egyp-
tian wheat market, this period was subdivided into two periods: the prereform pe-
riod, from January 1983 to June 1987; and the postreform period, from July 1987 to
December 1995.
The Impact of Market Reforms on Price Behavior
As discussed in Chapter 1, before the reforms in 1987, the government maintained
tight control over all aspects of the wheat sector—production, imports, marketing,
processing, and local distribution. During this period, consumer prices for bread and
63
23 100 Egyptian piastres are equivalent to 1 Egyptian pound.
24 Although CAPMAS data are usually rated as reliable, there is no cost-effective way to test for the accuracy of
their price series.flour were subsidized and wheat grain prices at the producer level were set at a fixed
rate, which was generally below international prices. (Refer to Chapter 2 for a his-
tory of the relationship between domestic and international wheat prices.) The re-
forms of 1987 relaxed some of these controls over the wheat sector. Currently, the
government pursues a two-pronged approach in the pricing of wheat. At the farm
level, the government sets a procurement price at which it will buy wheat from farm-
ers. The procurement price is a guaranteed floor price that was brought closer to in-
ternational prices following the reforms (see Chapter 2). At the consumer level, the
government subsidizes baladi flour and bread prices, while prices of other types of
bread and flour are now market determined.
Level of Domestic Real Wheat Prices
The average real retail price of wheat in selected urban markets in Egypt were esti-
mated to examine the evolution of real wheat prices since 1976, as shown in Table
35. The table shows that average real retail prices of wheat were generally higher in
the postreform period than in the prereform period, except in Alexandria and Ghar-
bia. This could be the result of an increase in domestic wheat farm prices, higher
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Table 35—Monthly urban real retail prices of wheat, 1976–95
Average price Growth ratea
Prereform Postreform Prereform Postreform
period, period, All periods, period, period, All periods
Region 1976–87 1988–95 1976–95 1976–87 1988–95 1976–95
(piastres per kilogram) (percent)
Cairo 130.45 164.77 147.88 0.17 −0.47 0.14
Alexandria 109.83 107.42 109.06 0.08 −0.11 0.00
Lower Egypt
Beheira 89.18 98.04 92.73 0.14 −0.31 0.07
Dakahlia 102.09 106.29 103.77 0.12 −0.47 0.02
Gharbia 100.28 93.18 97.45 0.17 −0.47 −0.04
Kafr El Sheikh 90.37 96.41 92.79 0.29 −0.48 0.08
Qalubia 92.89 99.10 95.37 0.17 −0.53 0.03
Sharkiaa 86.60 109.52 91.29 0.17 1.13 0.22
Upper Egypt
Fayum 89.40 95.41 91.80 0.18 −0.40 0.05
Giza 121.20 128.46 124.10 0.38 −0.35 0.10
Minia 95.04 98.94 96.60 0.10 −0.53 0.01
Sohag 95.95 112.46 102.56 0.20 −0.13 0.13
Source: CAPMAS, Consumer retail prices, Egypt, various issues.
Note: Real prices were deflated using the CPI, Egypt (1995 = 100), obtained from various issues of In-
ternational Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF 1996).
a Calculated using lny = a + b(t) where y is the deflated monthly urban real wheat prices, t is the time trend,
and b is the estimated annual growth rate.world wheat prices, and the elimination of the consumer subsidy on certain types of
bread and flour. On the other hand, the annual growth rate of real retail wheat prices
declined after 1987 and became negative during the postreform period 1988–95. In
general, over the entire 20-year period of 1976–95, real domestic wheat prices across
urban markets exhibited a small upward trend.
Wheat Prices Relative to Competing Crop Prices
Wheat normally competes with berseem in terms of land use, and with rice and maize
in terms of final consumption. For this reason, the analysis of changes in wheat prices
relative to prices of competing crops is important. Figure 7 shows the evolution of
nominal wheat prices at the farm level relative to that of competing crops over the
1970–94 period. It depicts two major phases in the growth of producer prices of
maize, rice, and berseem relative to those of wheat. The first phase, covering the pe-
riod from 1970 through 1982, is characterized by falling wheat farm prices relative
to the farm prices of rice, maize, and berseem. In the second phase of 1983–94, farm
prices of wheat rose in relation to other crops.
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Figure 7—Price ratios of nominal producer prices of selected cereal grains,
Egypt, 1970–94
Sources: For Egypt producer prices of wheat, rice, and maize, 1970–85, Table C.1 in Dethier (1989);
1986–95 producer prices of rice and maize, Khedr et al. (1996). The Egypt producer price for berseem is
the weighted price of short and long berseem, 1970–85, from Table C.6, Dethier (1989); and the 1986–90
producer price is from USDA, Attache Report: Grain and Feed Annual (various issues).The rise in wheat prices relative to all three crops following 1982 is due to sev-
eral factors. First, the liberalization of wheat prices in 1987 and the increase in the
procurement price of wheat to international levels resulted in higher wheat farm
prices in general. With respect to berseem, because its prices were never controlled
by the government, rotations with berseem rather than wheat were more profitable
before the reforms. This partly explains why berseem area and production were
higher in the prereform period, while wheat area started to displace berseem area af-
ter 1987. Maize farm prices were less taxed than wheat before the reforms25and were
liberalized in 1987. Similar to wheat, since 1987, maize prices have gotten closer to
international levels. In general, world wheat prices are higher than maize prices,
which explains why the wheat–maize price ratio has increased after liberalization.
Rice prices were heavily taxed—by about 50 percent (Khedr, Ehrich, and Fletcher
1996)—before 1987. They remained suppressed until 1991, when they were liberal-
ized. Starting in 1992, rice prices started to increase, resulting in a slight decline in
the wheat–rice price ratio after that period. In general, the current price ratios be-
tween wheat and its competing crops reflect a more liberal market environment
where domestic prices are influenced by local supply and demand conditions as well
as international price levels.
Price Variability
Another aspect of price behavior of interest here is the level of price instability and
how it has changed with the reforms. To evaluate wheat price instability in Egypt,
trend-adjusted coefficients of variation of real urban and rural wheat prices are com-
pared with those of world wheat prices. Because rural wheat prices are not available
before 1983, this analysis is restricted to price variability to the period after 1983 so
that the basis of comparison between rural and urban markets is equal. Three peri-
ods are used for this comparative analysis: the entire period of 1983–95, the pre-
reform period of January 1983 through June 1987, and the postreform period of July
1989 through December 1995. Usually, the immediate period that follows the reform
is characterized by more price volatility as local markets adjust to the new trading
environment. Therefore, to provide a more balanced comparison between the prere-
form and postreform period, the two-year period immediately following the reforms
(June 1987 through June 1989) is excluded.
The first rows of Tables 36 and 37 show the estimated indices of instability for
real international wheat prices for the three periods. Note that the index of instabil-
ity for world wheat prices was around 8 percent for the entire 1983–95 period. World
wheat prices seem to have become more volatile in the 1989–95 period (9 percent)
compared with the pre-1987 period (almost 7 percent). In the rest of Table 36, in-
dices of real wheat prices in 12 urban markets in Egypt are calculated. For all three
66
25 While some studies show that domestic maize prices preceding the reforms were about 85–96 percent of world
prices (Khedr, Ehrich, and Fletcher [1996]), other studies show that maize farm prices were higher than world prices




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.periods, wheat prices in Egyptian urban markets seem to be more volatile than world
wheat prices. However, the urban price instability index declined from a range of
10–17 percent prereform to 5–16 percent postreform. In addition, in the postreform
period, domestic price instability is closer to world price instability than in the other
periods. In the prereform period, domestic prices are almost twice as unstable as
world prices. In the postreform period, the urban price instability index for most mar-
kets (except Alexandria) is between 6 to 11 percent, close to the average world price
instability index of 9 percent.
The instability indicators for real retail prices in selected rural wheat markets are
shown in Table 37. Similar to the case in urban markets, instability in rural markets
seems to have declined after the reforms. The range in price instability indices de-
clined from 8 to 14 percent prereform to 5 to 10 percent postreform. In addition,
while in the prereform period wheat price instability in rural markets was higher than
in world markets, in the postreform period, wheat price instability in many rural mar-
kets is close to (or even smaller than) international price volatility.
The figures in Tables 36 and 37 also suggest that the real price instability index
in rural markets is, on average, lower than for urban markets. Because rural markets
are supplied by domestic wheat and urban markets by imported wheat, this may be
an indication that local supply and demand conditions and hence, local prices, are
more stable than international wheat prices. A price stabilization scheme that the
government could adopt to dampen the impact of world price shocks on domestic
markets is discussed in Chapter 7.
The decline in price volatility is a favorable outcome from the reforms. In Egypt’s
case, the reforms seem to have led to a decline in price instability for most markets,
even though world price instability has increased during this period. The decentral-
ized activities of the private sector result in a more flexible system that is better able
to respond to changes in market conditions than a centralized government system.
The more rapid response of the private sector and the freer flow of commodities be-
tween markets following the reforms tends to stabilize local price shocks.
Seasonality
Seasonality of wheat prices is the regular repeating pattern of price movements
within a year. The intrayear fluctuations reflect the market response to the contrac-
tion and expansion of the wheat supply in domestic markets. It is normally linked
to the biological nature of the production cycle of agricultural crops but also reflects
the costs of moving goods over time. Thus, prices would be expected to be de-
pressed during the harvest months, when wheat is abundantly available; and to be
inflated during the lean months, when supply of wheat is relatively tight.
The patterns of seasonality in wheat prices are analyzed separately for urban and
rural markets over the prereform and postreform periods. Overall, the seasonal pat-
tern of price movement of local wheat differs between urban and rural markets. Fig-
ure 8 illustrates the typical seasonality of urban prices, using the examples of Cairo
and Alexandria. The examples of Giza and Kafr El Sheikh in Figure 9 are used to
6970







































Source: CAPMAS Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
Note: Seasonal indices are calculated using the average-percentage method. The calculation involves two
steps. In step 1, the prices for each month are divided by the average price for each year multiplied by 100.
In step 2, the percentage of monthly averages in step 1 are then averaged over the number of years for each
period to obtain the seasonal index for that period (Merril and Fox [1970]).
illustrate the typical price seasonality patterns observed among rural markets. As il-
lustrated in Figure 9, intrayear fluctuations in retail wheat prices in rural markets
show a relatively smooth trend. In comparison, the seasonality indices for urban mar-
kets in Figure 8 show more erratic behavior. This is perhaps because urban markets
depend more on imported wheat, which exhibits more intrayear price swings, whilerural markets rely more on domestic wheat, which is characterized by more stable
prices (see previous section on price variability). In general, prices are lowest during
the months of May to July, which coincide with the harvest season, when wheat is
more plentiful. During the planting season, which occurs around November to Jan-
uary, wheat becomes less available and its price increases.
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Source: CAPMAS Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
Note: Seasonal indices are calculated using the average-percentage method. The calculation involves two
steps. In step 1, the prices for each month are divided by the average price for each year multiplied by 100.
In step 2, the percentage of monthly averages in step 1 are then averaged over the number of years for each
period to obtain the seasonal index for that period (Merril and Fox [1970]).Comparing the seasonality patterns in the prereform and postreform periods
shows that intrayear fluctuations of retail prices in both rural and urban markets have
declined considerably after the reforms. However, intrayear price movements are still
much smaller for rural than for urban markets. This difference in price seasonality
suggests that the two market groups may be effectively segmented. The disconnec-
tion of local wheat markets in Egypt can be explained by the fact that urban markets
are primarily supplied by imports, while rural markets rely mainly on domestic wheat
supply. Therefore, once wheat grain imports and trading are no longer under gov-
ernment control, more price convergence would be expected between rural and ur-
ban markets, as private sector marketing of imported and domestic wheat becomes
more integrated. The decline in the seasonality of the retail price of wheat grain in
the postreform period supports this report’s earlier hypothesis that seasonality might
decrease if the reforms contribute to a better integration of markets.
The Impact of Market Reforms on Price Spreads
The evolution of marketing margins is an aspect of price behavior that is important
in the evaluation of market performance during reforms. Marketing margins are a
concern to policymakers, particularly if they have become unjustifiably large over
time and if cost increases in the delivery of products are being charged to consumers
in the form of higher prices or translated as lower prices to farmers, or both. Market
liberalization is expected to result in the narrowing of margins between market
points, reflecting the reduced marketing costs of a more competitive and efficient
distribution process.
Wheat Grain and Flour Prices
Before 1992, the government subsidized fino flour prices and absorbed the cost of
processing wheat and distributing the flour. Therefore, the marketing margins dur-
ing this period did not reflect the true costs of marketing wheat or flour. As will be
seen in the following analysis, a consequence of the subsidy policy has been to dis-
connect the local wheat market from the flour market.
Figure 10 shows that until the early 1990s, 1 kilogram of fino wheat flour in the
urban markets cost less than 1 kilogram of wheat in both urban and rural markets.
The government enacted successive price increases during the second half of the
1980s, raising the price of the fino flour from 14 to about 95 piastres per kilogram in
the 1991/92 agricultural year. These sharp increases brought flour prices above the
level of wheat prices for the first time around 1990. Because of the higher cost of
local wheat, the flour price in Upper Egypt (Fayum) did not rise above the price
of local wheat until 1992. As expected, after its liberalization in 1992, the price of
fino flour surpassed the price of wheat grain for the remaining period.
The pricing and subsidy policies in the wheat sector not only unlinked wheat
grain prices from flour prices but also affected urban and rural wheat markets dif-
ferently. As depicted in Figure 10, urban retail wheat prices have the typical appear-
72ance of administered prices, with relatively constant prices that are interrupted by
periodic and sudden jumps. In contrast, as shown in Figure 11, retail wheat prices in
rural markets display smoother upward trend lines. This reflects the fact that prices
in urban markets are more tightly controlled through government imported wheat.
Farmers and traders in rural markets buy and sell small quantities of wheat outside
the official government channel, resulting in smoother price changes.
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Source: CAPMAS Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.74































































Source: CAPMAS Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.Spatial Margins
In general, wheat prices in rural areas, where most wheat is produced, would be ex-
pected to be lower than in urban areas, where consumption exceeds available supply.
When spatial price spreads between rural and urban markets of the same gover-
norates were analyzed, in 5 (Beheira, Qalubia, Sharkia, Minia, and Sohag) out of the
10 governorates selected for analysis, real rural wheat prices exceeded urban wheat
prices during the prereform period (Table 38). Real wheat prices in urban markets
were lower than real wheat prices in rural markets by less than 1 piastre per kilogram
to as much as 18 piastres per kilogram. In the postreform period, urban–rural retail
price spreads were negative for four markets (Beheira, Gharbia, Qalubia, and Minia),
although the gap narrows to between 1 and 8 piastres per kilogram.
The reversal of rural–urban price spreads may be either because of the frequent
reversal of trade flows or because rural and urban markets are effectively segmented.
The case of reversing rural–urban trade flows is unlikely, given the stable nature of
wheat production in Egypt. On the other hand, the explanation of market segmenta-
tion is highly likely. The separation of markets could result from the government’s
continued control of wheat import and distribution, and its prohibition of private sec-
tor involvement in imported wheat grain marketing. As a result, urban centers are pri-
marily supplied from imports through the public sector, while rural markets rely
mainly on domestic production. Consequently, rural prices are determined by
changes in local market conditions and prevailing procurement prices, while urban
prices depend primarily on world prices and the level of government subsidies. Thus,
the changes in rural–urban price spreads described earlier would be a reflection not
of changes in arbitrage activities across local markets, but of changes in government
procurement and pricing policies for domestic and imported wheat.
Spatial spreads in wheat prices between Cairo, the largest urban consumption mar-
ket, and other urban markets were analyzed. Normally market liberalization would be
expected to encourage spatial arbitrage—the movement of products from a low price
market to a high price market—which, in turn, may reduce price gaps between some
markets while raising them between others. Thus, market liberalization and increased
arbitrage should reduce intermarket price spreads. Table 39 shows the distance and
evolution of price spreads for wheat transported between Cairo and other urban mar-
kets. For the entire period of 1983–95, interurban spreads of wheat prices range be-
tween 19 and 58 piastres per kilogram. Prices in Cairo remain higher than prices in
other urban markets. The difference between average regional price spreads before
and after the reforms in Table 39 indicates that, with the exception of the Cairo–Giza
market pair, price spreads between Cairo and all other urban markets have increased
from around 20–45 piastres per kilogram to about 30–67 piastres per kilogram after
the reforms. These findings may suggest that intermarket arbitrage is taking place at
higher costs during the reform period than in the prereform period. However, the more
likely reason is that prereform prices did not reflect the real cost of transportation
between Cairo and all the other urban markets. As the table shows, price spreads be-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Contrary to interurban price spreads, seasonal wheat price spreads within individual
regional markets have declined during the postreform period (Table 40). The seasonal
price spread of the intertemporal price margin for wheat is calculated as the difference
between the highest price (which typically occurs during the lean season) and lowest
price (which occurs during the harvest season) within a year, as a percentage of the lat-
ter price. In the last two rows of the table, an average temporal price spread is calcu-
lated for the prereform and postreform periods, 1983–87 and 1989–95, respectively.
These numbers indicate a decline in the average intertemporal price spreads following
the reforms. In Cairo and Lower Egypt, temporal price spreads decline by about 50 to
60 percent. The decline is less pronounced in Alexandria and Upper Egypt (30–40 per-
cent). The narrowing of intertemporal price spreads after the reforms suggests that the
emerging marketing system has tempered intertemporal price swings.
Market Integration in the Prereform and Postreform Years
The main interest in the study of price integration among local wheat markets is to
find out whether price shocks or economic events in one market are transmitted to
78
Table 40—Temporal real retail price spreads in local wheat markets, 1983–95
Lower Egypt Upper Egypt
Year Cairo Alexandria Urban Rural Urban Rural
1983 49.54 14.41 55.25 46.70 42.14 32.32
1984 57.00 82.07 23.00 37.83 37.04 19.24
1985 54.25 29.65 54.18 34.68 33.39 28.19
1986 15.05 15.15 35.13 20.81 43.41 23.80
1987 42.36 30.71 34.59 48.29 38.92 40.68
1988 40.06 37.29 35.87 16.77 48.97 20.22
1989 32.46 67.86 56.25 58.09 41.32 55.08
1990 40.56 2.58 22.79 15.19 17.08 15.82
1991 18.89 n.a. 19.08 16.10 35.08 24.45
1992 16.45 n.a. 20.99 20.53 23.76 20.24
1993 14.05 n.a. 23.92 9.87 23.62 9.65
1994 11.72 11.72 20.78 13.61 25.17 18.54
1995 6.96 57.85 12.79 17.81 23.82 27.01
1983–87a 43.64 34.40 40.43 37.66 38.98 28.84
1989–95 18.11 24.05 20.05 15.52 24.75 19.28
Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
Notes: Real prices are deflated using the monthly CPI for Egypt (1995 = 100) obtained from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics CD-ROM (IMF [1999]). Price spreads are calculated as the ratio of
the difference between the maximum (highest) price and the minimum (lowest) price over the
minimum price in each year multiplied by 100. n.a. indicates data not available for market to al-
low calculation.
a Calculated as average temporal price spread over the period specified.other markets. If price signals are rapidly and fully transmitted between markets, this
implies a better flow of commodities between surplus and deficit regions. This in
turn contributes to stabilizing markets and improving food security. The impacts of
the reforms on market integration in Egypt is determined by estimating a time-series
model of wheat grain prices across several governorates.
Market Integration Model
Before describing the market integration model, the basic theoretical concepts used
in the model are defined.26 If two markets are integrated, some sort of “causality”
must link one market to the other. The concept of causality is interpreted with the
limited meaning that past movements of prices in one (set of) markets contribute to
the predictability of prices in other markets. If the causation is unidirectional, then,
technically, past prices in one market can be used to forecast the prices in the other
market—the principle of Granger causality (Granger 1969). If the analysis can iden-
tify a market whose prices can be used to systematically predict prices in the re-
maining markets, that specific market is considered a central market.27A causation
that runs in both directions would indicate a bidirectional causality or “feedback” re-
lationship between two connected markets. This would occur, for example, if both
markets are important regional markets where trade flows between them go in both
directions. Market segmentation would occur if price movements in individual mar-
kets are completely irrelevant in predicting price movements in other markets. In re-
ality, however, markets for the same commodity are rarely segmented.
Before market integration is tested, the retail-price series is tested for non-
stationarity.28 Unit roots in retail prices of Egyptian wheat are tested statistically us-
ing the test (Dickey and Fuller 1979) estimated as
DF : ∆et=α−βet−1 + vt (1)
where e is the residuals obtained from the least squares estimation of the first dif-
ference in prices at market level i against their lagged levels. Findings of non-
stationarity validate the use of the first differences of the natural logarithms of prices
in the analysis.
Besides the existence of causation between regional markets, it is important to
have information on the magnitude of market interdependence and the speed by
which information about market events are transmitted across individual markets.
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26 See Badiane and Shively (1997), Mendoza and Rosegrant (1995), Goletti and Babu (1994), and Goletti (1993).
27 See Ravallion (1986) for the implication of cases where only one central market affects prices in other markets,
which suggests a radial model of price formation.
28 The presence of unit roots would imply nonstationarity in the series, indicating that the variances are infinite and
thus explode with time. Ignoring unit roots has serious statistical consequences in subsequent model estimation be-
cause it renders the conventional least squares estimation procedure invalid and inferences derived from its results
highly suspect (Dickey and Fuller [1979]).This knowledge enables a better interpretation of the implications of changes in the
central market on price behavior in distant markets. In the process of intermarket
price transmission, the impact of immediate shocks should be distinguished from
their cumulative impact, which builds up over time. This is because the process of
price transmission occurs over time, involving complex dynamic adjustments among
individual markets. The analysis of the price adjustment process over time using the
convergence of dynamic multipliers enables a study of the speed of price transmis-
sion, that is, the number of days, weeks, or months it takes for changes in prices in
one subset of domestic wheat markets to be transmitted fully or partially to another
subset of markets. Information on the magnitude and speed of market adjustment to
shocks is key to understanding the operation of local markets and is useful in the de-
sign of stabilization programs, market information systems, and planning of food se-
curity reserves.
Market integration for Egyptian wheat is investigated using a bivariate auto-
regressive representation of retail prices between several pairs of markets in Egypt,







βi,h∆pj,t−h + Xi,tγi +ε i,t (2)
where
∆pi,t = the percentage change in the retail price of wheat in market i at time t;
∆pj,t = percentage change in the retail price of wheat in market j in previous months
time, t−h;
Xi,t = exogenous variables, such as seasonal dummies and time trend;
mi and ni = the number of lags in retail price changes identified by the Akaike infor-
mation criteria (Akaike 1969);
αi,k, βi,h, and γi = the coefficients to be estimated; and
εi,t = the error term.
The direction of information flow between markets is determined by the Granger
causality test and is formulated on the basis of equation (2):
H0:1β = β2 = β3 =  ....  =  βh = 0, h =  1 ,  2 ,  ...,  ni. (3)
The test above is used to establish the existence of a central market,defined as a mar-
ket whose prices have a one-way influence on prices in other markets. A weaker ver-
sion of centrality would involve causation within a certain region, so that a regional
centeris defined as a market whose prices affect prices in all the other markets within
that region but without, in turn, being affected by them. Granger causality testing is
done for all possible market pairs for Egyptian wheat.
Technically, simultaneity may be encountered in estimating equation (2), a prob-
lem that is related to the use of contemporaneous prices in markets iand j.Since prices
in any given pair of markets may be affected by the same type of shocks concomi-
tantly, the error term εi,t is expected to be correlated with the percentage price change
80variable pj,t. To overcome this problem, an instrumental variables estimation of pj,t
has been used, taking lagged values of the prices of all markets included in the study.
Thus, equation (2) is a reduced-form representation of price changes in one market
as a function of historical price changes in this market and those in other markets.
As pointed out earlier, an indicator that combines both the magnitude and speed
of price adjustment is used to measure the actual degree of integration among food-
grain markets. The magnitude of price adjustment is quantified using average dy-
namic multipliers based on equation (2). The dynamics of the adjustment process in-
volves a series of interim multipliers, as initial shocks originate in one market and
are transmitted from this market to another, before converging to a steady state. On
the basis of the model formulation in equation (2), the cumulative effect of an ex-
ogenous shock to changes in retail prices of wheat in market j on changes in retail








The full adjustment of the dynamic process described by the model is given by




where µi,jis considered a long-run multiplier because it allows for the market to fully
absorb the shock and adjust to its new equilibrium level.
Although the Akaike information criteria give a parsimonious representation of
the dynamics of pricing relationships between markets, the order of the autoregres-
sive process in equation (1) tends to either overestimate or underestimate the length
of time it actually takes for markets to attain full adjustments. The speed of price ad-
justment, Γi,j, to shocks originating in another market is then calculated by comput-
ing the time it takes for the intermediate multipliers to converge within a certain range
of the long-run multiplier given in equation (5). Ngenge (1983) provided two ap-
proaches for measurement: adjustment period I refers to the length of time it takes
for all but 5 percent of the impact from a shock to be reflected in prices, and adjust-
ment period II refers to the length of time it takes when the full impact of the
shock has dissipated. The minimum time of the two measures were used; that is, the
reaction time is measured when percentage deviations of the interim multiplier from
the long run multiplier are small enough. This tolerance limit, θ, is calculated for
every k >Γ i,j as
µk
i,j −µ ∞
i,j ———— < 0. (6)
x∞
i,j
The minimum tolerance limit is equal to 1 percent. Price responses achieved
within the shortest possible time would suggest markets are efficient in processing
81new information relayed from the other market. An extended response period would
indicate a sluggish market and the existence of impediments unwarranted by those
that naturally exist.
The extent of market connectedness measured can range from perfect market
integration to complete market disconnection or segmentation. Perfect integration,
µi,j = 1, occurs if the price in one market is an exact translation of the price in an-
other market, implying that price changes are fully transmitted between the two mar-
kets. The transmission factor can in this case be interpreted as an indicator of trans-
fer costs between the two markets. Absence of any price relationship between
markets would indicate segmented markets, that is, µi,j = 0. However, as neither has
been observed in real markets, perfect integration or segmentation are only extreme
cases, with intermediate degrees of integration, 0 < µi,j < 1, being the normal situa-
tion.
Generally, the speed of cross-market price responses is determined by the effi-
ciency of the distribution system and by the structural characteristics of local mar-
kets. Rapid adjustments would reflect sufficient flexibility and responsiveness of the
domestic market mechanism. Furthermore, given the magnitude of price adjustment
between two markets, better-integrated markets would tend to require less time to
adjust quickly to shocks originating in another market. Accordingly, both indicators
of magnitude and speed of price adjustment are used to measure the actual extent of
market integration in retail wheat markets in Egypt.
Discussion of Results
The data used to estimate the above model are monthly retail wheat grain prices in
11 urban markets in Egypt.29 The 1976–95 period is divided into a prereform period
(1976–86) and a postreform period (1987–95). The bivariate autoregressive model
is applied first performing the Dickey-Fuller test to test for nonstationarity of the in-
dividual price series. The results show that each series should be first-differenced to
impose stationarity. Next, lags between market pairs are identified using the Akaike
information criteria. In cases where zero lags are obtained, this means that adjust-
ment to price changes in another market are instantaneous, at least within a month.
In this case, long-run multipliers cannot be estimated and the analysis stops here. For
other market pairs where lags are identified, the next step uses the nonzero lags to
estimate the long-run multipliers. Finally, the speed of price transmission (measured
in months) is estimated using the formula defined in equation (5).
The discussion of the model results begins with the market integration between
Cairo and other urban markets in Egypt. The analysis is conducted between Cairo
and 10 other urban markets. First, it is assumed that the Cairo market leads all other
urban wheat markets so that the direction of price movement is from Cairo to other
82
29 The Sharkia market was dropped from the analysis because of a significant number of missing values in the price
series totaling 41 percent of the total 240 observations.markets. Then the reverse causation between the 10 other markets and Cairo is also
tested. This gives a total of 20 market pairs corresponding to trade flows to and from
Cairo.
As summarized in Table 41,30 results of the estimates of cross-market, long-run
multipliers before the reforms of 1987 show that only 20 percent of the total of 20
pairs produced significant multipliers. However, except for the Cairo–Minia pair, all
the significant market pairs have the wrong sign. The negative correlation between
Cairo and Dakahlia, and between Cairo and Alexandria, contradicts a priori expec-
tations and cannot be explained. The significant positive long-run multiplier of 0.22
between Cairo and Minia indicates the market leadership role played by the Cairo
market in the local discovery of wheat prices. However, the causality relationship be-
tween these markets is weak. The estimated long-run multiplier is 0.22. This means
that a 1 percent increase (or decrease) in Cairo prices only leads to a 0.22 percent in-
crease (or decrease) in wheat prices in Minia. A change in price in Cairo takes 8
months to be reflected as a change in price in Minia, which is much longer than the
normal travel time between these markets. Overall, the results show that urban wheat
markets are not affected by changes in market conditions in Cairo, and vice versa.
The segmentation of local urban wheat markets is not surprising considering that,
during the years before 1987, the interregional movement of wheat was prohibited
by the government and producer and consumer prices were set independent of
changes in market conditions. In this case, prices in different markets could be ex-
pected to be uncorrelated with each other.
Subsequent computations of the bivariate time-series model were conducted to
test for a change in market behavior after the introduction of reforms. The results
presented in Table 42 indicate that the transmission of price changes between Cairo
83
Table 41—Price transmission across urban wheat markets
during the prereform period (1976–86)






Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
Note: Sharkia was dropped from the analysis because retail prices for 1992–95 are
missing. Only significant estimates are presented.
a The arrow indicates that the market on the left leads or “Granger causes” the market on
the right.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
30 Only the significant estimates are presented in this table.and other urban markets has improved during the postreform period. Of the 20 long-
run multipliers, 3 are significant and of the correct, positive sign. In addition, 5 out
of the 10 market pairs exhibit no lags, indicating that adjustment to changes in Cairo
prices occur very quickly—within a month. These pairs include Cairo–Alexandria,
Cairo–Beheira, Cairo–Fayum, Cairo–Minia, and Cairo–Sohag. As mentioned ear-
lier, for these market pairs, long-run multipliers cannot be calculated and therefore
are not shown in Table 42.
The Cairo–Dakahlia market link, for which the previous estimates over the pre-
reform years yielded significant but incorrectly signed multipliers, exhibits signifi-
cant and positive long-run multipliers over the postreform years. The multiplier es-
timates are significant from Cairo to Dakahlia and for the reverse case, indicating a
feedback causality relationship between these markets, with Dakahlia exerting a
larger effect on Cairo (0.31 percent) than Cairo on Dakahlia (0.17 percent). This re-
sult may be because Dakahlia is one of the largest wheat-producing governorates in
Lower Egypt, and therefore, some wheat could be flowing from Dakahlia to Cairo,
influencing prices in Cairo. The results for the market pairs of Cairo–Kafr El Sheikh
and Cairo–Gharbia support the market leadership of Cairo, although the price rela-
tionship is weak. The cross-market, long-run multipliers between Cairo–Kafr El
Sheikh and Cairo–Gharbia only range from 0.19 to 0.24. Overall, market adjustment
to local changes in supply and demand takes considerable time, 1–8 months.
The same model has been computed for urban markets in Lower and Upper Egypt
before and after reforms. In Lower Egypt, significant multipliers were obtained in
the prereform period for 3 out of 38 pairs that were estimated. The estimated coeffi-
cients range between 0.06 and 0.23, with market adjustment taking as much as 20
months (Table 43). About 26 percent showed instantaneous relationships, suggest-
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Table 42—Price transmission across urban wheat markets in
the postreform period (1987–95)






Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
Note: A zero lag structure between a pair of markets indicates an instantaneous price
relationship between these markets. Sharkia was dropped from the analysis
because retail prices for 1992–95 are missing. Only significant estimates are
presented.
a The arrow indicates that the market on the left leads or “Granger causes” the market on
the right.
* Significant at the 12–15 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.ing that response time occurs within a month. (These latter results are not shown in
Table 43 because no long-run multipliers can be calculated for these market pairs.)
In comparison, long-run multiplier estimates in Upper Egypt for the same period
are significant for 6 out of 24 pairs with values ranging between 0.07 and 0.21 (Table
44). It appears from these results that markets in Upper Egypt were better integrated
over the prereform period than markets in Lower Egypt. The frequency of inter-
connected markets is higher in the first region, although the magnitude of integra-
tion is comparable in both regions. However, market adjustment seems to occur more
rapidly within Lower Egypt than Upper Egypt. Comparing these results with those
shown in Table 41, it seems that markets in these two regions are better integrated
with each other than with the Cairo markets, despite being influenced by the latter
market. No single market could be identified as a market leader from within the two
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Table 43—Price transmission across urban markets in Lower
Egypt (1976–86)





Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various issues.
Note: Instantaneous relationships were found for the market pairs of Qalubia–Kafr
El Sheikh, Qalubia–Ismailia, Qalubia–Damietta, Damietta–Kafr El Sheikh,
Damietta–Beheira, and Damietta–Ismailia.
a The arrow indicates that the market on the left leads or “Granger causes” the market on
the right.
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 44—Price transmission across urban markets in Upper
Egypt (1976–86)
Regional market pairsa Long-run multipliers Reaction time
(months)
Qena→Beni Suef 0.10** 0
Beni Suef→Giza 0.08* 0
Giza→Beni Suef 0.07* 3
Beni Suef→Fayum 0.16** 8
Minia→Beni Suef 0.21** 6
Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
a The arrow indicates that the market on the left leads or “Granger causes” the market on
the right.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.regions, leaving the Cairo market as the single lead market in the formation of local
prices for wheat in Egypt.
Results of long-run multiplier estimates within Lower and Upper Egypt show an
improvement in market connection in the postreform era. Within Lower Egypt, 50
percent of the 38 market pairs have significant long-run multipliers (Table 45). The
importance of Dakahlia as a lead market is also implied by the results of the analy-
sis of integration among markets in Lower Egypt during the postreform period. The
results shown in Table 45 seem to indicate that Dakahlia prices lead prices in almost
all other markets in the region. The only prices influencing Dakahlia prices, in turn,
are Beheira and Kafr El Sheikh prices, but the level of associated multipliers are low,
around 0.1. Both Beheira and Kafr El Sheikh are significant wheat producing gov-
ernorates, which might explain this reverse causality. For the Lower Egypt region as
a whole, the degree of market interdependence seems to have increased after the re-
forms. The number of market links with significant multipliers has increased with
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Table 45—Price transmission across urban markets in Lower
Egypt in postreform years (1987–95)





















Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various years.
Note: Instantaneous relationships were detected between Kafr El Sheik and Beheira,
Kafr and Ismailia, and Ismailia and Beheira.
a The arrow indicates that the market on the left leads or “Granger causes” the market on
the right.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.reforms compared with the estimates in the prereform period. Instantaneous reaction
time is observed between more market pairs. Furthermore, the average level of mul-
tiplier estimates is higher than those obtained in the prereform period.
The results for Upper Egypt, on the other hand, show more cases of instantaneous
intermarket price relationships within the region (Table 46). Out of the 24 pairs es-
timated, 7 exhibited immediate market response. In addition, estimates of the cross-
market, long-run multipliers are larger in values in the postreform period ranging
from 0.01 to 0.83 percent compared with 0.07 to 0.21 in the prereform years. The
period of market adjustment also tends to occur rather quickly in the postreform
years, about 3 months on average, compared with 3.4 months in prereform period.
These findings suggest that markets in Upper Egypt are better connected. It also in-
dicates that market information was conveyed and processed more quickly and more
efficiently following the reforms.
Conclusions
Results of the price analysis in this chapter suggest that market reforms have led to
some improvements in market performance. Domestic wheat prices are now more
responsive to international price levels and local supply and demand conditions.
Wheat retail price volatility and seasonal price spreads have declined in both rural
and urban markets, suggesting that the participation of the private sector in market-
ing activities is contributing to improving market stability. Although marketing mar-
gins between wheat grain and flour and between Cairo and other urban markets have
increased, this indicates mainly that marketing spreads in the prereform period did
not reflect marketing costs, such as transport and milling, because these costs were
borne by the government. The market integration analysis also suggests an increase
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Table 46—Price transmission across urban markets in Upper
Egypt in postreform years (1987–95)






Source: CAPMAS, Consumer Retail Prices, Egypt, various issues.
Notes: Instantaneous relationships were detected between Minia and Sohag, Beni
Suef and Giza, Fayum and Giza, Sohag and Giza, Fayum and Beni Suef, Minia
and Beni Suef, and Sohag and Beni Suef.
a The arrow indicates that the market on the left leads or “Granger causes” the market on
the right.
* Significant at the 1 percent level.in the magnitude and speed of price transmission between markets, resulting in bet-
ter-integrated and more efficient markets following the reforms.
Despite this progress in market performance, some inefficiencies remain. Wheat
markets in Egypt remain isolated from one another; in many cases, they function
rather independently of changes that occur in other markets. Estimates of the spatial
and temporal marketing margins for domestic wheat markets reveal that economic
incentives are adequate to engage in long-distance trading and in storage. However,
despite this and the presence of the necessary infrastructure, storage, market infor-
mation, and other market support services in Egypt (see Chapter 4), barriers still ex-
ist that impair the low cost and free flow of wheat between regions. Although the par-
ticipation of the private sector has increased significantly during the reform period,
its expanded participation remains encumbered by existing institutional constraints.
The government still exerts control over some aspects of the marketing for wheat
(such as a monopoly on imports and sale of imported wheat grain, and restrictions
on the movement of wheat grain between some governorates). For this reason, the
expected reduction in marketing costs and improvements in market efficiency are not
fully realized.
88CHAPTER 6
The Wheat Milling Sector: Structure,
Performance, and Future Prospects
T
he study of the wheat milling subsector is based on a survey of 524 public and
private wheat mills. The results of the survey are analyzed to determine the
characteristics of the wheat milling subsector and to assess its performance follow-
ing the partial liberalization of the wheat processing industry. The survey and the
analysis were designed to address several pertinent issues regarding the wheat
milling subsector, including the following priority questions:
• What are the characteristics and comparative performance of public and pri-
vate mills?
• What is the milling capacity of both the public and private sectors? Is it fully
used or is there idle capacity?
• What are the remaining constraints in the wheat milling subsector?
• What are the future prospects of the wheat milling industry in Egypt?
Structure and Organization of the Wheat Milling Sector
Wheat mills in Egypt can be classified into two main categories of mills depending
on their type of ownership. The first category includes all public mills that were re-
organized in 1993 under two holding companies: HCRWM, which manages five
milling companies, which in turn control 94 wheat mills; and FIHC, which manages
two additional milling companies, which in turn control 37 mills. Holding-company
mills are usually medium- to large-scale industrial mills with a milling capacity
greater than 50 metric tons of wheat grain per day. They play a critical role in the
execution of the Egyptian government’s food subsidy program by milling wheat
into baladi flour and selling the flour at subsidized prices to designated bakeries and
warehouses. They produce about 86 percent of the total amount of subsidized bal-
adi flour produced in the country. They also produce fino flour and sell it at free-
market prices in competition with the private sector.
The second major category of mills are those that belong to the private sector.
These can be further disaggregated into local village mills that usually mill for a fee
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CHAPTER 6
The Wheat Milling Sector: Structure,
Performance, and Future Prospectsfor rural households; and industrial mills where wheat is purchased, processed, and
the wheat flour is sold on a commercial basis. More than 5,000 village mills exist in
Egypt. Their daily milling capacity ranges between 1 and 50 metric tons of wheat.
They can produce different types of flour depending on the final degree of sifting.
Their most common product is 100 percent (or raw) flour. Private industrial mills have
a capacity that ranges between 50 and 500 metric tons per day. Among these mills,
about 34 have contracts with the GASC to produce baladi flour. Therefore, they act
almost like public mills and are heavily regulated by the government. The other type
of medium to large private mills are those mills that have been newly built to produce
fino flour on an industrial scale and that are independent of the government.
Public Sector Mills (HCRWM and FIHC)
Following the 1991 economic reforms, all public organizations, including milling
companies, were transformed into holding companies. The change occurred in two
stages. In stage one (May 1992), under the new Public Enterprise Law 203 of 1991,
the name of the existing Public Company for Silos, Mills, and Bakeries was trans-
formed into the Holding Company for Silos, Mills and Bakeries, with all its affili-
ated companies left unchanged. In the second stage (February 1993), this holding
company was merged with the Holding Company for Rice Mills to become one hold-
ing company, the Holding Company for Rice and Wheat Mills. Its affiliated compa-
nies now include five of the seven public wheat milling companies, the Public Com-
pany for Silos and Storage, and the six rice milling companies of the Holding
Company for Rice Mills. The other two public milling companies were reassigned
to FIHC, which controls 17 other food-related companies in such areas as the cook-
ing oil, confectionary, and sugar industries. The management of both HCRWM and
FIHC falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Enterprise.
To date, HCRWM has sold 61 percent of the shares in three of its five affiliated
wheat milling companies to the public. With the sale of more than 50 percent of the
shares to the private sector, regulation of these three milling companies transferred
from Public Enterprise Law 203 of 1991 to the Private Sector Companies Law 159
of 1981. The remaining companies under HCRWM and FIHC are only 40 percent
privatized and therefore continue to operate under Law 203.
The seven milling companies are located and named after the various geograph-
ical regions that they cover. The total wheat grain milling capacity of the milling
company mills is equal to about 22,000 metric tons per day, of which 28 percent pro-
duce fino flour, and 72 percent mill baladi flour. Table 47 shows the structure and or-
ganization of the seven milling companies, their geographical coverage, the number
of mills they own, their total milling capacity, and their specialization.
Contracted Private Mills that Mill Baladi Flour
In addition to the 7 milling company mills, GASC has negotiated contracts with 34
private sector millers to produce 82 percent wheat flour for the baladibread and flour








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.duction capacity of 85 metric tons per day. They are, on average, smaller than the
public sector baladi flour mills, which have an average milling capacity of 144 met-
ric tons of grain per day. Forty percent of these mills are located in the greater
Cairo–Giza area, the rest are spread out in several governorates. They follow specific
government guidelines regarding the quantities of wheat milled and the distribution
of the 82 percent wheat flour to baladi bakeries and warehouses.
Private Sector Mills that Mill Fino Flour
When the fino flour market was liberalized in the 1992/93 agricultural year, only the
public milling companies were equipped with mills that could generate fino flour.
Therefore, to encourage the private sector to mill wheat domestically rather than im-
port ready-made flour, which is more expensive, the Ministry of Supply gave per-
mission to the private sector to rent the mills of HCRWM and FIHC. It is, in general,
more expensive to import flour rather than import wheat and mill it into flour do-
mestically. This is because wheat grain can be shipped at lower costs than flour, the
locally produced bran can be marketed profitably to feed livestock and poultry, and
milling is not a technically complicated process (Carman and French 1988).
In September 1993, several private entrepreneurs signed contracts with HCRWM
and FIHC to rent their mills for a specific fee that varied with the volume of opera-
tion. Realizing the substantial profits made by the private renters, the holding com-
panies increased the milling fee and demanded a share of the profits of the private
sector renter in subsequent contracts in 1994 and 1995 (USDA 1995, 1996). The new
fee and profit-sharing structure—coupled with fees charged by the Public Company
for Silos and Storage to discharge, store, and transport the wheat grain, flour, and
bran—resulted in lower private sector profits. By late 1995, with international wheat
grain and 72 percent wheat flour prices increasing rapidly, the government instructed
the public milling companies to produce fino flour and sell it in competition with the
mills they rented to the private sector.
Because of the expensive fees that the public milling companies ended up charg-
ing and the relative profitability of milling wheat, the private sector started to build
its own storage and milling facilities and ended its rental contracts with the public
milling companies. By the end of 1997, 9 private mills had started producing fino
flour. By the end of 1998, the total number of private mills producing fino flour was
projected to reach 18. Since the contracts with the private sector ended, the public
sector also increased production of fino flour by using the previously rented mills for
that purpose. As discussed below, this has contributed to the accumulation of over-
capacity in the fino flour sector.
Contribution of Private and Public Sector Industrial Mills to Total
Fino Flour Production
In 1997, 19 public mills produced fino flour. Their combined total daily wheat ca-
pacity was 6,050 metric tons. At the same time, 9 private sector mills, with a total
92capacity of 2,510 metric tons per day, had started operating by the end of 1997. This
brought the total daily milling capacity of public and private mills in early 1998 to
8,560 metric tons per day, producing the equivalent of 160,243 metric tons of fino
flour per month.31 Peak monthly consumption, which usually occurs during the
school year (September through April), is estimated at 125,000 metric tons. This
means that during these months, there is an excess monthly capacity of 35,243 tons
(or 22 percent). During the rest of the year, monthly consumption does not exceed
100,000 tons, resulting in a higher monthly overcapacity of 60,243 metric tons (or 38
percent). This phenomenon has resulted in the fact that in the 1997/98 agricultural
year, many private fino flour mills were operating at 50 to 70 percent capacity while,
on average, public fino flour mills were operating at about 70 to 80 percent capacity.
Private Village Mills
Another category of private mills are small-scale, rural-based or village mills, that
typically mill wheat into 100 percent raw flour. The main source of wheat for the
production of raw flour is domestic wheat, which is brought by rural households and
farmers to the mills for processing. Some village mills also produce baladi and fino
flour, following customer specifications. For the most part, these mills, have a ca-
pacity of up to 50 metric tons per day. Unlike industrial-sized mills, village mills do
not purchase wheat grain or sell wheat flour. Rather, the customer brings the wheat
to the mill and pays a fee for the amount of wheat milled. The resulting flour is of-
ten further sifted by rural households and used for bread making and home baking.
Most rural mills also mill other grains, especially maize. In 1996, about 5,260 vil-
lage mills were spread throughout Egypt.
Milling Technology
Three principal types of milling technology are used in Egypt to grind the wheat
grain into flour: stone mills, old cylinder mills, and new cylinder mills. In stone mills,
wheat grain is fed between two heavy, grooved, flat stones, which crack and grind
the wheat kernel to release the flour. Mills of this type vary in size and milling ca-
pacity, from several to a couple hundred metric tons per day. Instead of millstones,
cylinder mills use two corrugated-steel, cylindrical rollers to crack and grind wheat
grain. This results in the extraction of a cleaner, more uniform, and larger quantity
of flour. Besides being superior for milling hard wheat that produces a higher-
quality flour, maintenance of the rollers is both less time-intensive and cheaper than
the regrooving and repairing necessary on millstones. Compared with the older mod-
els, new cylinder mills operate on a larger scale (typically 250 metric tons per day
per processing line) and employ additional and successively finer rollers and sifters.
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31 Monthly capacity of fino flour production is usually estimated by multiplying daily capacity of wheat milling by
72 percent and by 26 days per month (that is, 8,560 × 0.72 × 26 = 160,243 metric tons per month).New cylinder mills are both more technically efficient and more environmentally
friendly than stone mills, which are associated with intensive dust emissions and
larger flour losses.
The 131 public mills in Egypt are almost evenly split between stone and cylin-
der mills. Mills producing fino flour, whether public or private, typically use new
cylinder mills, since they are more efficient at producing finer-quality wheat flour
on an industrial scale. These mills use relatively little unskilled labor and rely
mainly on computerized machinery. Their capacity usually ranges between 150
and 500 metric tons per day, while the capacity of stone mills in Egypt does not ex-
ceed 235 metric tons per day.
The mills that produce baladi flour use all three of the technologies listed above.
The production of baladi flour relies more heavily on stone mills than the more ad-
vanced technologies. Of all the milling companies, North Cairo Flour Mills is the
best equipped and most technically advanced because it uses the lowest percentage
of stone mills (39 percent) and the highest percentage of new cylinder mills (27 per-
cent). Proportionately to their total number of mills, Alexandria and South Cairo
flour mills have the largest percentage of old cylinder mills (47 and 43 percent, re-
spectively), whereas South Cairo and Middle and West Delta flour mills have no new
cylinder mills. Many companies are upgrading their stone mills to transform them
into cylinder mills.
Contracted private sector mills that produce baladi flour are all stone mills, as
this type of mill is one of the oldest existing mills in Egypt. These mills have no in-
centive to upgrade their machines into cylinder mills as long as they are not free to
purchase and sell their wheat and flour at market prices and their milling fees remain
determined by the MOTS. The government is not allowing new industrial stone mills
to be built; all new mills must have cylinder machines. Finally, small privately owned
village mills usually have stone grinding machines to produce both raw and finer
types of flour that are sifted by hand. Few village mills own old cylinder mills.
Privatization of Public Milling Companies
The partial privatization of the seven public milling companies is part of a larger pro-
gram, announced in January 1993, for privatizing many of Egypt’s state-owned en-
terprises. In the milling sector, with the creation and assignment of the wheat mills
to HCRWM and FIHC through Public Enterprise Law 203, the seven affiliated
milling companies were first converted into joint stock companies. The companies’
shares were 100 percent owned by the holding companies but were subsequently
listed on the stock exchange.
Rather than selling the milling companies or the individual mills to domestic or
foreign investors, the holding companies decided to privatize the milling companies
through a public offering of shares. The privatization was implemented in this fash-
ion mainly because it would not have been feasible to sell each individual public mill
separately. First, public stone mills are an outdated technology that are not worth in-
vesting in. Second, most public mills sit on large and valuable pieces of land that are
94expensive. Therefore, it would have been hard to sell these mills, with the accompa-
nying land, to prospective private millers.
Partial privatization, through public share offerings, has not resulted in a signifi-
cant change in the companies’ management structure. As the majority shareholder,
the public holding companies continue to appoint the members of the management
teams of the milling companies. Furthermore, the milling companies are still ex-
pected to implement the government’s socioeconomic objectives in terms of pro-
duction and distribution of wheat flour. The government’s resistance over complete
privatization of this sector is ostensibly because of the strategic nature of wheat and
the belief that the continuation of the subsidy program necessitates that the manage-
ment of the milling companies’remain in the hands of the public sector.
Descriptive Analysis of Survey Results
Description of the Survey Design and Sample
To understand the structure of the milling sector, a wheat miller survey was imple-
mented in 18 Egyptian governorates.32 In total, 524 public and private sector mills
were interviewed from June to September 1997, covering the operations of the mills
through the end of 1996. The questionnaire asked the surveyed millers a broad range
of questions on the general characteristics and flour production of the mill: their mar-
keting, transport, and communication networks; operating costs; perceived prof-
itability, assets, and investment activities; and the role that they envision for the gov-
ernment in regulating and setting policy in the wheat milling sector. To be able to
compare the operations and performance of different mills, the same questionnaire
was used to interview all types of mills.
While an attempt was made to interview all public mills, the final survey sample
included 91 of the 131 public mills.33 The private mills interviewed fell into two ma-
jor categories: medium to large private mills that have contracts with GASC to mill
82 percent wheat flour, and village mills that process wheat for local consumption by
farmers and rural households. In the survey, 25 of the 34 contracted private mills (74
percent) were included in the final sample and millers from 408 randomly selected
village mills from 18 governorates were interviewed. The village mills were classi-
fied as either large village mills (capacity between 10 and 50 metric tons per day) or
small village mills (capacity less than 10 metric tons per day). All the new, large cylin-
der mills in the private sector that mill fino flour on an industrial scale did not start
operating until 1997. Therefore, because of a lack of complete information on their
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32 The governorates that were not covered in the survey include Port Said, Suez, Red Sea, New Valley, North and
South Sinai, Qena, and Aswan.
33 The reasons for this gap are as follows: a few mills were shut down for renovation, eight governorates were not
included in the original study for logistical reasons, some mills did not give complete information about their oper-
ations and were dropped from the final sample, and some mill officials were unavailable or refused to answer ques-
tions. A less-structured interview was also conducted with six of the seven milling companies.operations before and during 1996, they were excluded from the sample. Some in-
formal interviews were conducted, however, with a few of the millers from these mills.
General Characteristics of the Milling Sector
Table 48 displays the distribution of the sample by type and size of mills and the main
type of flour produced in 1996. All of the contracted private mills and 99 percent of
the village mills in the sample are stone mills. In 1996, all industrial-sized cylinder
mills were owned by the public milling companies. Average daily capacity for the
public mills is 178 metric tons per day, while in contracted private mills it is 126 met-
ric tons per day and in village mills it is only 6 metric tons per day.
Of the 91 public mills in operation in the sample, 82 percent mainly produced
baladi flour, 14 percent mainly produced fino flour, and the remaining 3 percent
mainly produced shami flour. Fino flour was produced mostly in cylinder mills that
are larger and more technologically advanced, while baladi flour was produced
mostly by medium-sized public mills. All the 25 contracted private mills in the sam-
ple produced baladiflour for GASC. Seventy-two percent of the village mills mainly
produced raw flour, while the rest sifted it to produce finer-quality flour. Of the pri-
vate village mills, production of raw flour is more highly concentrated in small vil-
lage mills with milling capacities of less than 10 metric tons per day.
Marketing Channels and Geographic Network for Wheat Flour
The next few paragraphs describe the marketing channels and the geographic net-
work of the milling sector along with a delineation of the roles of the different insti-
tutions involved. Because there are major differences between baladi, fino, and raw
flour, the analysis is done separately for the three types of flour. Figure 2 illustrates
the marketing channels related to the wheat milling sector.
Baladi Flour. Both domestic and imported wheat are used in the production of
82 percent wheat flour. GASC is the main government body responsible for procur-
ing and supplying all the necessary (domestic and imported) wheat quantities to pro-
duce the subsidized baladiflour and bread. In 1996, GASC purchased approximately
1.05 million metric tons of domestic wheat (about 18.3 percent of total estimated
production), and nearly 4.6 million metric tons of imported wheat, to be milled into
baladi flour. After being sold by farmers or traders to cooperatives and the PBDAC
branches, domestic wheat is stored in shounas (storage sheds) ready for delivery to
or pick up from public mills that produce baladi flour. Public mills also receive do-
mestic wheat directly from farmers, traders, and cooperatives. PBDAC and the pub-
lic mills purchase wheat at the procurement price on behalf of GASC.
All marketing costs associated with getting the wheat to the baladi flour mill are
borne by GASC. GASC allocates funds to each of these institutions to procure do-
mestic wheat. Some cooperatives also contract with GASC to purchase wheat from
farmers and deliver it to the mills. Contracted private mills receive the wheat grain

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.GASC calculates the wheat grain price at which it will sell the wheat to mills on
the basis of a negotiated milling fee that varies depending on the estimated cost of
production of the mills.34 The average purchase wheat grain price from GASC is
about £E446 per metric ton. This price is a subsidized price, since wheat grain mar-
ket prices in 1997 were around £E640 per metric ton. The lower wheat price is meant
to cover the costs of operations of the mills (or their milling fee), including a margin
for profit. The milling fee for baladi flour ranges from £E30 to £E46 per metric ton
for the public mills, while the milling fee received by the contracted private millers
ranges between £E25 to £E35 per metric ton, with an average of about £E32 per met-
ric ton.35 The profit margin for any particular mill can be computed as the milling
fee times the quantity of wheat grain processed less all labor, storage, energy, and
other operating costs. Most mills interviewed claimed that the milling fee is too low
(milling fees have not changed since 1991) and that it should be increased to £E60
per metric ton to cover the cost of operations of the mills.
Baladi flour is sold to bakeries at £E290 per metric ton and to warehouses at
£E500 per metric ton. GASC specifies the quantities of flour sold to each designated
bakery and warehouse. In addition, the mills receive from GASC £E210 for each
metric ton of wheat delivered to the bakeries. Therefore, in total, the mills receive
£E500 per metric ton of baladi flour, whether sold to bakeries or warehouses. The
GASC budget thus bears the cost of the 82 percent wheat flour and bread subsidy at
two levels: at the level of the mills and at the level of bakeries. At the mill level, it
sells wheat grain at below-market prices to the public and contracted private mills
despite paying world wheat prices for imported and domestic wheat. The level of the
subsidy, therefore, varies with international wheat prices.36 At the bakery level, it
bares the cost associated with selling baladi flour to bakeries at £E290 per ton in-
stead of £E500 per metric ton and the cost of reimbursing the mills £E210 per met-
ric ton for all the wheat flour sold to bakeries. In addition, it pays for the transporta-
tion, handling, and storage costs of wheat before it is delivered to the mills.
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34 GASC sells the wheat at different prices according to mill ownership, technology category, and age of the mill.
For public mills, average subsidized wheat prices are approximately £E453 per metric ton for stone mills, £E446
per metric ton for old cylinder mills, and £E439 per metric ton for new cylinder mills. For contracted private mills,
wheat prices range between £E440 and £E455 per metric ton. Prices are more expensive for stone mills, followed
by old cylinder mills, and then by new cylinder mills. This is because it is assumed that stone mills have lower costs
of production than old cylinder mills, which in turn are cheaper to operate than new cylinder mills. It is also assumed
that contracted private mills have lower costs of operations than public mills because of lower fixed and labor costs.
35 For example, from 1 metric ton of wheat grain, the representative mill produces 0.825 metric ton of baladi flour
and 0.19 metric ton of bran. Therefore, from the ton of wheat grain, it receives £E412.5 for the baladi flour (= 500
× 0.825), and £E76 for the bran (= 400 × 0.19), for a total of £E488. Subtracting the wheat purchase price from the
sale price of bran and wheat flour, the milling fee for a representative miller is approximately £E42 (that is, £E488
– £E446). Therefore, since wheat flour and bran prices are officially fixed, the actual price paid by the mill for the
wheat will vary with the milling fee negotiated with GASC. If the milling fee is higher, the price of the wheat grain
sold by GASC would be lower.
36 For example, in 1997, the average price of imported wheat was about £E640 per metric ton (including cost, in-
surance, and freight; custom duties; tariffs; and unloading), and therefore the level of the subsidy was around
£E640 – £E446 = £E194 per metric ton for the mills. In 1996, however, the average imported wheat price was
around £E800 – 850 per metric ton, increasing the cost of the subsidy to between £E354 and £E404 per metric ton.Wheat flour is usually picked up by neighboring bakeries and warehouses from
the mills’storage facilities. In turn, bakeries use the baladiflour to bake baladibread
and sell it at £E0.05 per loaf. Warehouses sell the wheat flour in 25 kilogram bags at
the equivalent of £E550 to £E600 per metric ton. Bakeries pick up their flour on a
daily basis, whereas warehouses pick up their orders once a week. This operation is
closely monitored by a resident MOTS controller in each mill to make sure that each
bakery and warehouse receives its exact quota of flour.
Bran is supposed to be sold at £E400 per metric ton and only to feed factories and
poultry and livestock producers. However, in 1996, most mills were selling the bran
in the black market at rates higher than the price suggested by the government (£E400
per metric ton).
Table 49 shows the distribution of baladi flour in the period 1997 to its different
outlets by region as well as the concentration of these outlets within each region. The
table indicates that, with the exception of Upper Egypt, where the majority of flour is
distributed to warehouses (71 percent goes to warehouses), bakeries receive the bulk
of baladiflour in all regions (73 percent of all flour on average). The table also demon-
strates that bakeries tend to be concentrated in urban areas (Cairo, Alexandria, Giza,
and the Delta regions), while warehouses are more common in the more rural areas
of Middle and Upper Egypt, where households bake their own bread. In Cairo, the to-
tal quantity of baladi flour received by bakeries is 24 percent of the total received by
all regions, while in Upper Egypt, it is only 7 percent. In Cairo, all the baladi flour
produced in 1997 was sold to bakeries as all baladiflour warehouses were shut down.
In 1996, with a production average of more than 157 metric tons per day, public
mills operated at 87 percent capacity and exceeded their quota for the production of
baladi flour by a small margin. Besides milling an additional 5 metric tons per year
of baladi flour above the quota, public mills, on average, distributed 68 metric tons
per mill to local farmers and mill employees. Baladi flour is mainly picked up by
bakeries and warehouses within the governorate of the mill, although some of the
flour makes its way to adjacent and more distant governorates. In 1996, the con-
tracted private millers met their contracted baladi quota. Although operating below
capacity, the millers were not able to increase production of baladi flour because of
their limited quota of wheat set by the government.
Private village mills mill wheat into baladiflour for a fee. Unlike the milling com-
panies and the contracted private mills, the private village mills that mill baladi flour
do so for local consumption. They use grain brought to the mill by the customer and
mill it into the type of flour desired by the customer at the negotiated milling fee.
The average fee charged for milling baladiflour was £E35 per metric ton, and in gen-
eral, was lower in the Delta region than in Upper Egypt, where the average fee
charged to consumers was £E48 per metric ton. Of the large village mills (capacity
between 10 and 50 metric tons per day), 53 percent produced mainly or solely me-
chanically sifted flour, while only 16 percent of the small village mills (capacity less
than 10 metric tons per day) produced the sifted flour in 1996.
Fino Flour. Both the public and the private sector compete in the production of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.duce fino flour could be included in the sample, because they had just started oper-
ating in 1997 and did not have sufficient historical data to fill out the questionnaires.
Therefore, the following analysis focuses on data gathered from fino flour public
mills and some notes derived from informal interviews with the new fino flour pri-
vate mills.
Unlike baladi flour, the production and trade of fino flour is almost free of gov-
ernment intervention, except for a few restrictions. As mentioned earlier, the most
important restriction imposed on fino flour millers is that they can only use imported
wheat. Moreover, to prevent subsidized wheat grain slated for baladi flour produc-
tion from being diverted for fino flour production, the government only allows one
type of flour to be milled in each mill. Any importer of wheat grain also has to show
proof of either owning or renting a mill, because imported wheat grain may not be
traded as grain or used for other purposes except for the production of fino flour.
The finoflour public mills receive all their imported wheat grain through their af-
filiated holding companies. Importation is done at the level of the holding company
and not at the level of the milling company to take advantage of economies of scale.
Through informal interviews, it was revealed that in a number of cases, the private
mills import wheat in cooperation with other private millers or with FIHC to reduce
unit import costs.
In 1996, 13 out of the 91 public mills in the sample produced fino flour for part
or all of the year. At least 2 or 3 public mills in each region produced fino flour. The
largest average annual production per public mill occurred in the main wheat con-
sumption and production regions of Metropolitan Cairo and the Western Delta. Fino
flour production by private village mills was produced only in Alexandria and the
Delta regions, with Alexandria producing the greatest quantity of flour per mill. In
1996, fino flour public mills operated at 81 percent capacity. The main reason stated
for operating below capacity was the unavailability of imported wheat grain, fol-
lowed by equipment problems.
Fino flour (whether from private or public mills) is sold in the free market to fino
bakeries, warehouses, pasta and food processing factories, and private traders. It is
sold primarily during the school year and holiday periods. Competition between the
private and public sectors in the fino flour market is growing rapidly because of the
fast entry of new private mills. Average imported wheat prices in 1996 were around
US$240–US$250 per metric ton (£E810–£E850 per metric ton), while average fino
flour sale prices were about £E1,200 per metric ton. At the beginning of 1998, how-
ever, international prices were down to about US$165 per metric ton (£E558 per met-
ric ton), and fino flour prices declined to between £E900 and £E950 per metric ton.
Raw Flour
Raw (100 percent extraction rate) flour is typically produced by private village mills
that mill locally grown wheat for consumption by farmers and other rural households.
The average milling fee is around £E42 per metric ton. The average fee is lowest in
the Nile Delta (£E38 per metric ton) and tends to rise as one moves up the Nile to
101reach £E45 per metric ton in Upper Egypt. Fees charged by small village mills with
capacities of less than 10 metric tons per day are in general £E5 to £E6 per metric
ton higher than those in village mills with capacities of 10–50 metric tons per day.
The lower fees for the latter are in part a consequence of higher milling capabilities,
volumes, and economies of scale.
More than 99 percent of the wheat grain milled by village mills was brought to
the mill by the customer on a need basis. In both 1992 and 1996, only three mills had
contracts with farmers to mill wheat. The customer is responsible for transporting
the wheat grain to the mill and transporting the flour back. The operation of village
mills is more seasonal than for larger mills. Of the total quantity of wheat milled by
village mills, 47 percent was milled during the four months after the harvest season—
typically from May to August, or June to September, depending on location. The vil-
lage millers also mill other grains such as white maize.
Unlike industrial mills that operate 20 to 24 hours per day, village mills typically
operate 5 to 6 hours per day. Mills in the Eastern Delta typically operate only 3 hours
per day, while in Upper Egypt they operate 9 hours per day on average. In 1996, vil-
lage mills processed an average total of 407 metric tons of wheat grain. More than
81 percent was converted into raw flour. In addition, some village mills produced
higher-quality flour. This sifting was either done using mechanical sifters or by
hand.
Bran
With the production by the milling companies and the industrial-sized private sec-
tor mills of some 4.8 and 1.3 million metric tons of baladi and fino flour, respec-
tively, approximately 1.6 million metric tons of wheat bran was produced in Egypt
during 1996. As described previously, wheat bran from the production of subsidized
baladi flour is supposed to be sold at GASC-determined price of £E400 per metric
ton to authorized users, while bran from fino flour production can be sold at free-
market prices. During 1996, as world wheat grain prices soared, free-market bran
prices reached £E600 per metric ton, and many baladi flour mills were unofficially
selling their bran at these market prices rather than at £E400 per metric ton. In the
1997/98 agricultural year, because of the excess supply of fino flour, bran market
prices had fallen to below the rate of £E400 per metric ton set by the MOTS. Bran
prices are also seasonal and tend to fall during the berseem (its major competitor)
harvest period.
Bran is mainly used as livestock feed in Egypt. Of the public mills in the sample,
74 percent sold wheat bran to feed factories, 20 percent sold it to animal producers
directly, and 70 percent sold it to bakeries or warehouses. Although 50 percent of the
mills producing finoflour sold bran to traders, somewhat surprisingly, 17 percent and
31 percent of the public mills and contracted private mills, respectively, producing
baladi flour sold bran to traders. This means that either a number of traders are au-
thorized users of subsidized wheat bran or the government does not strenuously en-
force prohibitions on the sale of bran to traders at market prices.
102Transport, Information, Communication, and Storage
In general, millers do not seem to face major problems in access to transport, infor-
mation, communication, or storage. The extent of use of each of these services
largely depends on the size of the mill and the type of flour produced. However, 22
percent of the milling company and private sector mills reported that the domestic
movement of wheat grain or flour was occasionally monitored by the traffic police
and, to a lesser extent, by the MOTS police. This monitoring is usually done to de-
tect any illegal use of domestic wheat for the production of fino flour and to reduce
the leakage of subsidized baladi flour to nontargeted entities. Most affected by the
restrictions on the movement of goods were the contracted private mills, 15 percent
of which indicated that restrictions had increased over the past five years.
One problem that arises in comparing cost items between different types of mills
is that public mills do not report all their costs. For example, most transport costs
are borne by the milling company rather than by the individual public mill. There-
fore, reported transport costs seem much lower for public mills than for their
private sector counterparts. For the public mill, average reported transport costs are
4 piastres per ton per kilometer, while it costs the average contracted private mill
12 piastres per ton per kilometer. As a result, transport cost figures for the public
mills should be considered as underestimates.
The costs of obtaining information on prices, regulations, and supply and demand
conditions vary by type of mill technology and mill size. In 1996, the milling com-
panies spent more than £E48,000 to obtain information to run their companies. In
addition, individual public mills spent on average £E3,300 in 1996 to obtain addi-
tional information. Mills producing fino flour spent £E2,299 to gather information,
while their counterparts producing baladi flour spent only half as much (£E1,195).
Mills that owned a telephone spent on average £E2,100 on information costs, while
those without a telephone spent less than £E5 in 1996.
Investment, Capacity Development, and Credit
The main assets of a mill include land, the mill itself (building and machines), trans-
port vehicles (such as trucks, vans, and cars), and storage facilities (silos, ware-
houses, and shounas). Table 50 presents the average real investment37 in Egyptian
pounds per metric ton of processed grain for both public and private mills for the
three periods 1978–87, 1988–92, and 1993–96. As many of the investment decisions
are made by the milling company rather than at the mill level, many mill managers
do not know the value of some past investments. In addition, many of the numbers
are not precise estimates because of the difficulty of recalling the value of invest-
ments back in time. The table thus only gives an idea of the evolution of investment
103
37 Real investment is calculated by dividing the purchase value of the investment asset by the GDP deflator, with


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.in the mills. The largest investments are usually made in the mill itself.38 In the pub-
lic mills, the largest investments were made in the mill during 1988–92, whereas dur-
ing 1993–96, no significant investments were made.
Excluding all new mills built since 1992, both the public mills and the contracted
private mills have undertaken investments to upgrade the milling capacity of their
older mills. From 1991 to 1996, milling capacity of the public mills built before 1992
grew by 8.8 percent over the period, an increase of 1.8 percent per year (Table 51).
These investments, coupled with a 0.5 percent annual improvement in capacity uti-
lization, led to a 20.7 percent increase in the average quantity of wheat grain
processed by the public mills, from 41,323 metric tons in 1991 to 49,894 metric tons
in 1996. The increase in capacity and capacity utilization was most pronounced in
the public mills producing fino flour, where the average quantity of fino flour grew
by 40 percent from 1991 to 1996, while the quantity of baladi flour rose by 13.8 per-
cent during the same period (Table 52).
As shown in Table 50, investments by the contracted private mills were more
evenly distributed over the three periods. During the 1978–87 period, most invest-
ments were in upgrading or building new mills. In the 1988–92 and 1993–96 peri-
ods, however, most investments were made in transport vehicles. In general, new in-
vestments by the contracted private mills to upgrade their mills were relatively low.
As a result, their average annual increases in milling capacity lagged behind the pub-
lic mills’. However, the little investment in greater capacity, coupled with a 6 percent
improvement in capacity utilization, led to a 33 percent increase in the quantity of
baladi flour produced over 1991–96 (Table 52).
The relatively low level of investment in upgrading the efficiency and output of
the contracted private mills is not particularly surprising. Rather than upgrade their
stone mills that produce lower-quality flour, many private sector millers opted to in-
vest in modern cylinder mills that produce the more profitable fino flour.
Table 50 indicates that, for the village mills, little is invested in transport or stor-
age facilities. The bulk of the investment by village millers is in the mill itself. As
seen in Table 50, investments in the mill peaked during 1988–92, especially for small
mills, and declined significantly during 1993–96. This may reflect the fact that, af-
ter the agricultural reforms of 1987, which resulted in a significant boost in domes-
tic wheat production, village mills started to expand. However, with the liberaliza-
tion of the finoflour milling sector in 1992, village mills faced increased competition
from large mills and therefore, investment in village mills decreased.
The low level of investment and the effect of increased competition is reflected
in Table 51, which shows that average village mill capacity has remained around 6
metric tons per day over the period. Capacity utilization declined from 36 percent in
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38 As an example of the costs involved for investing in a new mill, according to the United States Wheat Associa-
tion (1997), a new private finoflour cylinder mill with a capacity of 500 metric tons per day would cost about US$20
million, or £E68 million. The equipment would cost about US$30,000 per metric tons of daily capacity (for a Buh-
ler machine, which is considered the best and most expensive) and US$10,000 per metric ton for the land, building,
trucks, and all other assets.1991 to 30 percent by 1996. Moreover, the average quantity of raw flour produced
declined by 31 percent during this period (Table 52). In response, village mills have
increased their investments locally in sifting equipment to produce higher-quality
fino and baladi flour, albeit with only limited success.
Wheat mills in Egypt use a variety of means to fund their milling and wheat-
purchasing operations. Because the public milling companies provide the financing
for their affiliated mills, public mills do not request credit on an individual basis.
Decisions regarding maintenance and upkeep of the mills are determined and prior-
itized by the milling company, with input from the individual mills. Funds for in-
vestments in new equipment and wheat grain purchases are generated from milling
company profits, working capital, and through loans.
The majority (56 percent) of contracted private mills rely only on their own funds
to finance their milling activities. About 16 percent also used bank loans to finance
their operations and another 28 percent obtained additional funds by raising capital
from existing or new partners. Of those mills that used credit to finance their opera-
tions, approximately 60 percent used the loan to fund their purchases of wheat grain,
while 40 percent used the loan to purchase new equipment and improve the opera-
tions of their mills.
As private village mills typically mill the wheat grain that is brought to them
by the farmer or the consumer, the mill does not require funds to purchase wheat
grain itself. Between 95 and 97 percent of village millers used their own funds to fi-
nance their milling activities. Since many small village millers are also involved in
farming, most of the loans taken out by the remaining 3 percent were used to pur-
chase inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, and seeds. On the other hand,
most loans taken out by the large village mills were used to upgrade or purchase new
milling equipment.
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Table 52—Average quantity of wheat flour produced over time by
mill category and flour type, 1991–96
Year
Flour type 1991 1994 1996 Change from 1991–96
(metric tons) (percent)
Baladi flour
Public mills 29,577 30,989 33,677 13.8
Contracted private mills 14,521 15,748 19,325 33.1
Fino flour
Public mills 47,704 58,737 66,798 40
Contracted private mills
Village mills
Raw flour 705 584 486 –31
Mechanically sifted flour 1,654 1,652 1,603 –3
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1998).Access and cost of credit do not seem to be major problems or constraints for the
milling sector in Egypt. On the contrary, interviews with the new, private, industrial-
sized mills mentioned that access to capital to finance their mills was not hard to get,
and that banks have been awash with cash and keen to provide loans to investors.
Cost and Profit Margin Analysis
Structure of Operating Costs
Wheat mills have a number of costs associated with their operations. Table 53 shows
the unit operating costs disaggregated by component and type of mill. Unit costs are
obtained by dividing total costs by the quantity of wheat grain processed. The oper-
ating costs are underestimates of the real milling costs because of the absence of de-
preciation costs, costs of the initial investment in the land and the mill, and other non-
reported costs. Operating costs are especially underestimated for public mills
because their finance, tax, depreciation, and transport costs are borne mainly by the
milling companies. Obtaining detailed financial costs from the milling companies,
broken down by mill, is almost impossible. Therefore, one has to use these operat-
ing cost figures as indicative measures. They are mainly used to illustrate reported
costs by different types of mills, rather than as absolute measures of real operating
costs. In general, costs and profits between the different types of mills should be com-
pared with caution, as the cost figures are incomplete.
Despite these data shortcomings, the reported operating costs of the different types
of mills are disaggregated by cost category. As Table 53 shows, by far the largest cost
components for all mills are labor and energy costs, followed by equipment and main-
tenance costs. The table also indicates that public mills that are still majority owned
by the holding companies (that is, under Law 203) have the largest unit costs of op-
eration. Their average unit processing cost is £E28 per metric ton of wheat grain. Pub-
lic mills operating under Law 159 have unit operating costs equal to £E17 per metric
ton, or £E10 lower than their Law 203 counterparts. Labor costs and equipment and
maintenance costs are more than 50 percent lower in the mills under Law 159 than
those under Law 203 (£E8 per metric ton and £E2 per metric ton versus £E14 per met-
ric ton and £E4.5 per metric ton, respectively). This may suggest that the partially pri-
vatized public companies have been able to reduce operating costs.
Labor costs were obtained by asking for the total number of workers (per family,
temporary and permanent workers), as well as the total number of person-months
and the wage bill for each category of labor used. A breakdown of labor costs
shows that the annual wage rate for each worker is on average higher in the larger,
industrial-sized mills. The average wage rate is more than 45 percent higher in a pub-
lic mill than in a private sector mill. Furthermore, public mills employ more than 4.5
times as many workers as contracted private mills. As with many other public com-
panies, public mills have excess labor. The workforce in public enterprises is charac-
terized by redundancies (Dittrich 1998). Therefore, it is not surprising that public mills










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Contracted private mills are cheaper to operate than public mills. Their average
operating costs are estimated at £E15 per metric ton. Their major cost saving com-
pared with public mills is their labor costs, which are only £E3.44 per metric ton on
average. The largest costs for the contracted private mills are energy and communi-
cation costs, which are about £E5 per metric ton or 33 percent of total unit costs.
Since the public mills may be paying energy prices at subsidized rates or obtaining
bulk discounts, their energy costs are lower as a share of operating costs than their
private sector counterparts. Another major expense for the contracted private sector
mills is the cost of transporting wheat to the mill. Transport costs account for about
11 percent of operating costs of the average contracted private mill, while for the
public mills, they are less than 1 percent of operating costs. For the milling compa-
nies, transport costs account for about 6 percent of operating costs. In addition to
higher energy and transport costs, the contracted private mills also have relatively
higher tax and financing costs. However, as noted earlier, comparison of transport
and finance costs between private and public mills should be interpreted with cau-
tion because these costs are not adequately reported by the public mills.
In the private village mills, most unit costs are also absorbed by energy and com-
munication, labor, and equipment and its maintenance. Small village mills are actu-
ally more expensive to operate than large village mills per unit of wheat grain. The
total unit costs of operations for these small mills are £E21 per metric ton compared
with £E14 per metric ton for the large village mills and £E15 for the contracted pri-
vate mills. Unit labor and energy costs of small village mills are between 40 and 45
percent higher than the large village mills. Increased operation capacity of small vil-
lage mills could possibly reduce their unit costs.
Cost Comparison by Processing Technology and Type of Flour Produced
Table 54 shows the total unit operating costs per metric ton of processed wheat by
type of processing technology for the large, industrial, public mills. The numbers in-
dicate that, within public mills, old cylinder mills are the cheapest to operate, fol-
lowed by stone mills, and then new cylinder mills.39 The major cost difference
among the three technologies is related to labor, equipment and its maintenance, and
energy costs. Compared with old cylinder mills, stone mills are expensive to operate
because they require more labor and more frequent equipment maintenance because
of the old technology. They also require more energy than old cylinder mills. The
new cylinder mills have the lowest percentage of share for labor costs among the
three technologies because, as mentioned earlier, they use less labor than the other
types of mills. However, new cylinder mills are more expensive to operate in general
because of the high costs of the sophisticated computerized equipment and the
associated maintenance expense.
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39 This finding does not follow GASC’s estimates that the operating costs are lowest in stone mills, followed by old,
and then new cylinder mills.This latter finding seems counterintuitive, as one would expect that new mills
should invest in cost-minimizing technologies. However, perhaps the comparison be-
tween the two is not appropriate. New mills have higher up-front costs, such as fi-
nancing and depreciation, which have already been amortized by the older mills. Fur-
thermore, the new mills produce a higher-quality product (fino flour) that cannot be
directly compared with baladi flour, which is of much lower quality.
Profit Margins and Performance
Table 55 shows the estimated per-unit milling fee and profit margins for the differ-
ent categories of mills and types of flour produced. The milling fee is the difference
between the sale price of the wheat flour and bran and the purchase price of the wheat
grain. It includes both the costs of milling the wheat and the profit margin. The profit
margin is therefore equivalent to the per-unit milling fee minus the per-unit operat-
ing costs. As mentioned earlier, the reported operating costs are underestimated, par-
ticularly for the public mills, because of unreported transport, finance, and depreci-
ation costs. To calculate profit margins, transport costs for the public mills were
adjusted to represent approximately 5 percent of total operating costs. Therefore, al-
though the profit margins reported in Table 55 may be overestimated, especially for
the public mills, profit margins between the different types of mills can still be com-
pared.
For baladi flour, the average milling fee of a public mill is about £E42 per met-
ric ton, which is close to the average milling fee negotiated between the milling com-
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Table 54—Average public mill operating costs per metric ton of grain
processed by processing technology, 1996
Stone mills Old cylinder mills New cylinder mills
(£E per (£E per (£E per
Cost item metric ton) (percent) metric ton) (percent) metric ton) (percent)
Transport 0.19 0.73 0.01 0.05 0.22 0.82
Equipment and
maintenance 4.48 17.28 1.20 6.54 4.47 16.72
Rent 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.04
Taxes and licenses 0.61 2.35 0.07 0.38 0.06 0.22
Labor 13.86 53.47 10.46 57.00 10.6 39.66
Energy and
communication 3.33 12.85 2.80 15.26 5.18 19.38
Bag costs 1.55 5.98 1.56 8.50 3.58 13.39
Finance and
depreciation 1.77 6.83 1.22 6.65 2.33 8.72
Other 0.12 0.46 0.10 0.55 0.28 1.05
Total 25.92 18.35 26.73
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1998).panies and GASC. This translates into an average profit margin of £E19.1 per met-
ric ton. Surprisingly, this margin is lower for public mills under Law 159 than pub-
lic mills under Law 203, even though the latter have higher operating costs, as was
discussed earlier. This result is due to the milling fee, which is, on average, higher
for Law 203 public mills. For fino flour, on the other hand, public mills under Law
159 perform better than those under Law 203.
These findings suggest that privatization of the public mills by selling more than
50 percent of their companies’shares to the public did not result in better perform-
ance in terms of profit margins. The fact that North Cairo Flour Mills, which is con-
sidered the best-performing company, is only 41 percent private seems to support
this result.40 As mentioned earlier, privatization has only changed the ownership of
the milling company shares; management and operations are still controlled by the
public sector through the holding companies. Better performance seems to be closely
associated with higher production of fino flour and more modern and larger mills,
than with the extent of privatization. This is confirmed by the rest of Table 55, which
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Table 55—Price and profit margins by flour type and mill category, 1996
Flour and mill type Price margin Profit margin
(£E per metric ton)
Baladi flour
Public mills 42.2 19.1
Law 159 mills 32.2 16.7
Law 203 mills 46.5 20.2
Old cylinder mills 41.1 22.0
Modern cylinder mills 57.8 35.3
Stone mills 39.2 14.4
Large mills 41.1 30.3
Medium mills 42.3 17.8
Contracted private mills 30.9 15.8
Large mills 28.9 14.3
Other mills 31.5 16.3
Fino flour—public mills 223.4 193.7
Law 159 mills 228.2 200.5
Law 203 mills 220.4 189.5
Large mills 226.8 203.8
Medium mills 215.7 171.2
Raw flour—village mills 37.4 18.2
Large mills 31.9 17.5
Small mills 39.4 18.4
Source: IFPRI/MALR/MOTS (1998).
40 For example, in January 1997, the average monthly share price of North Cairo Flour Mills was £E196, compared
with £E119 for West and Central Delta Flour Mills, £E86 for East Delta Flour Mills, £E62.5 for Central Egypt Flour
Mills, £E94 for Upper Egypt Flour Mills, and £E105 for South Cairo Flour Mills (HSBC [2000]).shows that new cylinder mills have higher profit margins than old cylinder or stone
mills, and that large mills perform better than smaller scale mills. Furthermore, profit
margins for fino flour are five to six times as large as those for baladi flour.
Comparing the contracted private mills with the public mills indicates that the
private mills make less profits (£E15.8 per metric ton versus £E18.4 per metric
ton).41 Since they do have lower operating costs, the lower profit margins of con-
tracted private mills are attributed to the fact that, on average, their purchase price
for wheat is higher than for public mills. GASC charges higher wheat prices to con-
tracted private mills because they are stone mills and are supposedly cheaper to op-
erate. Comparing the contracted private mills, which are all stone mills, with the pub-
lic stone mills alone indicates that their profit margins are closer (£E10.4 per metric
ton versus £E14.4 per metric ton). The difference between the two is because con-
tracted private mills are on average smaller than public stone mills, and smaller mills
are, in general, associated with lower profits.
For the village mills that mainly produce raw flour, profit margins are about
£E18.2 per metric ton. They seem to be higher for smaller mills than for larger mills
(£E18.4 per metric ton versus £E17.5 per metric ton). This is mainly because smaller
village mills charge a higher milling fee.
Economies of Scale
According to Harwood, Leath, and Heid (1989), the wheat flour milling industry is
characterized by economies of scale in “processing, procurement, finance, and trans-
portation.” This means that operating costs per unit tend to drop as quantity processed
increases. Apart from the savings in per-unit transport, procurement, and finance
costs due to larger volumes traded, per-unit labor costs also decline with size because
the additional amount of labor needed to operate a large plant is marginal compared
with a smaller plant. In addition, larger mills may have better access to information
and credit than smaller mills, particularly if they are part of a larger corporate struc-
ture. This statement holds true for the public mills in Egypt, which belong to large
milling companies and thereby have better and cheaper access to credit than private
sector mills. (See Table 53 for the difference in finance costs between public and con-
tracted private mills.)
The presence of economies of scale in the wheat flour milling sector would ex-
plain why the development trend in the industry is to see a drop in the number of
mills and an increase in mill capacity. While the fino flour milling industry in Egypt,
for example, is still in its early stages of development, all new industrial mills have
on average much larger capacities than the existing mills. The new private mill ca-
pacities range between 200 and 500 metric tons of wheat grain per day, compared
with the average total milling capacity of 181 metric tons per day in the existing pub-
lic industrial mills.
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41 This difference is not tested for significance because unreported public mill costs may make absolute compari-
son between public and private mills unreliable.To test for economies of scale in the wheat flour milling industry in Egypt, a
translog cost function is estimated. The benefits of using a translog is that it is a flex-
ible functional form with minimum a priori restrictions on the structure of pro-
duction or costs (Brown, Caves, and Christensen 1979). It can be thought of as a
second-order Taylor’s series approximation of an arbitrary cost function. It permits
an explicit account of multiproduct firms and allows determination of both product-
specific and overall economies of scale that can vary with the level of outputs and
factor prices (Gilligan, Smirlock, and Marshall 1984). The translog cost function is
specified in natural logarithmic form (ln) as follows:42



























where C is defined as total costs, yi are the m outputs, and Pj are the n input prices.
To ensure symmetry and linear homogeneity in factor prices, the following re-
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Scale economies, defined as the relative increase in all outputs resulting from a
proportional increase in all inputs, can be computed as follows:
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where SE > 1 indicates positive economies of scale, SE = 0 indicates no economies
of scale, and SE < 0 indicates negative economies of scale.
The following translog cost function is estimated for the Egyptian industrial
milling sector using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method:
LnC =α 0 +α 1lnWF +α 2lnBRAN +β 1lnWGP + (1 −β 1)lnWAGE
11 + — δ11(lnWF)2 +δ 12lnWF.lnBRAN + — δ22(lnBRAN)2
22
11 + — γ11(lnWGP)2 +γ 12lnWGP.lnWAGE + — γ22(lnWAGE)2
22
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42 See Jorgenson (1986) for a detailed review of the translog cost function used in production analysis. On the meas-
urement of scale economies using the translog cost function, see Brown, Caves, and Christensen (1979) for an ap-
plication to U.S. railroad services; Murray and White (1983), Shaffer (1984), and Gilligan, Smirlock, and Marshall
(1984) for studies on the banking industries; and Omoregie (1995) for the oilseed processing sector in Nigeria.+ρ 11lnWF.lnWGP +ρ 12lnWF.lnWAGE +ρ 21lnBRAN.lnWGP
+ρ 22lnBRAN.lnWAGE +ε.
Total costs (C) are computed as the sum of material, labor, energy, equipment, fi-
nancial, and other miscellaneous operating costs. The two main outputs are wheat
flour (WF) and bran (BRAN). The variable input prices include wheat grain prices
(WGP) and wages (WAGE). Because of difficulties in determining the value and
rental rate of the mills capital stock, particularly for the mills owned by the public
sector, the price of capital is excluded from the equation.
The equation uses cross-sectional data on the public and private sector mills that
produce either 82 or 72 percent wheat flour. The sample is composed of the 25 con-
tracted private mills that mill baladi flour for GASC, 10 public and modern cylin-
der mills that produce the fino flour, and the 70 remaining stone and old cylinder
public mills that produce baladi flour.
The estimation results are presented in Table 56. Only 4 out of the 14 parameters
are statistically significant.43 This is perhaps because of problems with the underly-
ing cost data. First, wheat grain and flour prices vary little for a majority of the mills,
since they buy wheat grain and sell flour at fixed prices. Second, there are no data on
the costs of capital and energy prices that could provide more cost variability among
the mills. Third, given that most of the mills in the sample are not free to choose the
optimum quantity of input or output to minimize costs, it is hard to extract mean-
ingful results from this estimation.
Despite these data shortcomings, the SE is computed at the mean of the quanti-
ties and prices. The estimated SE is positive but small (0.0096), indicating that the
milling industry could have some economies of scale. Although this result is not con-
clusive, it could give some indication of the direction of the scale economies.
To determine whether a relationship exists between per unit milling costs and
the characteristics of the different mill types, an OLS regression is estimated where
the dependent variable is the operating costs per-unit of wheat grain processed
and the independent variables are related to mill size and characteristics. The
results from the OLS regression are presented in Table 57. The adjusted R2 equals
0.19 and the F-value of the regression is significant at less than 1 percent. This in-
dicates that, although the variables used do not account for most of the changes in
per unit operating costs, they do contribute to explaining some of this variation.
Most of the variables used are individually significant and have the expected signs
as discussed below.
The dependent variable in the regression is defined as the total operating cost per
metric ton of grain processed. The first two variables in Table 57 (mill capacity, and
capacity utilization rate) measure the design capacity of a mill in metric tons of wheat
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43 A stochastic frontier cost function was also estimated to determine the level of inefficiencies in the mills. How-
ever, the results were also not significant.115
Table 56—Parameter estimates of translog cost function
with symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions
Parameters Coefficient tP > >|t|
α0 −0.240 −0.21 0.83
α1 1.273 2.12 0.04
α2 −0.159 −0.34 0.74
β1 1.057 7.87 0.00
β2 −0.057 −0.43 0.67
δ11 0.025 0.30 0.76
δ12 −0.079 −2.04 0.04
δ22 0.127 4.02 0.00
γ11 0.012 0.66 0.51
γ22 0.012 0.66 0.51
γ12 −0.012 −0.66 0.51
ρ11 0.013 0.27 0.77
ρ12 −0.013 −0.27 0.77
ρ21 −0.022 −0.53 0.60
ρ22 0.022 0.53 0.60
Number of observations = 105
R2 = 0.99
Scale economies (SE) = 0.0096
Table 57—Relationship between per unit milling costs and mill characteristics:
dependent variable is operating costs per metric ton of wheat grain processed
Parameters Coefficient tP > >|t|
Constant 60.161 11.578 0.000
Mill capacity (metric tons per day) −0.036 −2.050 0.041
Capacity utilization rate (percent) −29.110 −6.071 0.000
72 percent wheat flour mill 5.889 1.689 0.092
Raw flour mill −0.280 −0.116 0.908
City governorate (Alexandria and Cairo) −10.694 −3.054 0.002
Middle Egypt 4.682 2.439 0.015
Upper Egypt 13.209 4.532 0.000
Public mill under Law 159 −19.308 −4.336 0.000
Contracted private mill −24.134 −5.519 0.000
Large village mill −41.322 −8.728 0.000
Small village mill −37.155 −7.593 0.000
Old cylinder mill 4.823 1.245 0.214
New cylinder mill 8.412 1.824 0.069
Notes: Number of observations = 514
R-squared = 0.2126
F (13, 500) = 10.39
Adjusted R-squared = 0.1922
Probability > F = 0.0000
Root mean squared error = 16.284.grain processed per day and the actual percentage of capacity used. Both variables
are significant and negative, indicating that per-unit operating costs tend to decline
with greater design capacity and volumes processed. Although not conclusive, this
finding may support the presence of economies of scale in the Egyptian milling in-
dustry. This may indicate that, as the industry moves toward greater concentration
and larger mills, per-unit milling costs should decrease, increasing competition in the
sector and benefiting the consumers because of lower flour prices.
The rest of the exogenous variables are binary variables used for determining the
relationship between the per-unit operating costs and the mill characteristics, such
as type of flour produced by the mill, location of the mill, ownership status, and
milling technology. The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy variable
for fino flour shows that, relative to baladi flour, it is more expensive to produce fino
flour. The insignificant coefficient of the raw flour variable indicates that there is no
significant cost difference between producing raw or baladi flour.
Regional dummies representing the city governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, Mid-
dle Egypt, and Upper Egypt, respectively, were used and compared with the Delta
region. The coefficients for these variables suggest that, compared with the Delta re-
gion, per-unit operating costs are lower around the large population centers and
higher in the more rural areas of Middle and Upper Egypt. One explanation for this
finding is that the most efficient mills are located in the Metropolitan Cairo and
Alexandria areas, while mills in Middle and Upper Egypt, which have a higher pro-
portion of smaller-sized mills, do not perform as well,.
Binary variables were also used to differentiate public mills that fall under Law
159 (that is, those with more than 50 percent of their shares privatized), contracted
private mills, large village mills, and small village mills, from public mills that fall
under Law 203 (that is, less than 50 percent privatized shares). The regression results
indicate that, relative to the public mills under Law 203, all these mills have lower
per-unit operating costs. These results are consistent with Table 53, which shows that
Law 203 public mills have the most expensive per-unit costs of operation, because
of their excessive labor costs.
Finally, binary variables were used to distinguish old and new cylinder mills from
stone mills. The insignificant coefficient on the old cylinder mill variable demon-
strates that old cylinder mills are not significantly cheaper to operate than stone mills.
On the other hand, new cylinder mills are more expensive to operate because they
have higher equipment, maintenance, and energy costs, as shown in Table 53.
Perception about Profitability and Policy Changes
A major determinant of the wheat millers’ performance over time is reflected in
changes in their level of profitability. Changes in policies also have an important im-
pact on profit levels. However, since no accurate data can be collected on past prof-
itability levels, millers were asked about their perception regarding their levels of
profits before the milling sector reform of 1992, between 1992 and 1996, and their
116expected profits for 1997. The intention here was not to approximate profit levels,
but to get an idea of how millers perceive the profitability of their business. Although
perceptions can be tainted by the inability to precisely recall past profits or by the
general pessimism or optimism regarding the economic or political environment,
they have an important effect on the willingness of millers to invest and expand their
activities in this sector. The interviewed millers were requested to rate their prof-
itability as good, average, fair, or bad.
Before 1992, profit levels for the milling companies were categorized as fair. The
main reasons cited were low wheat volumes and high operating costs. With the reg-
ulatory changes that liberalized the wheat milling sector, overall profitability of the
milling companies improved over the 1992–96 period. Furthermore, at the time of
the survey, profit levels for 1997 were projected to be good for both the North and
South Cairo Flour Mills companies, while only fair profit levels were projected for
the Middle and West Delta Flour Mills and the Upper Egypt Flour Mills Companies.
Overall improvement in 1997 profitability was expected because of higher volumes
of wheat and lower operating costs. Of the six milling companies interviewed, wheat
milling was by far their most profitable activity. Overall, their least profitable activ-
ity was baking and other activities related to food processing.
Despite these answers, in 1998, it seems that both HCRWM and FIHC had ac-
cumulated huge debts because they were selling a major portion of their fino flour
on nonguaranteed credit to reduce excess supply. The combination of debts, over-
capacity, and a general decline in the stock market led to a 75–85 percent decline in
their share price from 1997 to 1999 (HSBC 2000). According to a bank source, to-
tal milling companies outstanding debt had reached £E91 million in 1997 alone.
In terms of the profitability rankings at the mill level, while a majority of the pub-
lic mills rated their profits as fair for the years before 1996, 75 percent expected good
profits in 1997. Of the public mills and the contracted private mills that indicated
their profits as average or below average before 1992, the reasons enumerated in-
cluded relatively high operating costs and insufficient availability of wheat. With the
liberalization of the wheat milling sector, during the 1992–96 period, public mills
were able to achieve good or average profitability through competition, regulatory
changes, lower operating costs, and the processing of larger volumes of wheat.
For the contracted private mills, 43 and 35 percent of the contracted private millers
had an average or a fair level of profitability, respectively, before 1992. During
1992–96, the share with average profitability rose to 64 percent, while those with only
fair profits shrunk to 20 percent. The reasons for this improvement in perceived
profitability were similar to the ones reported by the public mills. Expected profits in
1997 for contracted private mills were not different from those for 1992–96, mainly
because the policy environment regarding baladi flour had not changed during the
period.
While profitability for the large industrial-sized mills has improved since 1992,
village mills have been less fortunate. In the period before 1992, 68 percent and 44
percent of the large and small village mills, respectively, were highly profitable.
117Good village mill profits were associated with little competition and relatively low
operating costs. In addition, large imports of wheat grain for the industrial-sized mills
made more domestic wheat available for local consumption. This raised both the uti-
lization rate and the quantity of wheat grain processed by the village mills, which in
turn helped increase their profits.
Profitability expectations for 1997 worsened for the village mills. With numer-
ous more-efficient, industrial-sized private mills scheduled to begin producing fino
flour in 1997 and 1998, the majority of the small village mills (64 percent) and about
half of the large ones expected that still greater competition and their relatively higher
operating costs would lead to poor or, at best, fair profits for the year.
Millers were also asked about their desire to expand their activities to other ar-
eas. Sixty-four percent of the contracted private mills and 38 percent of the public
mills answered positively, while only 8 percent of the village mills were interested.
Most village millers are engaged in other activities in their villages and are either
personally involved in the mill or use family labor to run the mill, so that they are not
very interested in expanding their milling activities outside their own village. These
mills also stated that they did not desire to expand their activities because it was not
profitable. This coincides with their perceived decline in profitability levels in recent
years. More than two-thirds of the large village mills were constrained from ex-
panding because of government regulations and restrictions, followed to a lesser ex-
tent by a lack of credit.
Most industrial mills (96 percent of the contracted private and 75 percent of the
public mills) confirmed that they are not allowed to produce more than one type of
flour in their mill. Private village mills, on the other hand, are not restricted on the
type of wheat flour they produce for a fee, since they are not involved with the sub-
sidized baladi flour program. In addition, 88 and 72 percent of the public and con-
tracted private mills, respectively, noted that the government controls their bran sales.
More than three-quarters of these mills noted that the restrictions on bran sales had
a negative impact on their profitability. Private village mills faced no restrictions on
bran sales.
The major technical problem that a mill faces is electricity shortages, followed
by breakdown of machines and shortages of wheat. Millers were asked about the kind
of regulatory changes needed to improve their milling business. The most significant
response, which cut across all types of mills, was the need for better infrastructure
(for example, reducing electricity shortages and increasing water availability) and
improving the quality of wheat. Domestic wheat is of poor quality because it is gen-
erally the wrong type of grain, not very clean, and has a high foreign-matter content.
For public mills, other important regulatory changes needed were increasing the
availability of equipment spare parts, followed by raising the supply of wheat. Con-
tracted private mills were also interested in seeing an increase in the quota of wheat
allocated to them. On the other hand, village mills preferred a reduction in taxes, fol-
lowed by increasing the availability of wheat and equipment spare parts. The request
to increase wheat availability reflects the overcapacity status of all mills.
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Excess Capacity in Fino Flour Mills
The results of this study have shown that, in 1996, profit margins for fino flour were
fairly high (Table 54). Consequently, starting in the 1996/97 agricultural year, these
high profit margins encouraged many entrepreneurs to invest in new large-cylinder
mills to produce finoflour. By 1998, the buildup of new capacity to produce finoflour
led to a highly competitive market and a dramatic fall in prices for 72 percent wheat
flour and bran prices. (The price of fino flour declined from about £1,200 in 1996 to
about £E950 in 1998; bran prices declined from about £E600 to £E400 in that same
period.) As a result, anecdotal evidence suggests that profit margins had eroded con-
siderably in 1998 and 1999. Declining profitability in the fino flour sector is further
confirmed by the dramatic decline in the share prices of all public milling compa-
nies between 1997 and 1999. For example, the share price of North Cairo Flour Mills
declined from an average of £E196 in January 1997 to £E36 in December 1999
(HSBC 2000). Similarly, all the other public milling companies witnessed a 75–85
percent decline in their share prices during the two-year period.44
Eventually, unless demand catches up with supply, many mills may go out of
business, creating instability in the milling sector for the next few years, as employ-
ees have to be laid off and large investments are not recovered. In the long run, the
sector may become much more concentrated, with a few strong companies captur-
ing a major share of the market.
In the late 1880s and after 1948, the United States also witnessed excess capac-
ity in its wheat flour industry, resulting in a highly competitive industry, low profit
margins, and eventual closure of many old and inefficient mills (Dahl 1993). Unfor-
tunately, in Egypt, the excess capacity may not force the closure of the old and in-
efficient public mills but of new and more efficient private mills. As inefficient pub-
lic mills are supported and subsidized by their respective milling and holding
companies, which are state-owned enterprises, they are not forced to shut down be-
cause of losses. This means that the performance of the milling sector in Egypt will
stagnate, as the private sector is forced to absorb the brunt of the adjustment process,
while the public mills are artificially kept in business.
Privatization Prospects for the Public Milling Companies
Of the seven existing public milling companies, three have sold 61 percent of their
shares to the private sector, while the rest have only privatized about 40 percent of
their shares. The privatization of the public milling companies has not, however, led
to substantial changes, as these mills are still managed and operated by the public
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44 None of the private milling companies in Egypt are publicly traded. They are usually family-held businesses.sector. As the chairman of the People’s Assembly Economic Committee is reported
to have said “privatization in Egypt has proved to be a transfer of ownership rather
than a policy aimed at raising productivity and investment rates” (Essam El-Din
1997, 10). At this point, the decision has been made by the government not to fur-
ther privatize any of the mills. The main reason is the strategic nature of wheat and
the belief that the subsidy program necessitates that the management of these com-
panies remain in the hands of the public sector. As long as the subsidy on baladiflour
and bread persists, privatization of the milling companies does not seem likely to
proceed further. Moreover, as the share prices of all public milling companies have
declined rapidly since 1997, it is perhaps not the right time for the government to sell
the remaining shares of its companies to the public.
Another important political issue in the privatization program is its impact on la-
bor. It has been estimated that between 30 and 40 percent of the labor force in state-
owned enterprises is redundant (Abu-Ismail 1996). To prevent large-scale unem-
ployment after privatization, the government extracted commitments from many of
the privatized companies to limit the downsizing of employees. The government also
developed incentive packages, such as early retirement schemes, small-business
loans, and retraining programs to encourage civil servants to begin new careers and
leave the public sector labor force (Abu-Ismail 1996).
The public milling companies that will be privatized will probably have to reduce
their labor force to become more cost-efficient, either through complete buy-outs of
the most redundant employees, reassigning employees to other organizations, or
training and assisting employees in finding better-paying jobs elsewhere. If public
milling companies were fully privatized following the liberalization of the baladi
flour market, these companies would be able to raise money and improve their per-
formance by selling off the expensive pieces of land on which the public mills stand.
For example, the old and inefficient stone and cylinder mills could be demolished
and sold for the land value, and the salvageable mills could be dismantled and moved
to smaller and cheaper land.
Prospects for the Contracted Private Mills and the Village Mills
The future prospects of the contracted private mills and the village mills are uncer-
tain. Contracted private mills are relatively old and have outdated technology. They
have no incentive to invest in new and bigger equipment as long as they are produc-
ing the subsidized baladi flour under GASC’s payment terms. If the wheat milling
industry is completely liberalized, these mills will have to invest in new machines
and bigger capacity to survive the competition with larger and better-equipped new
mills. Some may even have to shut down and sell their property for the land rather
than the mill itself.
The analysis above has shown that the profitability of village mills has been de-
clining as they face greater competition from ready-made flour and bread. As some
of these mills are valued by their customers because they produce fresh flour and are
more geographically available than retail stores or bakeries in small rural villages,
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especially those that are located near urban centers, will either have to shut down or
mill other commodities, especially if the wheat flour and bread market is completely
liberalized.
Prospects If Baladi Flour Marketing and Milling Is Liberalized
If the baladi flour market were liberalized, what would happen to the milling sector
in Egypt? Given that Egypt has a comparative advantage in producing wheat flour
locally rather than importing it, the milling sector could be expected to become com-
petitive, as happened in the fino flour market, resulting in low profit margins and the
closing of inefficient private mills. Old mills would have to be sold for their land
value or be completely renovated and upgraded. New mills would have to reduce
costs and develop strategies to market their products. Mills may have to differenti-
ate their products and produce several wheat flour grades and qualities to expand
their market. The sector would also become more concentrated, as only the most
competitive mills would be able to survive. Mills would be fewer but bigger.
Furthermore, if the baladi flour market is liberalized, the government will no
longer be able to justify its control over the milling companies. The fate of these
companies is uncertain, as currently they have accumulated large debts and are not
being managed as efficiently as the private sector mills. Although some milling com-
panies have already started renovating and upgrading their mills, they will no longer
benefit from the financing and tax benefits that they used to get when they belonged
to the public sector. Therefore, under equal conditions, they may not be able to com-
pete with the private sector and may also have to be shut down or sold at a loss.
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A
s noted in the preceding chapters, Egypt’s government pursues multiple goals
in the wheat area. They include low and stable consumer prices for bread and
flour, stable producer prices, and increased self-sufficiency. These goals are pursued
at the same time as the government aims at maintaining macroeconomic balance (im-
posing strict controls on government spending and underlining the need to reduce
the deficit in merchandise trade), growth in household incomes, and reduced unem-
ployment. Simultaneously, the government is engineering a structural shift toward a
more important role for the private sector and market mechanisms, as well as open-
ness toward foreign trade with a closer alignment between domestic and international
prices.
In this chapter, a CGE model is used to explore quantitatively the short-run equi-
librium effects of changes in three areas that are critical to wheat policy—consumer
subsidies on bread and flour; producer subsidies to raise self-sufficiency; and re-
sponses of the domestic economy to changes in international wheat prices under al-
ternative settings, including a tariff-based mechanism for limiting domestic price in-
stability. The analysis highlights not only the effects of policies on their most
immediate target (for example, the impact of changes in bread subsidies on house-
hold welfare), but also on other targets (for example, the government budget balance)
as well as the tradeoffs involved.
Egypt’s Economy, Wheat, and Wheat Policies
Table 58 briefly summarizes the role of wheat and subsidies on wheat products in
the Egyptian economy on the basis of data for the 1994/95 agricultural year, the base
year for the model-based analysis in this report. The numbers indicate that the wheat
crop sector generates a modest share of total factor income, in part a reflection of the
declining importance of agriculture. Nevertheless, in terms of area, wheat is the ma-
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Scenarios for Egyptjor winter crop, while wheat imports (including dwindling imports of wheat flour)
are a substantial part of total merchandise imports. This reflects the fact that, relative
to consumption, production remains limited.
The Wheat CGE Model: Structure and Data Sources
Background
CGE models may be defined as economywide models the solutions to which depict
a simultaneous general equilibrium in all markets of the economy. This class of mod-
els, which has been widely applied to developing countries over the past 20 years,
can be tailor-made to capture institutional features and policy mechanisms that are
specific to the modeled economy. They have a comparative advantage in the analy-
sis of domestic tax and subsidy policies and trade policy, in particular when there is
a need to consider links between different producing sectors, links between the
macro and micro levels, and the disaggregated impact of changes in policies and ex-
ogenous shocks on sectoral structure, household welfare, and income distribution.
CGE analyses of the Egyptian economy has a relatively long history, with the first
model dating back to 1976.45
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Table 58—Subsidies for agriculture, wheat, and bread flour in the Egyptian
economy, 1994/95
Indicator Value Share of Percent
Wheat area (millions of feddans)a 2.5 Total winter area 33
Wheat production (millions of metric tons) 5.7 Wheat total use (self-sufficiency rate) 48
Agricultural value-added (£E billionsb) 27 GDP at factor cost 15
Wheat crop value-added (£E billions) 4 Agricultural value-added 15
Wheat and wheat flour imports (£E billions) 3.1 Total merchandise imports 8.3
Bread and flour subsidy costs (£E billions) 1.6 Current government spending 3.1
Bread and flour per capita subsidy for
low-income household (£E)c Total per capita consumption
Rural 18 Rural 2
Urban 38 Urban 2.1
Sources: Crop area from CAPMAS 1996a; production and trade data from CAPMAS 1996b; subsidy data
from Ali and Adams (1996); government spending data from Central Bank of Egypt (1995);
urban population share from World Bank (1993); and total population from IMF (1996).
a 1 feddan = 0.42 hectare
b U.S.$1 = £E3.39
c Low-income household = household representing the 33 percent of the population in each area (rural or ur-
ban) with the lowest per capita income.
45 See Löfgren (1994b) for a survey of CGE models of Egypt.This CGE model of Egypt, called the Wheat CGE model, starts from an earlier
model of Egypt (Löfgren, Robinson, and Nygaard 1998) that in turn draws on Löf-
gren (1995) and on Robinson and Gehlhar (1996). It is in the tradition of trade-
focused CGE models of developing countries described in Dervis, de Melo, and
Robinson (1982). However, compared with this earlier generation of models, it in-
cludes a wider range of features that are tailored to the structure of the economy that
is modeled.
The distinguishing features of the Wheat CGE model include a disaggregated
treatment of agriculture (to capture seasonality in land use and links between crop
and animal activities) and food processing (to capture links between wheat produc-
tion, bread consumption, and government subsidy policies), as well as the policy
regime for the wheat sector, including fixed subsidized prices for part of bread and
flour consumption.46
Model Structure
Table 59 shows the disaggregation of institutions, factors, and activities in the model.
Among the institutions, the households are divided into three rural and three urban
categories, each of which represents one-third of the population in each region.
Among the factors, labor and capital are used by all sectors, while water, summer
land, and winter land are used only by agricultural crop activities.
In crop agriculture, it is assumed that, apart from some agronomic and institu-
tional restrictions (described below), the factors land (summer and winter), water,
and capital (primarily agricultural machinery) are mobile across crops and allocated
so as to equalize the marginal returns to each factor in all relevant crops. In animal
agriculture, the capital stock (primarily animals) is fixed and specific to this sector.
For two factors, land and water, excess supply is possible; if so, the price is zero. The
other factors—agricultural labor, crop capital, and animal capital—are fully used
with flexible market-clearing wages and rents.47
Outside agriculture, the capital stocks are also sector specific and fully employed
with flexible rents. The labor employed by nonagricultural activities forms a sepa-
rate market; this labor force is mobile across the different nonagricultural activities.
In this market, unemployment is allowed. The labor supply function is assumed to
be infinitely elastic at the 1995 real wage (indexed to the CPI of the households that
supply nonagricultural labor) until aggregate employment reaches 95 percent of the
nonagricultural labor force (a 5 percent unemployment rate), at which point the sup-
ply curve becomes vertical and “full” employment is reached.
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46 Upon request, the model equations are made available in computer-readable form. The discussion here uses no
equations.
47 Given that the quantity of water stored in the High Dam at Aswan currently is at record levels, the water supply
is set at a level that is above the quantity demanded for any of the simulations presented in this chapter. Hence, land
is always in scarce supply. For water, the model records consumption by crop at a scarcity value of zero.The model includes 28 activities, including 14 in agriculture. The crop activities
are differentiated according to period of land occupation into winter crops, summer
crops, and perennial crops. With a few important exceptions, activities (the produc-
ing sectors) map one-to-one to commodities (the outputs produced), that is, each ac-
tivity produces only one commodity and it is the only producer of this commodity.
The exceptions are the two berseem (clover) activities, which produce the same com-
modity (berseem), and fodder byproducts from several other crop activities. This
disaggregation makes capturing direct links between crop and animal activities
possible: crop outputs (most importantly berseem, maize, and various crop by-
products) are used as inputs in the animal activity; animal outputs (manure and animal
labor) are used as inputs in crop activities.
The production technologies are as follows: Producers are assumed to maximize
profits given their technology (specified by a nested constant elasticity of substitu-
tion value-added function, and Leontief intermediate input coefficients that are flex-
ible inside agriculture but fixed for other sectors), and the prices of inputs and out-
puts. It is assumed that ex ante expected prices coincide with ex post prices actually
received. This is a characteristic the model shares with the vast majority of equilib-
rium models, including, it is believed, all other existing agricultural sector or general
equilibrium models of Egypt. The arguments of the value-added functions are labor,
capital, and, for the crop sectors, a land and water aggregate. The latter is made up
of land and water in fixed proportions. Thus, for crops, substitutability is possible
among land, capital, and the land and water aggregate on the level of the value-added
functions; there is no substitutability between land and water.
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Table 59—Disaggregation of factors, institutions, and activities
Set Elements
Institutions (8) Households (rural and urban, both divided into low-, middle-, and
upper-income)
Government
Rest of the world
Factors of production (5) Capital (disaggregated by sector in which it is installed)




Activities (28) Winter crops (wheat, legumes, long berseem, short berseem, winter 
vegetables, other winter crops)
Summer crops (cotton; rice; maize, including sorghum; summer vegetables; 
and other summer crops)
Perennial crops (fruits and sugarcane)
Animal agriculture
Food processing (subsidized bread, unsubsidized bread, subsidized flour, 
unsubsidized flour, and other food processing)
Other (oil, cotton ginning, textiles, other industry, electricity, construction, 
government labor services, transportation, and other services)In several areas, the model structure has been tailor-made for Egyptian condi-
tions. For land (summer and winter) and nonagricultural labor, the prices (the rents
or the wages) are differentiated across the demanding sectors on the basis of fixed
ratios (calculated from base-year data). This is a reflection of real-world phenomena
that are not modeled explicitly.48 When the aggregate price changes for either land
type or nonagricultural labor, this is accompanied by proportional changes in the dif-
ferentiated sectoral prices of the factor in question.
The model accounts for two major agronomic-area constraints: the area of short
berseem (a crop that precedes cotton) is constrained to equal the cotton area, and the
cotton area is limited to a maximum of one-third of the land not covered by peren-
nial crops. Given the relatively short-run time frame of the analysis, the areas of
perennial crops and, as noted above, the size of animal stock are fixed. Agricultural
intermediate input coefficients are flexible in the context of producer minimization
of intermediate input costs subject to a limited degree of input substitutability (given
by a constant elasticity of substitution function) and a fixed aggregate input re-
quirement per unit of the activity. Agriculture deviates from the more standard treat-
ment for other sectors to avoid rigid links between crop and animal activities in
Egypt’s agriculture, as crop activities supply the animal activity with the bulk of its
intermediate feed inputs.49
Two nonagricultural sectors are given special treatment. For the oil activity
(which represents the production of crude oil and petroleum products), the quanti-
ties of output and factor use are fixed at the 1995 level; this was deemed preferable
to the alternative assumption of profit-maximizing behavior. For electricity, a flex-
ible capital supply (reflecting surplus capacity) ensures that the nontraded electric-
ity commodity is sold at a fixed price. It should also be noted that the output of the
activity for government labor services is, in effect, fixed—the government, the sole
demander, demands a fixed quantity of the nontraded commodity produced by this
activity.
The model captures the circular flow of incomes in the economy. Factor incomes
generated by the production activities are split among the domestic institutions
(households and government) in fixed, factor-specific shares. In addition to factor in-
come, households receive transfers (labor remittances) from the government and the
rest of the world (fixed in foreign currency). Total household income is used to pay
direct taxes, to save, and to consume. Direct taxes and savings (the latter with one
exception that is discussed below) are fixed shares of household income. Sectoral
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48 For labor, sectoral wage gaps may be linked to differences in job security, educational requirements, status of job,
and physical comfort. In agriculture, recorded monetary returns to land may differ as crops differ in required skills,
monitoring, riskiness, and impact on soil fertility.
49 For the animal activity, fixed intermediate input coefficients would generate rigid links between, on the one hand,
the level of animal production and, on the other hand, the levels for crop activities producing fodder by-products, in
particular given the fact that these by-products are not traded internationally. Similar rigidities would appear if in-
termediate crop demands for manure were a fixed coefficient.consumption demand is determined by the linear expenditure system, derived from
maximization of the Stone-Geary utility function subject to a spending constraint.50
Besides factor incomes, government revenue consists of transfers from the rest
of the world (fixed in foreign currency) and taxes—direct taxes from households, in-
direct taxes from domestic activities, sales tax revenues, and import tariffs. All taxes
are ad valorem (that is, imposed as fixed shares of the relevant values). Transfers
from the government to households and aggregate government consumption are
fixed shares of nominal GDP. After having paid for a fixed quantity of labor services,
the government consumes remaining commodities in fixed-value shares. The gov-
ernment subsidizes part of household consumption of bread and flour, other
processed food, transportation, and electricity. The subsidy rates for household con-
sumption for the relevant types of flour and bread are flexible so as to ensure that the
consumer prices are fixed. For other commodities, the subsidy is a fixed share of the
variable price that is paid by the consumer.
The rest of the world supplies imports and demands exports. For vegetables and
services, exports are demanded according to constant-elasticity demand curves; the
lower the export supply price, the larger the quantity exported. For all other com-
modities, Egypt is able to export or import any quantity it desires at international
prices that are fixed in foreign currency.
For grains (exported or imported) and oil exports, it is assumed that domestic out-
put sold domestically and traded commodities are perfect substitutes. As a result, for
these commodities, the domestic price is determined by the domestic currency ex-
port or import price (transformed from the foreign currency price through the ex-
change rate and adjusted for any taxes or subsidies) to the extent that trade takes
place. For commodities other than grains and oil exports, imperfect substitutability
or transformability is assumed. The Armington assumption is used to capture the
choice between imports and domestic output under imperfect substitutability: to the
extent that a commodity is imported, all domestic demands—household and gov-
ernment consumption, investment demand, and intermediate demands—are for the
same composite commodity. The mix between imports and domestic output is de-
termined by the assumption that domestic demanders minimize cost subject to im-
perfect substitutability, captured by an aggregation function of constant elasticity of
substitution. Similarly, the allocation of domestic output between exports and do-
mestic sales is determined on the assumption that domestic producers maximize
profits subject to imperfect transformability between these two alternatives, ex-
pressed by a function of constant elasticity of transformation. These assumptions,
imperfect substitutability and transformability, grant the domestic price system a cer-
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50 Implicitly, the model assumes that, for goods that are both produced and consumed by a household unit (appli-
cable to a large part of agricultural production), the household faces a market price that it views as fixed. In the con-
text of the overall goal of maximizing utility, it first makes a profit-maximizing production decision and subsequently
makes a utility-maximizing consumption decision, influenced by the profits that are generated from agricultural pro-
duction (Löfgren and Robinson [1999]).tain degree of independence from international prices and dampen export and import
responses to changes in the producer environment.
With the above-mentioned exceptions—partially fixing prices of bread, flour, and
electricity and linking domestic grain and oil product prices to international levels—
domestic prices of domestic outputs and composite commodities are all flexible, per-
forming the task of clearing relevant markets in a competitive setting where both
suppliers and demanders are price-takers.
The macro system constraints (or macro closures) determine the manner in which
the accounts for the government, the rest of the world, and for savings and invest-
ment are brought into balance. Government savings (also called the current govern-
ment surplus) is a flexible residual in the government balance.51 Similarly, foreign
savings clears the balance of the rest of the world while the real exchange rate (an
index of the ratio between the prices of traded commodities and domestic outputs
sold domestically) is fixed. On the spending side of the balance between savings and
investment, aggregate investment is fixed in real quantity terms. On the savings side,
the savings rate of the upper-income urban household is assumed to be flexible, vary-
ing to generate a level of total savings needed to finance aggregate investment.52
Data Sources
The bulk of the model data is based on a disaggregated social accounting matrix
(SAM)53—a 94 × 94 matrix for the 1994/95 agricultural year, the most recent year
for which a comprehensive macro database was available in early 1997. It was con-
structed on the basis of data from various official publications, including the most
recent national-account government budget and trade data (Central Bank of Egypt
1995; CAPMAS 1996a,1996b; IMF 1996), available official SAMs and input–
output tables (CAPMAS 1994, 1995), crop data (MALR 1994; CAPMAS 1996b),
and the 1990/91 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (CAPMAS 1993). In-
formation from these and other sources were brought together in one matrix, the dis-
aggregation of which parallels the disaggregation of the current model. Underlying
the construction of such a SAM is an attempt to make the best possible use of avail-
able scattered data. Inevitably imbalances appear when data from different sources
and years are integrated in one framework; a SAM-Entropy program, developed at
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51 Government savings is the difference between current reserves and current spending, that is, it excludes items on
the government capital account. In the base simulation and the experiments of this report, its value is always posi-
tive.
52 Savings from the other sources—government, other households, and the rest of the world—are not free to equil-
ibrate aggregate savings and investment. Government and rest-of-the-world savings are the residuals that clear their
respective accounts, while savings of other households are a fixed share of income after direct taxes. Savings from
other households are specified as fixed-income shares.
53 A SAM is a square matrix with identical column and row accounts. It provides a comprehensive and consistent
depiction of economic interactions in a region (typically a country) during a time period (typically one year). Each
SAM cell indicates the value of the payment from the column to the row account associated with the cell. (For ad-
ditional information on SAMs, see Pyatt and Round [1985].)IFPRI, was used to generate a balanced model SAM that retains as much as pos-
sible of the information contained in the original data set.54The SAM generator pro-
gram constrained data for consumption of subsidized bread and flour so that the per-
capita subsidy value in urban areas is approximately twice the value in rural areas,
with urban areas receiving a higher per-capita bread subsidy but a lower flour sub-
sidy (Ali and Abdel Rahman 1996). Moreover, it was assumed that, in each region
(urban and rural), the different households had identical per-capita consumption val-
ues of subsidized bread and flour. As a result, there is an inverse relationship between
household income and share of bread and flour consumption spent on subsidized
commodities. This reflects findings from earlier IFPRI research that suggest that the
income elasticities of demand for subsidized bread and flour are very low, possibly
even negative.55
A macro version of the model SAM, identical to the disaggregated SAM except
for the aggregated depiction of activities, commodities, and households, is shown in
Table 60. A variety of sources were used for estimates of elasticities for the functions
of Armington, constant elasticity of transformation, constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (production), linear expenditure system (household consumption), and export
demand. (For a brief survey of elasticities of CGE models, see Löfgren [1994a].)
Table 61 shows the relative importance of different types of factor incomes. Low-
income households rely more heavily on labor income, in rural areas, from work in
agriculture; high-income households receive the bulk of their incomes from capital
and, in rural areas, land.
Mathematical Model Formulation, Base Run, Validity, and Time Frame
CGE models are typically formulated and solved as systems of simultaneous equa-
tions exclusively made up of strict equalities. However, to permit the inclusion of in-
equality constraints for resource markets, agronomic constraints, and a lower limit
for nonagricultural wages, the Wheat CGE model is formulated and solved as a
mixed complementarity problem, consisting of a set of simultaneous equations that
are a mix of strict equalities and inequalities. The latter are linked to bounded (price)
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54 The database for this chapter was generated in the spring of 1997 before the completion of IFPRI’s Egypt Inte-
grated Household Survey. The assumptions regarding the distribution of subsidized bread and flour consumption—
different patterns in rural and urban areas and even per-capita consumption in each region across income groups—
were close to the pattern indicated by the survey and by earlier IFPRI work (Alderman and von Braun [1984]). The
results from the survey were incorporated into a later round of CGE-based analysis of subsidy issues on the basis of
a SAM that is updated to 1996/97 (Löfgren and El-Said [1999]). For the entropy approach to SAM balancing, see
Thissen and Löfgren (1998); and Robinson, Cattaneo, and El-Said (1998).
55 Ali and Adams (1996, 1787) note that the alternative assumption that all households consume subsidized and un-
subsidized bread and flour in identical shares “almost certainly” overestimates the shares of subsidized goods for
households with higher incomes. Given that income elasticities of demand for subsidized bread and flour most likely
are close to zero, the assumption of equal per-capita spending levels on these commodities irrespective of income
level is a reasonable working assumption in the absence of better data. Recent estimates of income elasticities based
on the Egypt Integrated Household Survey confirm that the income elasticities of demand for subsidized bread and

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.variables associated with agricultural resources and labor. The GAMS modeling soft-
ware is used both to generate the disaggregated SAM and to implement the model.
The model may be solved with PATH or MILES, two solvers for mixed comple-
mentarity problems.56
The base solution of the model is calibrated to exactly replicate the disaggregated
SAM for the 1994/95 agricultural year. In the different simulations, the model is run
in a comparative static mode. The results indicate the short-run equilibrium re-
sponses to changes in policies and exogenous shocks, comparing a new solution with
the base solution. Each new solution represents a new equilibrium, since agents (pro-
ducers and consumers) have fully adjusted themselves to new prices and incomes. It
refers to the short run, since capital stocks outside crop agriculture are fixed by sec-
tor: the time span is too short for current investment to lead to changes in installed
capital or for capital to move between noncrop sectors (Hazell and Norton 1986).
There is no clear-cut validity test or way of knowing how close the simulated
model response is to the unobservable actual response.57 The current model is
viewed as valid for the purpose of this analysis—to explore short-run equilibrium ef-
fects of selected exogenous changes—given that its assumptions regarding agent be-
havior, elasticity values, and rules for market-clearing capture available knowledge
about the functioning of the Egyptian economy. It also puts special emphasis on cap-
turing government tools for wheat policy as well as the seasonal and agronomic con-
straints under which Egypt’s farmers operate.
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Table 61—Structure of household factor incomes in base SAM
Rural households Urban households
Low- Middle- Upper- Low- Middle- Upper-
income income income income income income
(percent)
Capital
Agriculture 6.8 8.5 10.5 0.8 0.8 0.8
Nonagriculture 38.6 44.9 52.4 46.5 54.8 72.9
Labor
Agriculture 20.0 10.5 4.2 3.1 2.3 0.7
Nonagriculture 21.0 18.6 11.5 48.2 40.5 23.9
Land 13.6 17.4 21.3 1.5 1.6 1.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
56 For GAMS, see Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus (1988). Rutherford (1995) provides more information on PATH
and MILES.
57 Simulation models (such as CGE models, multimarket models, agricultural-sector mathematical programming
models) are appropriate in data-scarce settings where full econometric estimation and validation of a sufficiently de-
tailed model is impossible. In response to the need for policy analysis, these models are pragmatically constructed
in the spirit of making the best possible use of available information, including relevant aspects of economic theory.Given the importance of trade issues and the wheat sector to this analysis, the
simulations reported in the next section were conducted under alternative assump-
tions for the elasticity of factor substitution in wheat production and the trade elas-
ticities. All experiments were also redone with a 50 percent increase and a 50 per-
cent decrease for the factor-substitution elasticity. All experiments were redone with
a 50 percent increase and a 50 percent decrease for the trade elasticities (Armington,
constant elasticity of transformation, and export-demand elasticities). The qualita-
tive results that are addressed in the following analysis were not affected by these
changes. The relative changes in the variables also remained close to the changes re-
ported below.58
Simulations
In the first group of simulations, the impact of policy changes in two areas of wheat
policy are explored—consumer subsidies on bread and flour, and producer subsidies
to raise self-sufficiency. In these simulations, it is assumed that international wheat
and flour prices remain at base-year levels. In a second group of simulations, a sub-
set of these policy changes and a tariff-based mechanism for limiting domestic price
instability are implemented under alternative levels of international wheat and flour
prices.
Bread and Flour Consumer Subsidies
In Chapter 2, it was noted that, in 1994/95, bread and flour subsidies represented 0.8
percent of GDP (£E1.6 billion). The effects of selected changes in the current policy
of permitting any household to purchase unlimited quantities at fixed subsidized
prices are simulated here. The simulations are defined in Table 62 and the results are
summarized in Table 63.
Targeting Subsidies to Low-Income Households (BFTAR)
The first simulation (BFTAR) explores the impact of targeting bread and flour subsi-
dies to low-income households in urban and rural areas, that is, eliminating these sub-
sidies for two-thirds of the population that belong to the middle- and upper-income
households. The latter groups continue to have access to these commodities but at
undistorted prices. In practice, this would require identification of the third in each re-
gion that is least well-off and the development of a system for providing this group
with exclusive access to the subsidy (for example, distribution of subsidy access
cards). (For an approach to food subsidy targeting in Egypt, see Ahmed et al. [1999b].)
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58 The qualitative results were unchanged in the sense that the direction of change was reversed only in a couple of
instances where the reported changes in Tables 62, 64, and 65 are close to zero (absolute values of reported changes
from base of less than 0.3 percent). For values without any sign change, the maximum absolute deviation from any
value reported in the same tables (typically percentage changes from the base) is less than 0.33, with few deviations
exceeding 0.2. The major implications of the sensitivity analysis are spelled out later in this report.On the micro level, the major initial effect is that, in response to higher prices for
previously subsidized wheat and flour and the associated decline in real incomes,
middle- and upper-income households reduce consumed quantities, especially for
commodities with high-income elasticities (such as vegetables and animal products).
On the macro level, the surplus on the current account of the government (govern-
ment savings) increases.
The equilibrium outcome, shown in Table 62, indicates that the economywide ef-
fects of the subsidy cut are quite minor; this should be expected, since the cut in sub-
sidy spending only amounts to 0.5 percent of GDP. The most noteworthy changes
are declines in the welfare of upper- and middle-income households by 0.6–0.7 per-
cent and 1.4–1.6 percent, respectively, and an increase in the government surplus by
0.4 percent of GDP (since the government subsidy bill is reduced).59 The decrease
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Table 62—Alternative bread and flour subsidy policies: Parameter changes
BFTAR BFCUT BFCUT-TC MAIFLR
Percentage cut in bread and flour subsidy
Rural household
Low-income 0 −100 −100 0
Middle-income −100 −100 −100 0
Upper-income −100 −100 −100 0
Urban household
Low-income 0 −100 −100 0
Middle-income −100 −100 −100 0
Upper-income −100 −100 −100 0
Compensation to householda
Rural low-income 0 0 1 0
Urban low-income 0 0 1 0
Maize share in subsidized flour 0 0 0 20
Notes: BFTAR = targeting bread and flour subsidies to low-income households; BFCUT = 100 percent
cut in bread and flour subsidies; BFCUT-TC = 100 percent cut in bread and flour subsidies with
compensation to low-income households; and MAIFLR = 20 percent of subsidized flour from
maize.
a One if full compensation for real income loss is paid; zero if no compensation is paid.
59 For the BASE, welfare is indicated by household consumption spending per capita. Changes in welfare are meas-
ured by the compensating variation as a percentage of the BASE value. The compensating variation shows what the
household would be willing to pay (per capita) to enjoy the change that is implemented—a negative value for a
change that is detrimental for the household, since in this case a payment to the household would be necessary (Var-
ian [1992]). The compensating variation is computed at the BASE savings rate. As a result, changes in the savings
rates of upper-income households (a decline in the simulation BFTAR) and related consumption changes are not
permitted to influence the measure of household welfare.
The closure rule for the government account (flexible government savings) permits the model to capture tradeoffs
between changes in household welfare and in the government surplus. Alternatively, the government may keep its sav-
ings unchanged and use the increased room in the government balance to reduce direct taxes. If so, subsidy cuts tend
to generate a slight positive change in household welfare (see CGE-based simulations in Ahmed et al. [1999a]).in agricultural factor incomes (indexed to the aggregate CPI) is primarily due to a
decline in incomes from animal production, a sector that is particularly sensitive to
lower incomes for households that are relatively well-off (because of high-income
elasticities of demand for their outputs and quality differences between domestic and
imported commodities). In crop production, there is a slight shift toward wheat,
maize, and rice as a result of declining prices for competing crops, the prices of which
to a significant extent depend on domestic (as opposed to international) market de-
velopments (in this case, a fall in domestic demand).60 This is reflected in a limited
increase in the self-sufficiency rate for wheat. The marginal increase in the unem-
ployment rate is caused by an increase in the (CPI-indexed) nonagricultural wages,
which raises the unit labor cost (paid by producers) relative to producer prices (re-
ceived by producers) and, hence, reduces the profit-maximizing quantity of labor
hired outside agriculture.
Removing Subsidies (BFCUT)
When bread and flour subsidies are also eliminated for low-income households, the
magnitudes of the macro effects are approximately 50 percent stronger (which is pro-
portional to the subsidy share of this group). Most importantly, compared to the
BASE, the government surplus increases by 0.6 percent of GDP, which is less than
the subsidy cut itself because of indirect effects. This leads to small unfavorable
changes in various government items (including a decline in revenues from all kinds
of indirect taxes as the level of aggregate economic activity declines). Welfare de-
clines by 1.8–2.0 percent for low-income households, while the welfare loss is sim-
ilar to that under BFTAR for other households. The differences between households
reflect the importance of subsidized bread and flour in their budgets and how they
are affected by declining incomes in agriculture. In the Egyptian economy, the gen-
eral pattern is that the lower the household’s income, the larger the budget share of
subsidized bread and flour. Hence, if the households were more finely disaggregated,
for example into deciles (groups with 10 percent each of the rural or urban popula-
tions), the welfare loss would most likely be much higher for the lowest income
groups.
Combining Subsidy Removal with Targeted Compensation (BFCUT-TC)
The preceding simulation shows that, if bread and flour subsidies are eliminated,
low-income households would suffer from the largest relative decline in welfare. In-
stead of protecting this group through targeted subsidies (as in BFTAR), subsidy cuts
may alternatively be combined with other forms of assistance to the poor. This is im-
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60 The prices of the major grains—wheat, maize, and rice—are aligned with international prices and unaffected by
domestic market developments (see Chapter 2). The prices of other crops, which are imperfectly substitutable with
exports or imports of the same crops (for example, vegetables), have a weaker link to international prices; a decline
in domestic demand will reduce domestic prices.plemented in the simulation: removal of bread and flour subsidies is combined with
targeted cash compensation to low-income households that is sufficient to maintain
their initial welfare level.61 In practice, the compensation for removal of unrationed
quantities of subsidized bread and flour may be in the form of rationedfood (or other
consumer goods) quantities that are smaller than consumed quantities and, hence,
are equivalent to a cash transfer (since no marginal price would be affected).62
Compared with subsidy targeting (BFTAR), the government surplus increases by
£E180 million or 0.1 percent of GDP, primarily because the transfer payments
needed to keep the lower-income households at their initial welfare levels are smaller
than the cut in spending on food subsidies. The wheat self-sufficiency rate goes up
(and the trade deficit declines), since the subsidy removal for low-income households
reduces domestic use of wheat commodities that, on the margin, are imported. A
more complete institutional analysis would also consider the feasibility and costs of
subsidy targeting and targeted cash transfers (see Ahmed et al. [1999b]). An added
advantage of targeting the subsidy is that it would eliminate the ostensible need for
government intervention in wheat marketing and processing, with large potential for
efficiency grains.
Maize–Wheat Flour Mix (MAIFLR)
As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1996 the government started an experimental program
substituting a wheat–maize flour blend (with a 20 percent maize share) for all-wheat
flour in the production of subsidized flour and bread. This program is aimed at re-
ducing the costs of the bread and flour subsidy (since maize tends to be cheaper than
wheat) and reducing Egypt’s dependence on imported wheat. It has been implemented
in a few bakeries in Cairo, and the government is considering its expansion to other
areas. Using the CGE model, the experiment MAIFLR simulates the economy-
wide impacts of the implementation of this program on a nationwide basis. Techni-
cally, the policy shift is represented by changed input coefficients in the production
of subsidized flour so that 20 percent of the wheat grain is replaced by maize. It is as-
sumed that households’demand behavior is not affected by the introduction of maize
(that is, there is no significant difference in taste).
The higher maize-flour extraction rate and a lower maize price give rise to gov-
ernment savings. The initial effect is that 20 percent of the wheat demanded for use
in production of subsidized flour is shifted to maize at 75 percent of the initial cost.
This leads to reduced subsidy spending, reflecting a decline in the per-unit subsidy
needed to maintain fixed prices for subsidized bread and flour. Given that Egypt is
an importer of both wheat and maize, import spending is shifted from wheat to maize,
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61 The compensatory cash transfer is determined by the compensating variation, that is, the payment that would keep
household welfare at the same level before and after the change.
62 In accordance with this interpretation, the (CPI-indexed) nonagricultural wage floor is not adjusted for the CPI
increase that results from the subsidy cut for low-income households, given that compensation is paid to this group.
This exception to indexing of the nonagricultural wage floor only applies to this simulation.with some savings induced by the lower maize price. As shown in Table 62, the
impact is moderate but positive according to all indicators except the wheat self-
sufficiency rate, which climbs from 47.5 percent to 53.5 percent as imports fall. How-
ever, the fall in the aggregate trade deficit is limited to 0.1 percent of GDP because
of the increase in maize imports. The government’s current surplus goes up by £E166
million, or 0.08 percent of GDP.
Wheat Producer Subsidies for Increased Self-Sufficiency
As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the goals of the Egyptian government is to increase
wheat self-sufficiency. In the absence of government controls on farmers’ crop
choice, the government’s primary means of raising domestic wheat production is to
improve incentives. In the following group of simulations, domestic farmers are paid
the per-unit subsidy for wheat (raising the price they receive to above the inter-
national level) that is required to reach alternative target self-sufficiency rates in 2.5
percent increments from 50 percent to 70 percent.63
The assumptions underlying the simulations and the results are summarized in
Tables 63 and 64, and in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. The subsidy increase (as a
percentage of GDP) needed to raise the self-sufficiency rate from 50 percent to 60
percent is 0.7 percent of GDP (raising the producer price, including the subsidy, by
28 percent), while the additional subsidy needed to raise the self-sufficiency rate fur-
ther to 70 percent amounts to 0.9 percent of GDP. Hence, under base-year conditions,
the marginal subsidy cost of increasing the wheat self-sufficiency rate is quite sub-
stantial—the subsidy payment needed for the 60 percent self-sufficiency target is
close to the value of total bread and flour subsidies in 1994/95. Moreover, according
to World Trade Organization rules, domestic support is limited to 10 percent of the
farmgate value of production. Given the production of wheat straw (representing
around 25 percent of the grain value in 1994), this would allow a maximum subsidy
of 12.5 percent per unit of grain produced (Konandreas and Greenfield 1997). Hence,
wheat price support aimed at anything but marginal changes in wheat self-sufficiency
would violate World Trade Organization rules.
The wheat subsidy policy leads to large changes in relative prices—prices in-
crease strongly for winter crops (competing with wheat for the same land) and for
food processing (since it uses crop products as intermediate inputs)—and large
changes in crop areas, especially in the winter (Figure 13). The increase in agricul-
tural factor incomes reflects that the policy boosts the value added of all agricultural
factors except animal capital (since this sector suffers from higher prices for fodder
inputs, especially berseem). Production, employment, and factor incomes outside
agriculture suffer when value added per unit of output declines as a result of higher
prices of inputs from agriculture.
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63 In practice, instead of paying a subsidy per unit produced, it may be administratively easier to pay a subsidy per
feddan planted in wheat. Although the microeconomic incentive structure would be different, the impact is likely to
be similar.The changes in factor incomes have a positive impact on the welfare of rural
households, since they depend heavily on agricultural incomes. Urban households,
by contrast, primarily rely on other sectors for their incomes and are negatively af-
fected. In addition, changes in household welfare depend on their consumption pat-
terns. As shown in Figure 12 and Table 65, the net results are welfare increases for
rural households and decreases for urban households. On the aggregate level, house-
hold welfare increases (by 0.4 percent for 60 percent self-sufficiency), with a trade-
off in the form of a decline in the government surplus (by 0.8 percent of GDP for 60
percent self-sufficiency).
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Table 63—Alternative bread and flour subsidy policies: Summary of results
BASE BFTAR BFCUT BFCUT-TC MAIFLR
(percentage change from BASEa)
Real GDP at factor cost (billions
of 1995 £E)a 187.13 −0.08 −0.13 −0.08 0.01
Agricultural factor incomes
(CPI-deflated, billions of 1995 £E) 27.25 −0.33 −0.78 −0.51 0.17
Nonagricultural factor incomes
(CPI-deflated, billions of 1995 £E) 159.88 −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.14
Welfare per capita (£E)b
Rural household
Low-income 918.24 0.01 −1.99 0.00 0.09
Middle-income 1,336.45 −1.37 −1.44 −1.37 0.10
Upper-income 3,005.21 −0.69 −0.80 −0.70 0.10
Urban household
Low-income 1,809.05 0.17 −1.76 0.00 0.09
Middle-income 2,122.12 −1.63 −1.53 −1.57 0.08
Upper-income 6,036.22 −0.60 −0.58 −0.57 0.09
All households 2,533.17 −0.70 −1.06 −0.70 0.09
(change from BASEc)
Food subsidy (percent of GDP)c 1.22 −0.54 −0.80 −0.80 −0.11
Government surplus (percent of GDP) 2.56 0.41 0.62 0.50 0.08
Merchandise trade deficit
(percent of GDP) 11.22 −0.08 −0.13 −0.11 −0.12
Unemployment rate
(percent of labor force) 20.00 0.18 0.28 0.17 −0.01
Wheat (grain + flour) self-sufficiency
rate (percent) 47.48 0.24 0.49 0.36 6.05
Wheat share of winter land area
(percent) 32.82 0.06 0.14 0.08 −0.01
a For example, real GDP at factor cost declines by 0.08 percent from BASE to BFTAR (from 187.130 to
187.031).
b For non-BASE columns, the compensating variation concept is used to measure welfare changes. See foot-
note 59 for details.
c For example, the food subsidy declines from 1.22 percent of GDP for BASE to 0.68 percent for BFTAR
(1.22 − 0.54 = 0.68).138
Table 64—Wheat producer subsidies for self-sufficiency: Parameter changes
SSW50 SSW60 SSW70
Wheat self-sufficiency rate (percent) 50 60 70
Notes: SSW50 = 50 percent self-sufficiency rate in wheat (grain + flour); SSW60 = 60 percent self-
sufficiency rate in wheat (grain + flour); and SSW70 = 70 percent self-sufficiency rate in wheat
(grain + flour).
Figure 12—Wheat subsidies for self-sufficiency: Household welfare and
subsidies

















Source: Compiled by the authors.












Figure 13—Wheat subsidies for self-sufficiency: Winter crop areas
Source: Compiled by the authors.International Wheat Prices and Domestic Wheat Policy
The level and variability of international wheat prices are major concerns to Egyp-
tian policymakers, in particular given a large import bill and the policy of keeping
subsidized bread and flour at fixed prices. Moreover, the effects of the policies sim-
ulated previously are influenced by international wheat prices. In this section, the
CGE model is used to simulate the impact of changes in international wheat and flour
prices under a subset of the settings covered above: the policies of 1994/95 (the
BASE scenario), full removal of bread and flour subsidies, partly maize-based sub-
sidized flour, and wheat producer subsidies generating a 60 percent self-sufficiency
rate. In addition, a tariff-based mechanism for limiting domestic price instability is
tested. The simulations and their results are summarized in Tables 66 and 67.
In a first set of simulations, the world prices of wheat and flour are increased by
30 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The price change for flour reflects the ap-
proximate share of wheat in flour production costs (assuming the prices of other in-
puts and factors do not change). After the mechanisms through which these inter-
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Table 65—Wheat producer subsidies for self-sufficiency: Summary of results
Indicator BASE SSW50 SSW60 SSW70
(percentage change from BASEa)
Real GDP at factor cost (billions of 1995 £E)a 187.13 0.02 0.04 −0.07
Agricultural factor incomes (CPI-deflated,
billions of 1995 £E) 27.25 1.81 9.72 19.90
Nonagricultural factor incomes (CPI-deflated,
billions of 1995 £E) 159.88 −0.23 −1.32 −2.79
Welfare per capita (£E)a
Rural household
Low-income 918.24 0.47 2.34 4.50
Middle-income 1,336.45 0.40 2.06 4.11
Upper-income 3,005.21 0.43 2.33 4.85
Urban household
Low-income 1,809.05 −0.09 −0.55 −1.24
Middle-income 2,122.12 −0.10 −0.62 −1.37
Upper-income 6,036.22 −0.11 −0.65 −1.40
All households 2,533.17 0.08 0.38 0.71
(change from BASEa)
Food subsidy (percent of GDP)a 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government surplus (percent of GDP) 2.56 −0.12 −0.75 −1.73
Merchandise trade deficit (percent of GDP) 11.22 −0.11 −0.50 −0.81
Unemployment rate (percent of labor force) 20.00 0.07 0.38 0.78
Wheat (grain + flour) self-sufficiency rate (percent) 47.48 2.52 12.52 22.52
Wheat share of winter land area (percent) 32.82 1.32 6.16 10.36
Wheat producer price (including subsidy)a 100.00 5.17 27.82 56.93
Wheat producer subsidy (percent of GDP) 0.00 0.11 0.71 1.63
a See Table 63 for explanation.national price increases affect the domestic economy have been analyzed, a second
set of simulations is used to provide a more general perspective by testing the con-
sequences of gradual international price changes from –30 percent to +30 percent for
wheat and –20 percent to +20 percent for flour.64
Base Scenario with Higher World Wheat Price (BASE+30)
In this scenario (BASE+30), the initial changes, increases in international wheat and
flour prices, are translated into equivalent increases in domestic prices. To maintain
a fixed real exchange rate in the face of an increase in international prices, the do-
mestic currency appreciates (for this and other scenarios with a rise in international
140
Table 66—Domestic policy and increased world wheat prices:
Parameter changes
BASE+30 BFCUT+30 MAIFLR+30 SSW60+30 FLXTAR+30












Wheat 30 30 30 30 30





Maize share in subsidized
flour 20
Notes: BASE+30 = 30 percent increase in wheat world price+basic policy; BFCUT+30 = 30 percent in-
crease in wheat world price +100 percent bread and flour subsidy cut; MAIFLR+30 = 30 percent
increase in wheat world price +20 percent maize flour; SSW60+30 = 30 percent increase in wheat
world price +60 percent wheat self-sufficiency rate; and FLXTAR+30 = 30 percent increase in
wheat world price +flexible wheat import tariff.
a Import price in foreign currency.
64 Sensitivity analysis indicates that, compared with the results reported in Table 66, rural households would do
slightly better (improvement in per capita welfare by 0.1–0.2 percent) if the elasticity of substitution in wheat pro-
duction is increased by 50 percent (the analysis uses a value of 0.3) or if trade-related elasticities are reduced by 50







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0prices). The government subsidy cost increases as it maintains fixed consumer prices
for subsidized bread and flour.
In response to this shift in incentives, wheat production expands while domestic
output levels decline and prices increase for crops competing with wheat. Non-
agricultural sectors are affected negatively by higher agricultural prices (as they re-
duce household purchasing power and raise the cost of intermediate inputs) and
increased real wages (since nonagricultural producer prices decline relative to CPI-
driven non-agricultural wages).
On the aggregate level, the final results are negative: there are declines in real
GDP (by 0.2 percent), the government surplus (by 0.3 percent of GDP), and house-
hold welfare (by 1.5 percent) while unemployment grows. The wheat self-sufficiency
rate increases sharply (from 47.5 percent to 61.7 percent), an indication of a strong
response in crop production to changed relative prices, facilitated by the fact that
lower household welfare reduces demand and prices for crops that compete with
wheat. In combination with the economic contraction (reducing imports), this leads
to a decline in the trade deficit relative to GDP. On a more disaggregated level, losses
are registered for all households except upper-income rural households who are
largely unaffected. The losses are more significant for urban households. The loss
for rural households is smaller since their loss as consumers is partly balanced by
gains on the production side (as they earn much of their incomes from agricultural
factors). The negative impact on upper-income rural households is minimal since
they benefit strongly from higher incomes from fixed crop factors (land and capital),
and depend less on animal incomes.
Consumer Subsidy Removal with Higher World Wheat Price (BFCUT+30)
The scenario BFCUT+30 combines the international price increases for wheat and
flour with removal of bread and flour subsidies for all household groups (the subsidy
policy change being identical to BFCUT). Compared with the preceding scenario
(BASE+30), the main difference is that most of the burden of higher international
prices, instead of being absorbed by the government, now directly affects the house-
holds. As a result, the government surplus is largely unaffected by the international
price changes (see scenario BFCUT in Table 63), while aggregate household welfare
falls strongly (to 3.2 percent below the BASE level). The wheat self-sufficiency rate
climbs slightly higher, to 62.4 percent, reflecting the combined impact of changes in
incentives for producers (higher wheat prices) and consumers (higher bread and flour
prices). Among the households, in both urban and rural areas, those with lower in-
comes suffer the most (that is, the regressive distributional impact of subsidy cuts is
reinforced by the international price hike).
Maize-Wheat Flour Mix with Higher World Wheat Price (MAIFLR+30)
The positive effects of shifting to the maize–wheat flour mix are more pronounced
when world wheat grain and flour prices increase (MAIFLR+30). The basic reason
142for the gains is that the cost advantage of substituting maize for wheat is amplified.
Compared with BASE+30, factor incomes and household welfare improve across the
board by around 0.2 percent. The increase in the government surplus and the decrease
in the merchandise trade deficit (both expressed as shares of GDP) are at around 0.2
percent of GDP. In terms of wheat self-sufficiency, the increases resulting from the
shift to maize–wheat flour (reducing domestic wheat consumption) and higher world
wheat prices (discouraging wheat consumption and encouraging wheat production)
are combined, raising the self-sufficiency rate to 70 percent.65
Subsidies for Higher Self-Sufficiency with Higher World Wheat Price
(SSW60+30)
Under base-year conditions, the subsidies needed to raise wheat self-sufficiency to
60 percent were substantial (corresponding to 0.8 percent of GDP; cf. SSW60 in
Table 65). Accordingly, the resulting changes in domestic incomes and prices were
also significant. This reflects that the subsidies were used to generate an outcome
that strongly deviated from the market outcome (a 47.5 percent self-sufficiency rate).
In contrast, with a 30 percent increase in the world wheat price under base-year con-
ditions, market mechanisms would on their own raise the wheat self-sufficiency rate
to a level slightly above 60 percent (compare BASE+30). Hence, under these condi-
tions, it would be expected that the additional subsidy (and the associated economic
repercussions) needed to raise self-sufficiency to 60 percent is much smaller.
This is confirmed for the next simulation, where a wheat price subsidy for pro-
ducers is used to generate a 60 percent self-sufficiency rate in a setting with a 30 per-
cent increase in world wheat prices (simulation SSW60+30). The subsidy turns into
a minor tax with predictable effects on factor incomes and household welfare. Com-
pared with BASE+30, nonagricultural factor incomes and urban household welfare
increased slightly, while agricultural factor incomes and rural household welfare de-
creased slightly. On the aggregate level, there is a negligible decline in household
welfare and the merchandise trade deficit, while the government budget surplus de-
cline (by 0.2 percent of GDP) is close to the additional spending on producer wheat
subsidies.
Tariff-Based Price Stabilization with Higher World Wheat Price (FLXTAR+30)
In the stylized simulation of price stabilization through flexible tariffs (FLX-
TAR+30), an approach that was discussed in Chapter 2, the increases in domestic
wheat and flour prices (incorporating the impact of the tariff change) are one-third
of the increases in world prices (the latter increase by 30 percent and 20 percent,
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65 The absolute levels of wheat production and the percentage changes in production and consumption in response
to higher world wheat prices are virtually identical for the BASE and MAIFLR scenarios. When the self-sufficiency
rate is computed, the MAIFLR scenario realizes a larger increase in the rate of self-sufficiency for an identical in-
crease in production because the denominator (total wheat consumption) is lower.respectively). This would be the outcome if a policy of using a three-year moving
average were followed in a setting where world wheat and flour prices remained un-
changed for two years and increased in the third year (Figure 14).66 Since the inter-
national price changes are reduced by two-thirds compared with BASE+30, most
economic indicators (including losses in real GDP and household welfare, as well as
the gain in the wheat self-sufficiency rate) are also reduced by two-thirds. The main
exceptions to this are the trade deficit and the government surplus. Since the gov-
ernment now is subsidizing imports, the deficit increases. The surplus does not
change significantly, since the tariff cuts (accompanied by a fall in tariff revenues)
lower market prices for wheat and flour (both imported and domestic), thereby
strongly reducing the explicit bread and flour subsidy. In effect, a substantial part of
the government subsidy burden is transferred to the agricultural producers, reducing
their gain from the international price rise.
The preceding simulations addressed the impact of increases in international
wheat and flour prices. A second set of simulations provides a more general per-
spective by testing the consequences of gradual international price changes from
–30 percent to +30 percent for wheat and –20 percent to +20 percent for flour. These
price changes are applied to four scenarios: the base case (BASE), full removal of
bread and flour subsidies (BFCUT), producer subsidies generating a 60 percent self-
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Figure 14—Wheat world price: Observed and three-year moving averages











Wheat subsidy (percent of GDP)
Rural welfare (percentage change from BASE)
Urban welfare (percentage change from BASE)
Source: IGC, World Grain Statistics (various years).
Note: Wheat world price is the price of No. 2 hard winter wheat, f.o.b. U.S. Gulf. 
66 For example, if international prices (in domestic currency, before tariffs and taxes) of a commodity in 1993–95
were 100 and in 1996 increased to 130, tariffs would, ceteris paribus, be lowered (possibly becoming negative, turn-
ing into an import subsidy) to limit the domestic price increase from 100 in 1995 to 110 in 1996 (the average of the
international prices in domestic currency in 1994–96).sufficiency rate (SSW60), and the tariff-mechanism for limiting domestic price in-
stability (FLXTAR).
The results, which generalize the above observations for a 30 percent increase in
the world wheat price, are summarized in Figures 15 through 18. Taking as the point
of departure the lowest world price, the results for the BASE scenario show that in-
creases in international prices lead to a substantial decline in the government surplus
(Figure 15) and significantly raise the wheat self-sufficiency rate (Figure 18), with a
slight decline in rural welfare (Figure 17) and a stronger decline in urban welfare
(Figure 16).
Compared with the BASE, BFCUT has a larger government surplus (since spend-
ing on food subsidies is lower), a slightly higher self-sufficiency rate (consumption
of wheat products is discouraged by the absence of bread and flour subsidies), and
lower rural and urban welfare (as household purchasing power is hurt by the subsidy
cuts). The differences compared with the BASE tend to be fairly small, especially
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Figure 15—World wheat prices and changes in the government surplus
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Figure 16—World wheat prices and urban household welfare
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SSWfor wheat self-sufficiency, but are more pronounced the higher the level of the world
wheat price. Overall, the scenario BFCUT sacrifices household welfare for a larger
government surplus and a higher self-sufficiency rate.
The scenario SSW60 maintains a 60 percent self-sufficiency rate by subsidizing
producer prices at a substantial budgetary cost—its budget surplus is lower than for
any other scenario until the increase in the world wheat price is 26 percent, at which
point the scenario is identical to BASE, since no subsidy is paid. Until this point, the
subsidy supports agricultural incomes and rural welfare while having a negative im-
pact (although much smaller in percentage terms) on nonagricultural incomes and
urban welfare. The further the world price increase deviates from 26 percent, the
larger the difference between SSW60 and other scenarios.
Finally, according to these indicators in the figures, FLXTAR significantly damp-
ens the effects of international price instability on the domestic economy. The only
exception is the current government surplus. The changes in this indicator are simi-
146
Figure 17—World wheat prices and rural household welfare
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Figure 18—World wheat prices and changes in the wheat self-sufficiency rate














SSWlar across the scenarios except for SSW; the level is higher for BFCUT. Compared
with BASE, the policies under FLXTAR lead to declining net tariff revenues when
the world wheat price increases. However, this is compensated for by lower costs of
bread and flour subsidies as the variable tariff keeps domestic wheat price increases
in check. The resulting implicit tax on agriculture is positively related to the wheat
world price; hence, it contributes to increased stability in agricultural incomes and
rural welfare.
Conclusion
After a gradual reduction in the food subsidy program since the early 1980s, the
budgetary cost of bread and flour subsidies is now a more modest share of GDP (0.8
percent), while the budget deficit has been brought under control. This gives the gov-
ernment the opportunity to continue its gradual approach to subsidy reform, draw-
ing on accumulating evidence on the impact of alternative reforms on different parts
of the population. Given the priority attached to the protection of poor groups, it may
be desirable to avoid a general removal of bread and flour subsidies in the absence
of any alternative, effective social safety net. Nevertheless, improved subsidy tar-
geting and the introduction of less-distorting forms of support to poor households
would eliminate the ostensible need for government intervention in the wheat mar-
keting sector, thereby raising economic efficiency and freeing government resources
for more productive uses.
To the extent that the government wishes to reduce the transmission of fluctua-
tions in world wheat prices to the domestic economy, a system of flexible tariffs
would be compatible with reliance on market forces and an important private sector
role in different areas, including grain trade. However, this scheme would require a
renegotiation of Egypt’s World Trade Organization tariff bounds for wheat grain and
flour. The need for domestic price stabilization would be stronger if bread and flour
subsidies were reduced. Over time, poverty reduction, the establishment of an ef-
fective social safety net, and the development of forward markets for wheat products
would reduce the need for government price stabilization policies.
Using producer subsidies to increase wheat self-sufficiency rates in excess of what
is generated by the market would be costly and is limited by World Trade Organiza-
tion rules. However, the organization’s rules do not limit public spending on “general
services,” including agricultural research, extension, and infrastructure—which may
boost yields, raise farmer incomes, and reduce the agricultural trade deficit.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
I
n 1987, the government of Egypt initiated market reforms in the agricultural sec-
tor to boost domestic production and reverse stagnation in the agricultural econ-
omy. This was followed in 1991 by structural adjustment and stabilization programs
to reduce macroeconomic imbalances and convert Egypt from a state-controlled into
a more market-oriented economy.
The objectives of this study are to analyze the structure and performance of the
wheat marketing sector following the reforms in Egypt’s economy and to evaluate
the economywide impacts of alternative wheat policy scenarios. The study is based
on market surveys of wheat producers, traders, and millers; an analysis of wheat




The wheat production sector in Egypt has undergone many changes since the be-
ginning of the market reform programs in 1987. The removal of minimum wheat-
area requirements, the elimination of compulsory delivery of wheat quotas, and the
liberalization of producer prices have increased the profitability of wheat-based crop
rotations and has led to the adoption of higher-yielding varieties and modern pro-
duction technology. The result has been substantial growth in wheat crop area and
yields, causing wheat production to increase from 1.9 million metric tons in 1986 to
about 6 million metric tons in 1998, or 46 percent of total consumption. Furthermore,
the quantity of domestic wheat procured by the government for its baladi flour and
bread subsidy program has increased from less than 0.1 million metric tons in 1986
to 1.8 million metric tons in 1998. However, the continued growth in domestic con-
sumption has kept wheat imports in the range of 6 to 7 million metric tons per year.
The partial liberalization of wheat grain marketing has also increased the partici-
pation of the private sector in wheat trading and resulted in more competitive markets.
Because the private sector is more flexible than the government and responds more
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Conclusions and Policy Implicationsquickly to changes in market conditions, this has contributed to stabilizing markets by
reducing price volatility, seasonality, and intertemporal price swings. While domestic
wheat prices in Egypt exhibited more instability than international prices before the
reforms in 1987, they are now less unstable than the latter. Market integration has also
improved because of better transmission of price signals and a less-restricted flow of
wheat between surplus and deficit regions. Furthermore, while price spreads before the
reforms did not reflect underlying marketing costs because of government subsidies,
they now better represent the costs of transport, storage, and processing activities.
The liberalization of the fino flour market has induced new private investments
in wheat milling. Starting in 1996, many new, modern, and more efficient mills have
been built by the private sector. Public milling companies have also been partially
privatized and have renovated and upgraded their facilities. This has resulted in
greater domestic wheat flour production and reduced wheat flour imports. Conse-
quently, although consumer fino flour prices are no longer subsidized, they have
fallen sharply soon after liberalization because of increased competition in the fino
flour milling sector.
Remaining Constraints
Despite these achievements, the performance of the wheat marketing sector in Egypt
is limited by several constraints. All production, transportation, and distribution of
baladiflour are under state control. Baladiflour and bread consumer prices are heav-
ily subsidized. The government prohibits the use of domestically grown wheat grain
for the transformation into fino flour and does not allow sale of imported wheat in
grain form. Owing to balance-of-payment concerns and political considerations, pro-
curement of domestic wheat by the government is favored over imported wheat. This
increases the pressure on local officials to deliver larger quantities of wheat to the
government and encourages some of them to restrict the movement of wheat outside
their localities.
These restrictions have repercussions on the activities of the private sector. The
wheat traders’ survey indicates that the response to liberalization has been charac-
terized more by the entry of new traders rather than the expansion of existing ones.
It seems that private traders are hesitant to expand their activities in the wheat mar-
keting sector beyond the entry level. For instance, despite low transport costs, non-
excessive interest rates, and storage costs that are below the observed temporal price
spreads, the surveyed traders tend to keep stocks for as little as one month and the
average distance between wheat purchase and sales areas is only about 20 kilome-
ters. The limited storage activities are consistent with the short-distance nature of
local trading and the observed low quantity of shipments, which tends to range be-
tween 3 and 5 metric tons. This hesitance to invest in wheat marketing is due to
several factors, including limited access to capital, regulations in several segments
of the wheat marketing sector, occasional restrictions imposed on intergovernorate
movement of domestic wheat, and a wheat policy environment that is politically sen-
sitive because wheat is considered a strategic food commodity.
149The market integration analysis reveals that local wheat markets are quite seg-
mented, even though the level of segmentation has declined since the 1987 reforms.
The estimated measure of market interdependence indicates that only a fraction of
price changes originating in individual markets is transmitted to neighboring mar-
kets, and that the transmission takes a relatively long time to occur. Overall, the level
of integration between wheat markets in Egypt is low in comparison with other de-
veloping countries and lower than would be expected given the level of infrastruc-
tural development in the country.
The milling sector still faces many challenges. Public mills suffer from excessive
and redundant labor and have higher per-unit labor costs than private mills. Fierce
competition between the public and private sectors has resulted in overcapacity in
the production of fino flour. The costs of overcapacity buildup will be borne by pri-
vate millers, since public mills are supported by the state budget even if they record
losses. Therefore, competition between the public and private sectors is not on a level
playing field, resulting in a crowding out of private investment and inefficient allo-
cation of state resources. The government’s unwillingness to relinquish this industry
to the private sector delays the transformation of many old and small mills into more
efficient and cost-effective technologies that can benefit from economies of scale.
Policy Simulations
The CGE analysis in this study shows the economywide impacts of alternative policy
options that the government may wish to adopt depending on its politico-economic
priorities and goals. In particular, three critical areas of wheat policy are addressed:
consumer subsidies on bread and flour, producer subsidies to raise self-sufficiency,
and responses of the domestic economy to changes in international wheat prices. The
following paragraphs summarize the findings from the CGE analysis.
Bread and Flour Consumer Subsidies. If the government is mainly interested in
reducing the costs of the baladi flour and bread consumer subsidy without affecting
the welfare of the poor, one option is to target the subsidy to low-income households.
This could be done by identifying the poorest third of the households in urban and
rural areas and targeting the subsidy toward them (see Ahmed et al. 1999b for an ap-
proach to food subsidy targeting in Egypt). In this scenario, subsidy spending would
be cut by about £E1 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) and current government surplus
would go up by £E0.9 billion (0.4 percent of GDP). Urban and rural welfare losses
for middle- and upper-income households would be small, around 1.5 and 0.6–0.7
percent, respectively.
An alternative option for protecting the poor is eliminating the subsidy and com-
pensating the poorest third of the households with cash transfers. This option results
in higher cuts in subsidy costs and greater government savings. However, it may be
more administratively difficult to implement. Complete removal of the subsidy with-
out compensation for the poor would result in the highest cost savings for the gov-
ernment. However, the negative impact on the welfare of the poor, which declines by
about 2 percent, reduces the political feasibility of this option.
150Mixing maize flour with wheat flour to reduce the costs of the baladi bread and
flour subsidy and the dependence on imported wheat does not lead to substantial cost
savings or reduction in the trade deficit. Maize is only 15 percent cheaper than wheat
and, in the absence of any immediate increases in maize yields or area, maize still
needs to be imported.
Wheat Producer Subsidies for Increased Self-Sufficiency. Subsidizing wheat
producer prices to achieve a higher rate of wheat self-sufficiency could be costly.
Raising the rate from 47.5 percent to 60 percent or 70 percent would involve subsidy
costs of £E1.5 billion and £E3.3 billion (0.7 and 1.6 percent of GDP), respectively,
and would be in excess of the level of product-specific subsidies permitted accord-
ing to the World Trade Organization agreement.
International Wheat Prices and Domestic Price Stability. The government may
wish to stabilize domestic wheat prices in the face of international price fluctuations.
It would be feasible to achieve this through a flexible import tariff that keeps the bor-
der price at a target level. Simulations with flexible tariffs, keeping domestic wheat
and flour prices at the level of a moving three-year average of international prices,
show that such a policy reduces the fluctuations in real household welfare and wheat
self-sufficiency by approximately two-thirds compared with when the world price
varies under the current fixed tariff system. At the same time, the variations in the
current government surplus are similar, with and without flexible tariffs because of
balancing changes in government revenues (from tariffs) and expenditures (on bread
and flour subsidies).
Policy Implications for Egypt
The results above suggest that the government could consider several policies to fur-
ther its reforms in the agricultural sector and promote sustainable economic growth
in Egypt. These policies can be grouped into four main categories: domestic wheat
procurement and self-sufficiency, design of the baladiflour and bread consumer sub-
sidy, domestic wheat price stability, and public and private roles in wheat marketing.
Domestic Wheat Procurement and Self-Sufficiency Targets
Although Egypt’s wheat production has grown substantially in recent years, the
government has problems reaching its wheat procurement targets. A recurring ques-
tion among policymakers is why such a small portion of national production is avail-
able for purchase by the government. The results of this study suggest that most of
the wheat produced is consumed in the rural areas. Given this, the costs of increas-
ing deliveries of domestic wheat to the government are considerable. To do so, the
government would have to subsidize wheat producer prices above international lev-
els, which could be costly. Furthermore, encouraging farmers to sell the wheat they
have set aside for home consumption will increase their purchases of subsidized bal-
adi flour and bread, resulting in a higher budgetary burden on the consumer sub-
sidy system.
151Wheat self-sufficiency is often cited as a goal of Egyptian wheat policy. This
study shows that achieving this goal using price policy would be costly and ill-
advised. Instead of subsidizing producer prices, the government would be better off
investing in research and infrastructure. Government investment into research for the
development of higher-yielding wheat varieties would not only increase wheat pro-
duction, farmer productivity, and farm income but should also help make more wheat
available for the baladi bread and flour subsidy program without increasing per-unit
subsidy costs. Furthermore, as Egyptian agriculture diversifies into the production
and export of higher-valued products, infrastructure investments would facilitate the
marketing and export of these commodities.
Design of the Baladi Bread and Flour Consumer Subsidy
The present constraints in the wheat marketing sector are tightly linked to the exist-
ing design of the baladibread and flour program. The subsidy system on baladiflour
bread is set up so that the subsidy is distributed at all levels of the wheat marketing
channels, including the milling, bread processing, and consumption levels. This sub-
sidization scheme prevents the complete liberalization of the wheat marketing sys-
tem. The policy implications of the general equilibrium analysis are that, given the
priority attached to the protection of poor groups, it may be desirable to avoid a gen-
eral removal of bread and flour subsidies in the absence of any alternative, effective
social safety net.
Therefore, without giving up its commitment to subsidizing bread prices for the
poor, Egypt can target the subsidy to baladi bread at the consumption level and re-
move all the restrictions at earlier stages in the process. Since the intent of the sub-
sidy is to provide a cheap source of bread for the poor, an alternative and less distor-
tionary option than the current universal price subsidy is to target the subsidy to
consumers most in need with the help of ration cards, coupons, or magnetic cards that
can be distributed to selected segments of the population. For example, the govern-
ment could distribute a predetermined number of ration cards to the poorest house-
holds. These ration cards can be used to buy a limited amount of bread at subsidized
prices from bakeries. Bakeries are then reimbursed the difference between the mar-
ket and the controlled price from the government on the basis of the number of ration
cards collected. In any of these programs, however, the political and administrative
costs and the feasibility of implementation need to be studied very carefully.
The advantage of targeting the subsidy to the poorest consumers is that it would
lead to potential savings in subsidy layouts. This study shows that, excluding the po-
tential added costs of administering the new subsidy scheme, targeting the subsidy
to the poorest third of the households would reduce subsidy costs by more than 50
percent. The negative welfare impacts on the middle- and high-income households
would be moderate. More important, targeting the subsidy would decrease the leak-
age of subsidized flour into the free market and enable the complete liberalization of
the wheat marketing and processing sectors, with a large potential for efficiency
gains.
152Domestic Price Stability
Results from the price analysis conducted in this study reveal that, before the reforms
in 1987, price control by the government did not lead to more stable markets; price
volatility decreased following the reforms and is now even lower than international
price levels. However, once the baladi bread and flour subsidy is eliminated, con-
cerns over the impact of price instability on poor consumers may increase. If the gov-
ernment wishes to reduce the effect of international fluctuations in wheat prices on
domestic wheat prices, it would be more effective and compatible with market forces
to use a flexible import tariff that keeps the border price at a target level. In the long
run, as Egypt’s economy grows and develops, the private sector’s use of forward
markets and appropriate safety nets for the poor would reduce the need for state in-
tervention in price stabilization policies.
Public and Private Roles in Wheat Marketing
Presently in Egypt, the public and private sectors are both involved in the marketing
and processing of wheat and flour. As mentioned above, the involvement of the pub-
lic sector in wheat imports, trading, and processing are linked to the baladiflour sub-
sidy program. However, experience elsewhere and in Egypt suggests that the private
sector is usually more efficient than the state in the provision of production, market-
ing, and trading activities. In the fino flour market, for example, the private sector
has proven that it can produce and market this product effectively. Given the post-
liberalization response of the private sector in the production and distribution of fino
flour, indications are strong that the private sector is sufficiently developed to take
over the marketing of baladi flour once all wheat grain and flour marketing restric-
tions are removed.
In most cases, state-owned enterprises have been shown to be inefficient and to
impose large budgetary burdens on the state. Therefore, in many countries under-
going market reform, these activities are increasingly being left to the private sector.
Privatizing and dismantling state-owned enterprises is a difficult task because of en-
trenched interests and its impact on unemployment. However, given their limited
budgetary resources, governments might well be advised to concentrate their spend-
ing on areas that create the highest social payoffs and that cannot be effectively pro-
vided by the private sector.
The areas where the government should play a role include:
• areas considered as public goods, such as agricultural research, extension, ru-
ral infrastructure, and a market information system—all of which can con-
tribute to increase agricultural productivity and income;
• redistribution measures or safety nets for the poor, or for those who may be
temporarily hurt by reforms; and
• provision of a legal and regulatory framework that facilitates private sector
investment, including a functioning judicial system, regulations concerning
market conduct (for example, antitrust law, contract law, consumer protection
153law, bankruptcy law, and property rights law), a system of commodity grad-
ing and standards, and supporting institutions or organizations that could pro-
vide credit to small farmers and traders.
Continued emphasis on policy formulation in these three areas is important as Egypt
seeks to accelerate growth and reduce poverty.
Policy Implications and Lessons for Other Countries
Many developing countries are currently in transition from a state-dominated to a
more market-oriented economy where the private sector is expected to play a domi-
nant role. Most of them are characterized by an agricultural sector where the state
intervened heavily in providing inputs to farmers, in procuring output at fixed prices,
and in controlling marketing and trade. These countries are now at a stage where their
governments would like to increase the production of their main staple crops, while
attempting to keep consumer prices low to protect the poor. The Egyptian experience
with wheat policy reform provides seven useful lessons for other developing coun-
tries undergoing similar types of reforms.
The first of these lessons is that producers and the private sector do respond to
changes in profit incentives, and often faster than the government expects them to.
Second, the fear that liberalization would lead to more unstable markets is not well
founded. The experience in Egypt indicates that, because the private sector is more
quick to respond to changes in market conditions, it contributes more effectively in
stabilizing prices and dampening market shocks. Third, the concern that eliminating
consumer subsidies always leads to higher consumer prices is not warranted. In-
creased competition and a more cost-effective private sector often result in a reduc-
tion in marketing margins and lower retail prices. Fourth, if governments are wor-
ried about the impact of international price fluctuations on domestic price stability,
many effective options are available which do not distort market mechanisms, in-
cluding a flexible tariff regime.
Fifth, the consequence of partial liberalization should be studied carefully. Con-
tinued state intervention in certain market segments reduces the investment potential
of the private sector. Evidence in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa shows that follow-
ing partial liberalization, entry of the private sector in small-scale trading—which
does not require a lot of investment—has been widespread. However, expansion into
more capital-intensive activities, such as storage and transport, has been much more
limited. This is partly because the private sector is hesitant to invest in a sector where
government control is still pervasive. In addition, partial liberalization often leads to
leakage of the controlled commodity into the free market. This is both costly and un-
dermines the goal of government intervention.
Sixth, when the objective of a commodity subsidy is to protect the consumer, it
is more efficient to target the subsidy directly at the consumption level rather than at
all stages of the commodity production and marketing channels. Seventh, increasing
self-sufficiency through producer price subsidies is usually costly. Current global-
ization trends are facilitating and reducing the cost of access to international com-
154modity markets. Therefore, countries should increasingly rely on international trade
to supplement domestic production. Furthermore, self-sufficiency does not guaran-
tee food security; the latter is more a function of income and access to markets. Gov-
ernments are better advised to focus on measures to promote food security rather than
food self-sufficiency.
Finally, supporting inefficient state-owned enterprises delays the implementation
of more cost-effective technologies and crowds out private sector investment. Inter-
national experience shows that production and trading activities are better left to the
private sector. The public sector should instead focus its resources on activities that
have positive externalities and that tend to be either not provided or are underfunded
by the private sector, such as research, extension, public market information, infra-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stratified Random Sampling Method
for the Egypt Wheat Producers Survey
T
he sample of 800 wheat farmers in the 1998 Egypt Wheat Producer Survey is
designed to be representative of farm households growing wheat in the 1997/98
agricultural season. It is a four-stage stratified random sample that relies, in part, on
lists of wheat farming households prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land
Reclamation (MALR).
In the first stage, 80 districts with probabilities proportional to wheat production
in 1997 were selected. As a result of this method, the sample does not include any
districts in governorates with little or no wheat production, such as Cairo, Port Said,
Suez, the Red Sea, and the Sinai governorates. Another result of this approach is that
districts with large wheat production (more than 486 thousand ardebs) were certain
to be selected. The largest wheat producing district—Atsa, in Fayoum—was selected
twice (Table 68).
Some adjustments in the selection process were made necessary by the nature of
the production data. First, the data listed wheat production in the region of Nubaria
as a separate category rather than according to the governorate and district. Thus, six
administrative zones of Nubaria were, for the purpose of the sampling, treated as six
districts. This adjustment may be beneficial in that it ensures that Nubaria, a new land
farming area, will be represented proportionally in the sample.
Second, with regard to wheat production on new land outside of Nubaria, Ma-
trouh, and New Valley, the data did not provide district-level figures but rather gov-
ernorate totals. For the purpose of sampling, this production was allocated among
districts in proportion to the old land production. Although not ideal, this adjustment
has little effect on the selection probabilities, because this unallocated wheat pro-
duction on new land accounted for just 4.7 percent of the total.
In the second stage, a number of “basin groups” were selected from each
district with probability proportional to the arable land area. This selection was car-
ried out by the Department of Sampling of the MALR as part of a larger survey
carried out during 1997/98. A “basin” (or hod) is a subdivision of the farmland in
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each village, and the basin groups were designed by the MALR to include 150–250
feddans of arable land.
In the third stage, two “basin groups” were selected from each district. One ex-
ception is the district of Atsa (Fayoum). Because Atsa was selected twice in the first
stage, four basin groups from this district were selected. In all districts, each basin
group was given equal probability of selection.
In the last stage, five wheat producing households were chosen from each selected
basin group, making use of a complete list of wheat farmers compiled by the MALR
as part of the larger survey. The households were selected with equal probability.
Three replacement households were also selected from each basin group in case one
or more of the five could not be interviewed.
Because each wheat farmer in Egypt did not have an equal probability of being
selected for the sample, weights must be applied in the data analysis. The weights
(also called expansion factors) are the inverse of the probability of selection. Thus,
if wheat farmers in a region were underrepresented in the sample, the weights com-
pensate for this by giving greater weight to these farms in the calculation of national
averages and percentages. Because the sample was selected in a four-stage process,
the calculation of the weighting factor involves four terms:
DP Ad Gd Hg W g = —— —— —– — ——
P d SAd SGd SHg
where
Wg = the weighting factor for basin group g in district d,
D = the number of districts selected,
P = total wheat production in Egypt,
Pd = wheat production in the selected district d,
Ad = total arable land in district d,
SAd = arable land in the MALR-selected basin groups of district d,
Gd = the total number of MALR-selected basin groups in district d,
SGd = the number of IFPRI-selected basin groups in district d,
Hg = the total number of households in basin group g, and
SHg = the number of selected households in basin group g.
The first term is a ratio of wheat production, because the probability of selecting
districts was proportional to wheat production. Similarly, the second term is a ratio
of areas, because MALR selected basin groups with probabilities proportional to
arable land area. The third and fourth terms are the inverse of the proportion of units
selected, reflecting the fact that the units (basin groups and households, respectively)

































































baladi bread bread made from 82 percent extraction (baladi) flour
baladi flour a coarse flour made by extracting 82 percent of wheat grain
CAPMAS Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (Cairo, Egypt)
CGE computable general equilibrium
CPI consumer price index
FIHC Food Industries Holding Company
fino bread bread made from 72 percent extraction (fino) flour
fino flour a refined flour that made by extracting 72 percent of wheat grain
GASC General Authority for Supply Commodities
GDP gross domestic product
HCRWM Holding Company for Rice and Wheat Mills
HCSMB Holding Company for Silos, Mills, and Bakeries
MALR Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation
MOTS Ministry of Trade and Supply
PBDAC Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit
SAM social accounting matrix
shami bread bread made from 76 percent extraction (shami) flour
shami flour a flour that is coarser than fino flour and finer than baladi flour, made
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